In re: Gary Baptiste

Citations: 828 F.3d 1337; 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12836; 2016 WL 3752118Docket: 16-13959-J

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; July 13, 2016; Federal Appellate Court

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Gary Baptiste has submitted a counseled application to the Eleventh Circuit seeking permission to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). He challenges his convictions for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime and conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, referencing the Supreme Court's rulings in *Johnson v. United States* and *Welch v. United States* regarding the constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause. This is Baptiste's second application on the same issue; his first was denied because the court found that his conviction was based on a drug trafficking crime rather than a violent crime, a conclusion Baptiste did not dispute at prior stages. The court reiterated that since the Johnson decision did not address drug trafficking definitions, Baptiste's reliance on it was misplaced. His current application is deemed essentially identical to the first, as it raises the same legal arguments and issues, despite including additional details disputing the characterization of his conviction. The federal habeas statute mandates dismissal of claims previously presented, which the court asserts applies in this case, reaffirming that a new application cannot proceed without certification under § 2244.

2244(b)(1) applies to petitions under 2254 for state prisoners, suggesting it should also extend to federal prisoners seeking to file repeated non-meritorious motions. Several circuit courts have interpreted 2244(b)(1) as applicable to federal prisoners under 2255, emphasizing that it would be unreasonable to allow federal prisoners to repeatedly file the same motions while barring state prisoners from doing so. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the cross-reference in 2255(h) to 2244 indicates that the same standards apply to federal habeas motions. The application of 2244(b)(1) prohibits the refiling of claims rejected in previous applications, as reinforced by cases such as Bennett and White. The statute mandates dismissal of repetitious filings, with the term "shall" indicating no discretion for the court to entertain such claims. Baptiste's claim, previously rejected, falls under this prohibition, necessitating dismissal. Additionally, his request essentially seeks reconsideration of a prior ruling, which is not permitted under the statute. Thus, Baptiste’s application for relief under Johnson must be dismissed based on both the repetitious nature of his claim and the statutory restrictions against reconsideration.

Orders are subject to review by the Court of Appeals, which may rehear decisions sua sponte, as established in cases like In re Lambrix and In re Byrd. However, the statute prohibits circumventing 2244(b)(3)(E) by allowing prisoners to file what are effectively motions for reconsideration under the guise of new applications. Even if not mandated by statute, the law-of-the-case doctrine compels adherence to prior rulings in ongoing cases unless specific exceptions apply. These exceptions include: 1) new substantial evidence from a subsequent trial, 2) a change in controlling law, or 3) a prior decision that was clearly erroneous and causes manifest injustice. In Baptiste’s case, previous decisions had already denied his application on substantive grounds, and he failed to demonstrate that any exceptions applied. He did not present new evidence, nor did he cite any legal precedent that would alter the outcome. His claim merely repeated previous arguments, asserting the prior ruling was incorrect without proving it was clearly erroneous. Consequently, Baptiste’s application for a second or successive motion under 2255 is denied.