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Weitz Co. v. Hands, Inc.

Citations: 294 Neb. 215; 882 N.W.2d 659Docket: S-15-581

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court; July 22, 2016; Nebraska; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Weitz Company, LLC v. Hands, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed several legal principles related to equitable estoppel and contract law. The court affirmed that estoppel claims can arise in both legal and equitable contexts, and that appellate courts review factual issues de novo but may consider the trial court's observations of witness credibility. For promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate a promise that the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance, that such action occurred, and that enforcing the promise is necessary to avoid injustice. It was established that a promise's definiteness must be sufficient to show reasonable reliance, and trade usages can indicate foreseeability of reliance. 

Furthermore, the court ruled that a general contractor can rely on a subcontractor's bid even if a formal contract is pending. However, a contractor cannot impose onerous terms on a subcontractor while expecting them to adhere to an original bid. If a bid is excessively low, reasonable reliance may be questioned. The court noted that damages under promissory estoppel are not uniform but should reflect what justice demands, and plaintiffs must prove damages with reasonable certainty. Additionally, the election of remedies is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded. 

In this case, Weitz, the general contractor, relied on H&S's bid for plumbing and HVAC work. After H&S refused to honor its bid post-award, Weitz completed the project with other subcontractors at a higher cost. The trial court found H&S estopped from withdrawing its bid and calculated damages based on the difference between H&S's bid and the actual costs incurred by Weitz. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment and the damages awarded.

In 2011, the Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan) invited Weitz, among three other prequalified general contractors, to bid on a nursing facility project in Beatrice, Nebraska, based on established relationships and recommendations. Good Samaritan, a significant entity in the retirement living market, sought to foster a direct relationship with Weitz for ongoing projects without competitive bidding. The invitation to bid specified a deadline of 2 p.m. on August 30, 2011, included instructions allowing objections to proposed subcontractors, and mandated that bids could not be withdrawn for 60 days post-opening, with forfeiture of bid security for non-compliance, although Good Samaritan did not require bid securities due to prequalification.

On bid day, Weitz organized its bidding process by assigning leaders to different work categories, reviewing project specifications, and preparing a comprehensive scope checklist to manage subcontractor bids effectively. The process culminated in a bid day spreadsheet where bids were compiled, often finalized just before the deadline. Brian Mahlendorf, a Weitz project executive, noted that it was common for general contractors to depend on subcontractor bids, which are typically submitted shortly before the deadline.

H&S submitted a bid for plumbing and HVAC work on bid day, with a base bid of $2,430,600 and additional quotes for alternate work. A revised bid of $2,417,000 arrived too late for consideration. Mahlendorf and Kennedy assessed that H&S’s bid was reasonable despite being above Weitz's internal estimates, and they felt confident in H&S due to prior collaboration and the assumption that H&S had thoroughly reviewed its numbers.

Two prequalified general contractors indicated plans to utilize H&S for plumbing and HVAC services amid a weak construction market in 2011, where subcontractors were aggressively bidding low to secure work. Kennedy noted significant bid discrepancies, with a 15% difference between the lowest and second-lowest bids being common. Weitz incorporated H&S’s comprehensive and competitively priced bid of $2,430,600 into its own bid of $9.2 million to Good Samaritan, indicating a commitment to H&S as a primary subcontractor, despite an option for alternatives.

On September 1, 2011, Weitz received indications that Good Samaritan would select its bid, with final confirmation following on September 2. Mahlendorf informed H&S of Weitz’s successful bid and the intention to proceed with a contract, which typically established precise terms between Weitz and its subcontractors. Good Samaritan awarded Weitz the contract without vetoing H&S or any other subcontractors, despite retaining the right to do so.

However, H&S's owner, Hugh Sieck, testified that he had instructed his estimators not to submit a bid to Weitz due to prior negative experiences with the contractor's practice of "bid shopping," which he believed was more prevalent with Weitz than others.

John Sampson, a worker for a prequalified general contractor, contacted Sieck on bid day to suggest reviewing H&S' bid, noting a significant discrepancy compared to other subcontractors, though he did not specify the nature of the difference. He indicated that a 10-15% difference might prompt a review, but concerns arise with differences of 20-30%. Following this, Sieck instructed H&S' estimating team to retract their bid, but they mistakenly submitted it anyway. Believing H&S' bid had errors, Sieck ordered a search for mistakes. Lloyd Ness, responsible for the plumbing and piping bid, testified that Sieck was frustrated, feeling they had underbid. Ness refused to lie about alleged errors, leading to his resignation. Sieck denied asking him to deceive Weitz. Another estimator, Thomas Santillan, confirmed Sieck did not ask him to lie. Sieck ultimately identified a miscalculation in the shower installation costs and directed Santillan to inform Weitz of errors including a miscalculation and omitted travel time, totaling over $250,000. Santillan later determined the shower cost calculation was correct but maintained that travel costs were underestimated, noting further inaccuracies in the bid. 

During a meeting on September 9, 2011, Mahlendorf from Weitz expressed the need to finalize bids but disputed Sieck's recollection of the conversation, stating Weitz did not intend to shop H&S' bid. Despite H&S' bid being comprehensive, negotiations failed, and the estimated error grew to over $430,000. By October 2011, Weitz decided to work with other subcontractors, adhering to bidding documents that prohibited bid withdrawal or modification for 60 days, with the contract for Good Samaritan already in progress by the time the issues with H&S arose.

Weitz was compelled to continue with the project due to business considerations, as abandoning it would damage its reputation and future opportunities, particularly with prequalified general contractors like Good Samaritan Society. Kennedy emphasized the importance of maintaining bid integrity, while Mahlendorf noted that withdrawing could jeopardize relationships with both the design firm and the owner. After H&S withdrew from its bid, Weitz sought bids from other subcontractors, ultimately selecting Falcon and MMC based on their lowest costs, totaling $2,814,700 for plumbing and HVAC. Weitz calculated damages by subtracting H&S' base bid and optional work costs from the subcontract amounts, resulting in $292,492 in damages.

In its complaint, Weitz alleged breach of contract and promissory estoppel against H&S. The court ruled that no contract existed but enforced H&S' bid under promissory estoppel, granting Weitz damages. H&S contested the judgment, claiming the court erred in awarding damages for promissory estoppel instead of breach of contract and in not requiring Weitz to choose between its claims. The case's analysis noted that promissory estoppel is often used to bind subcontractors to their bids until a general contractor has had a reasonable time to accept them, referencing the precedent set in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.

In Nebraska, to establish a claim of promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a promise that the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance from the plaintiff, 2) that the promise did induce such action or forbearance, and 3) that enforcing the promise is necessary to prevent injustice. While the promise doesn’t need to be definite enough to support a unilateral contract, it must be sufficiently clear to show reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the plaintiff. 

In this case, H&S’ bid was deemed a promise that H&S should have foreseen would induce reliance from Weitz. H&S explicitly identified the work it proposed to undertake for the Good Samaritan project and sought consideration from the general contractors, indicating an expectation of reliance. Testimonies indicated that subcontractors typically anticipate general contractors relying on their bids, and the short timeframe of 15 minutes before the bid deadline further supported the foreseeability of Weitz's reliance. 

Weitz did rely on H&S’ bid, incorporating it into its own bid to Good Samaritan, as confirmed by various testimonies and a bid-day spreadsheet. Weitz’ total bid of $9.2 million included H&S’ base bid of $2,430,600, demonstrating a reasonable reliance consistent with industry practices. H&S contended that reliance was unreasonable due to the bidding documents allowing Good Samaritan to veto subcontractors, but this did not negate Weitz’s reliance, especially since Good Samaritan had not objected to any proposed subcontractors and typically did not exercise this right. The absence of significant evidence showing the likelihood of Good Samaritan rejecting H&S’ bid reinforced the reasonableness of Weitz’s reliance.

H&S' second argument, asserting Weitz' reliance on its bid was unreasonable due to a lack of a quotation hold period, is rejected. The court notes that general contractors typically rely on subcontractors’ bids without such provisions and finds no legal basis mandating that subcontractors must include them. H&S' reference case, permitting promissory estoppel only as a defense, is deemed an outlier. 

H&S' third argument claims Weitz' reliance was unreasonable because it could withdraw from the project without consequences. However, the court emphasizes that Weitz’ commitment to hold its bid open for 60 days was significant for its reputation and future business with Good Samaritan, especially given their mutual interests in the retirement living sector. Furthermore, Weitz' existing relationship with the project architect was at risk if it reneged.

In addressing H&S' fourth argument regarding Weitz’ attempt to accept bids under materially different terms, the court clarifies that a general contractor can reasonably rely on a subcontractor’s bid even when anticipating a formal subcontract with additional terms. The court distinguishes this from a scenario where a general contractor imposes onerous conditions that a subcontractor cannot reasonably be expected to accept, citing a relevant case to illustrate that reliance is unreasonable under such circumstances. Here, H&S' assertion about the subcontract terms is dismissed as it withdrew before any subcontract was sent.

Lastly, H&S argues Weitz should have recognized its bid was excessively low, indicating potential mistakes. Although the differences in scopes complicate direct comparisons, H&S' claim of its bid being "considerably lower" than competitors does not undermine Weitz’ reasonable reliance on the bid.

H&S’ bid was deemed reasonable for Weitz to rely upon, as it was higher than Weitz’s budget based on historical data, and the weak construction market in 2011 led to aggressive bidding. H&S submitted its bid to four prequalified general contractors, and two, including Weitz, accepted it without questioning its validity. The court found it necessary to enforce H&S' bid to prevent injustice, emphasizing that subcontractors should not be allowed to withdraw bids after general contractors have relied on them. H&S contended that enforcing its bid was unfair due to mistakes it made and accused Weitz of unethical bid shopping. However, evidence did not support claims of bid shopping during the project, as testimony indicated Weitz did not intend to shop H&S’ bid. Consequently, the court ruled that H&S’ bid was a promise on which Weitz reasonably relied, necessitating enforcement to uphold justice. 

Regarding damages, H&S disputed the awarded amount, arguing that the court incorrectly granted benefit of the bargain damages instead of reliance damages, claiming Weitz did not demonstrate damages with reasonable certainty. The court noted that no uniform damage measure applies in promissory estoppel cases, and the determination of damages should align with the need to prevent injustice, allowing for flexibility based on case specifics.

Damages in contract law are determined based on what justice requires, which can sometimes lead to reliance damages, as established in Rosnick v. Dinsmore. This case clarified that the "definiteness" requirement doesn't apply to promissory estoppel, allowing for damages that reflect justice rather than just the benefit of the bargain. Normally, damages are measured by the promisee’s reliance, but this isn't a strict limitation in every case. Remedial flexibility is essential in promissory estoppel due to its equitable nature, and different situations may necessitate varying damage measures.

In construction bidding disputes, courts typically assess the general contractor's damages as the difference between the original subcontractor's bid and what the contractor paid to replace them. The court upheld the measure of damages awarded to Weitz, indicating that it was just. H&S's claim that Weitz failed to prove damages with sufficient precision was rejected; the standard is reasonable certainty, not absolute proof. Furthermore, H&S forfeited its argument regarding Weitz needing to choose between contract and promissory estoppel claims, as the election of remedies must be explicitly pleaded.

In Weitz Co. v. Hands, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of Weitz on its promissory estoppel claim. The court found that H&S's bid constituted a promise that H&S should have anticipated Weitz would rely on, as is customary in the construction industry. Weitz's reliance was deemed reasonable, particularly as it incorporated H&S’s bid into its own proposal to the project owner. The court determined that enforcing H&S’s bid was necessary to prevent injustice. Additionally, the determination of Weitz's damages was upheld as correct. H&S's assertion of an election of remedies defense was not considered, as it was not specifically pleaded. Judge Miller-Lerman did not participate in the decision.