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MacK v. Anderson

Citations: 2016 MT 204; 384 Mont. 368; 380 P.3d 730Docket: DA 15-0600

Court: Montana Supreme Court; August 23, 2016; Montana; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Chriss and Carolyn Mack (Macks) filed a complaint against Jimmy Anderson, Glenda Anderson, Kristie Anderson, John Anderson, Glenda F. Anderson, and Rowdy Anderson (Andersons) in the Montana Supreme Court, appealing the findings of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court of Ravalli County. The District Court ruled that the Macks have the right to access and install a headgate at the point of diversion (POD) for Headgate No. 103 in South Burnt Fork Creek and permitted access along the Mack Ditch across the Andersons' property. The court also upheld a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and allowed the Macks to seek reasonable attorney fees and costs under 70-17-112, MCA. 

The Andersons raised several issues on appeal, questioning the District Court's jurisdiction regarding the merits of the dispute, the establishment or modification of the POD, and the right to a jury trial concerning the irrigation ditch crossing their property. The Macks own a 160-acre section adjacent to the Andersons, who own several smaller parcels. The Macks have fully adjudicated “high water” rights for their property, which are not contested in this case. After discovering a dam on the ditch that diverted water to a pond on the Andersons' property, the Macks sought legal action in May 2014, leading to the current proceedings.

On May 9, 2014, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued by Judge Haynes, preventing the Andersons from interfering with the Macks’ access to the Mack Ditch, ordered a show cause hearing for May 20, 2014, which was later vacated following a stipulation that the TRO remain in effect. On May 19, 2014, the court authorized Ms. Turek to commence maintenance on the Mack Ditch. During this work, Jimmy Anderson allegedly threatened Ms. Turek and her crew. On May 27, 2014, the Andersons filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting the Mack Ditch did not exist on their property, and also complained to the Bitterroot Conservation District regarding the Macks’ lack of a 310 permit for maintenance activities. The District ruled that the Macks needed a permit and required mitigation efforts, which the Andersons obstructed by placing gravel near the ditch's headgate.

Subsequent District Court hearings sought to determine if the Macks were entitled to a preliminary injunction. Evidence revealed discrepancies between the physical location of Headgate 103 and the legal descriptions in the Macks' Statement of Claim. The Macks provided documentation, including the 1978 Decree, to support their claim that the headgate's true location was misrepresented. Following these proceedings, the District Court, on September 16, 2015, granted the Macks a preliminary injunction, affirming their right to access the area for repairs and maintenance, while citing a likelihood of their success on the merits. The court also reserved judgment on attorney fees under 70-17-112, MCA. The Andersons subsequently appealed. 

The standards of review indicate that district courts have considerable discretion in granting injunctive relief, with appellate courts only intervening in cases of manifest abuse of discretion or incorrect legal conclusions.

The District Court's ruling on the merits of a dispute raised questions regarding its jurisdiction. Preliminary injunctions, governed by 27-19-201, MCA, can be granted under specific circumstances outlined in five disjunctive subsections, particularly subsections (1) and (2), which require showing entitlement to relief and potential irreparable injury from ongoing acts during litigation. An applicant must demonstrate a legitimate cause of action and likelihood of success on the merits, alongside establishing a prima facie case indicating potential irreparable harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until trial, defined as the last uncontested condition before the dispute.

The Andersons contested the District Court's findings, claiming it addressed the merits of the case beyond the preliminary injunction scope. The Macks countered that the Andersons did not cite any specific language indicating a merits determination and supported Judge Haynes' assertion that the court reserved judgment on the merits. The District Court conducted four hearings to assess the ditch easement and headgate location to determine the status quo. The inquiry was focused on whether the Macks had entitlement to the relief sought, particularly concerning water rights and delivery methods.

Despite the Andersons’ characterization of this inquiry as a final merits adjudication, the District Court's order indicated that its findings were not conclusive. The court expressed that it was likely the Macks would succeed in their claims and reasoned for this initial determination regarding prescriptive easement. The court established that the status quo to be maintained involved the Macks' ability to utilize their water rights through their historic diversion point and route, with a final merits determination pending as part of the ongoing proceedings.

The court found that the Macks sufficiently demonstrated their likelihood of success for an injunction, while reserving judgment on the case's ultimate issues. The Andersons failed to show any language in the court's order that evaluated the case's merits, focusing instead on their disagreement with the court's assessment of the status quo prior to the injunction. The District Court thoroughly reviewed evidence to establish this status quo, making appropriate findings without abusing its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

The Andersons contended that the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by altering the point of diversion (POD) for the disputed ditch, arguing the court overlooked the Water Court's exclusive authority over such matters. In contrast, the Macks asserted that the court did not change any diversion means or place of use. Notably, ditch rights are distinct property rights separate from water rights, with the Water Court having exclusive jurisdiction to interpret existing water rights, while district courts oversee water distribution related to previously adjudicated rights.

The District Court's role involved interpreting a 1978 Decree regarding the location of Headgate 103, a diversion point for the Macks' claimed rights. The Andersons presented evidence suggesting a different location for Headgate 103, which could undermine the Macks’ claims. However, after a thorough examination of evidence over four days, the District Court concluded that the 1978 Decree accurately depicted the Macks' claimed POD and rejected the Andersons' argument regarding the Statements of Claim. The court recognized an error in the Macks’ claims but deemed it inconsequential, indicating it had considered all evidence to ensure water distribution followed the 1978 Decree.

Ultimately, the District Court maintained respect for the Water Court's jurisdiction while fulfilling its duty to determine the necessity of a preliminary injunction to protect the Macks' ditch rights, highlighting the complexities faced by district courts in water distribution disputes.

The District Court did not infringe upon the Andersons' right to a jury trial regarding the irrigation ditch crossing their property. The Andersons claimed that the court's determination on the Mack Ditch's merits denied them this right. However, the court's Order explicitly stated that its findings were intended to maintain the status quo and that the parties' rights would ultimately be resolved at trial. The Order mandated the submission of status reports within 90 days and allowed for requests to set a trial date to permanently address any remaining contested issues. The court anticipated further litigation, including a final ruling on the Mack Ditch rights. Consequently, the claim that the Andersons' jury trial rights were usurped is unfounded, as the District Court correctly reserved the case's merits for jury determination. The findings made by the District Court were appropriate, and the preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion.