Razorback Cab of Fort Smith, Inc. v. Amon

Citations: 2016 Ark. App. 352; 498 S.W.3d 346; 2016 Ark. App. LEXIS 384Docket: CV-15-946

Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; August 24, 2016; Arkansas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Razorback Cab of Fort Smith, Inc. and Mark Nunez appeal a $50,000 judgment awarded to Danaye Amon following a car accident on January 15, 2013, at the intersection of Towson Avenue and Fresno Street in Fort Smith. Amon was driving north when Nunez, waiting to turn left, collided with her vehicle, which subsequently struck a railroad-crossing post. Amon experienced pain and underwent medical treatment, ultimately suing Razorback for negligence in September 2013. Razorback contended that Amon was partially at fault and that her injuries were either exaggerated or preexisting. After a two-day trial, the jury found Razorback wholly liable and awarded Amon damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and vehicle damage. 

Razorback argues that Amon's attorney made an improper "send-a-message" statement during closing arguments, which aimed to prompt the jury to impose punitive damages, despite no such damages being sought. Razorback objected to this statement, but the court did not provide the requested jury instruction to disregard it. Razorback's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied, leading to the current appeal. The court affirmed the judgment, emphasizing Razorback's significant burden to show grounds for reversal.

The circuit court holds broad discretion in overseeing counsel's closing arguments, with reversals only occurring in cases of manifest abuse of discretion, defined as acting without due consideration. In the current case, Amon’s counsel's remarks were found to align with the theme of holding Razorback accountable for the accident, rather than seeking punitive damages, which aligns with precedent that views arguments in their entirety. Regarding the exclusion of Dr. Vera Collins's deposition and redacted medical notes, the court admitted the notes while removing references to Amon's psychiatric treatment and alleged drug-seeking behavior. Amon's visit to Dr. Collins was for anxiety, and she did not seek pain medications related to the car accident. Dr. Collins, while suspecting drug-seeking behavior based on her notes and Amon's medical history, confirmed she had not treated Amon for pain. The court indicated that the unredacted notes could be admissible if Dr. Collins testified to clarify her comments.

Amon's counsel faced objections during a deposition with Dr. Collins, as the doctor’s attorney stated that Dr. Collins was not serving as an expert witness and would not review additional records or form opinions based on them. Razorback sought to introduce the deposition into evidence, but the court denied this due to the impediment of Amon's cross-examination by Dr. Collins's attorney. The court's discretion in evidentiary rulings is acknowledged, with reversals requiring a manifest abuse of that discretion or a showing of prejudice affecting a substantial right.

The court's decision to redact references to psychiatric issues and drug-seeking behavior in Dr. Collins's notes was upheld, as Amon's treatment was solely for chronic anxiety without seeking compensation for these issues. Moreover, Amon's previous medical records did not indicate drug-seeking behavior. The ruling also excluded Dr. Collins's deposition testimony, as the doctor had acted as both an expert and fact witness. Although Dr. Collins testified that Amon was drug-seeking, her attorney restricted further inquiry during cross-examination, limiting Amon’s ability to fully explore Dr. Collins's expert opinion. Razorback contended that Dr. Collins's testimony should have been admitted as a fact witness, arguing it raised questions about the relevance of Amon's medical bills related to the car accident; however, this evidence was already available through Dr. Collins's notes.

Amon's mid-April visit to the doctor indicated she was not suffering from specific physical ailments, and the exclusion of certain evidence was deemed non-prejudicial since similar evidence was presented from other sources. One of Amon's previous physicians, Dr. Weddle, noted a significant anxiety component in her pain complaints; however, Amon did not seek compensation for anxiety related to the accident. Amon's treatment with Dr. Collins was focused on long-standing anxiety issues, and Dr. Weddle’s notes were available for jury consideration regarding the nature of Amon's complaints.

During the trial, Amon's discovery requests became relevant when Dr. Silver, her pain-management specialist, testified. Razorback attempted to impeach Dr. Silver’s testimony using documents not disclosed to Amon during discovery, including prior disciplinary actions and disability assessments. The circuit court denied Razorback's use of these documents, ruling it was unfair since Amon had not been made aware of them in advance, thus finding no abuse of discretion in this decision. Razorback contended that the documents were public records, but the court emphasized the importance of discovery compliance.

Additionally, Razorback argued that the court improperly allowed Dr. Silver to provide an unsolicited explanation regarding a past ruling against him by the Arkansas Medical Board; however, the court maintained broad discretion over witness interrogation and did not reverse on this issue. Razorback also claimed that redactions in Dr. Collins’s notes hindered its ability to cross-examine Amon regarding her injuries, but this point had been previously addressed.

Razorback's request for a new trial was denied due to the absence of reversible errors. Razorback argued that Amon was partly at fault for the accident because she was driving the speed limit of forty miles per hour near a railroad crossing. They cited Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-51-201(d), which mandates reduced speeds at intersections or railway crossings. However, the jury could reasonably conclude that Razorback was solely responsible, as Nunez turned in front of Amon. Even if Amon's speed were considered a violation of the statute, such a violation is not automatically deemed negligence; it serves merely as evidence to be evaluated alongside other factors, as instructed to the jury.

Additionally, Razorback contended that the circuit court erred by not including a specific jury instruction regarding the reasonableness of speed under existing conditions. The court found this objection unfounded, stating that the matter was adequately covered by existing jury instructions which emphasized the duty of drivers to maintain a reasonable and prudent speed, particularly near intersections and railway crossings. Amon's motion to strike a portion of Razorback's reply brief was deemed moot, and the ruling was affirmed.