Trustgard Insurance Company v. Charles Herndon

Citations: 338 Ga. App. 347; 790 S.E.2d 115; 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 443Docket: A16A0585, A16A0861

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; July 14, 2016; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be received within ten days to be considered timely. In the case Trustgard Insurance Company v. Herndon, the shooting incident involving Charles Herndon and Vivian Welker occurred on April 11, 2013, resulting in Welker incurring approximately $55,000 in medical expenses. Trustgard denied coverage under its homeowner’s policy, citing exclusions for intentional and criminal acts, and subsequently sought a declaration of no liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Herndon and denied Trustgard's motion. Trustgard appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in these rulings.

The Court of Appeals of Georgia reviewed the evidence favorably for Herndon, establishing that he and Welker had a personal relationship and that Welker was at his property to collect money. An argument over the amount of money led to Herndon unintentionally shooting Welker while handling a gun, which he claimed was accidental. Welker also indicated the shooting was accidental during police inquiries. Herndon was charged with aggravated assault and battery but pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless conduct. The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders, indicating potential errors in the initial summary judgment decisions regarding the policy exclusions.

Welker filed a claim with Trustgard to recover medical expenses from a shooting, which Trustgard denied based on three policy exclusions: the Intentional Acts Exclusions and the Criminal Act Exclusion. The Intentional Acts Exclusions state that coverage does not apply to bodily injury caused by intentional acts or expected outcomes, while the Criminal Act Exclusion pertains to injuries arising from criminal acts committed by an insured person, regardless of any charges or convictions. 

Herndon sought summary judgment on the Intentional Acts Exclusions, which the trial court granted, concluding there was no evidence the shooting was intentional. Trustgard's motion for summary judgment under the Criminal Act Exclusion was denied due to lack of admissible evidence demonstrating the shooting was a criminal act. Shortly after, Herndon filed a second motion addressing the Criminal Act Exclusion, which the trial court also granted, excluding evidence of Herndon’s guilty plea.

Trustgard appealed both rulings. The trial court's First Order found that Herndon’s guilty plea was inadmissible because it was entered under Georgia's First Offender Act, which does not constitute a formal conviction. However, the appellate court clarified that guilty pleas, even under the First Offender Act, can be considered as admissions of guilt for the underlying offense. Thus, evidence of Herndon’s guilty plea was deemed admissible, potentially impacting the outcome of the Criminal Act Exclusion claim.

In Georgia, a guilty plea is considered an admission against interest and serves as prima facie evidence of the admitted facts. First offender treatment allows a defendant to have their record cleared after fulfilling terms, but does not prevent restrictions on civil rights during that period. Herndon was charged with aggravated assault and battery, and on January 6, 2014, he pleaded guilty to reckless conduct and several obstruction counts. He was sentenced as a first offender to 15 years probation. Citing Hasty v. Spruill, it is established that a guilty plea is an admission against interest. Prior cases have shown that a guilty plea, even under first offender treatment, can be used in civil cases to contradict a party's testimony. The trial court erred in excluding Herndon’s guilty plea as evidence, particularly as he argued against the applicability of the Criminal Act Exclusion despite admitting to a crime with his plea. After considering Herndon’s guilty plea, the court found no evidence rebutting it, leading to a determination that the trial court should have granted Trustgard’s motion for summary judgment based on the Criminal Act Exclusion. Previous cases also illustrate that contradictions between prior guilty pleas and later testimonies must be reconciled to avoid undermining the integrity of the plea.

Herndon's affidavit and Welker's testimony, asserting that the shooting was accidental, do not counteract Herndon's admission of criminal conduct related to the incident. Herndon failed to mention his guilty plea in the affidavit and did not provide evidence to contest its validity. Furthermore, he did not clarify why the Criminal Act Exclusion should not apply given his guilty plea. The trial court's denial of summary judgment to Trustgard under this exclusion is reversed. Trustgard's argument for summary judgment under the Intentional Acts Exclusions is rendered unnecessary due to this ruling. In a related appeal, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Herndon is also reversed, as the Criminal Act Exclusion applies regardless of the mens rea involved, including reckless conduct, which is classified as a crime under Georgia law. The case is remanded for the trial court to vacate the summary judgment for Herndon and to enter summary judgment in favor of Trustgard. Judgments are reversed, and cases are remanded with direction. McFadden, J. concurs; Miller, P. J. concurs in judgment only.