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State v. Eric L. Loomis
Citations: 371 Wis. 2d 235; 2016 WI 68; 881 N.W.2d 749; 2016 Wisc. LEXIS 178Docket: 2015AP000157-CR
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; July 13, 2016; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The case involves Eric L. Loomis, who appeals the denial of his post-conviction motion for a resentencing hearing following the use of a COMPAS risk assessment tool during his sentencing. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin examines whether the use of this tool violates Loomis's due process rights, particularly due to its proprietary nature, which limits the ability of defendants to contest its scientific validity, and its consideration of gender in assessments. The court notes the broader context of the adoption of risk assessment tools in sentencing, driven by a commitment to reduce recidivism and promote public safety, as supported by the Conference of Chief Justices and the American Bar Association. It emphasizes the evolving nature of these tools and the necessity for the justice system to adapt to new research and data. Ultimately, the court affirms the circuit court's decision. Loomis challenges the circuit court's use of a COMPAS risk assessment during his sentencing, arguing it infringes on his due process rights and that the court improperly assumed the truth of the read-in charges. The court found that if the COMPAS assessment is utilized correctly, with appropriate limitations, it does not violate due process. The court noted that its reliance on the COMPAS scores was supported by other independent factors, indicating that it did not solely rely on the risk assessment to determine Loomis's suitability for community supervision. Additionally, the court correctly considered the read-in charges by adhering to recognized legal standards, thus affirming its decision to deny Loomis's motion for post-conviction relief for resentencing. In this case, Loomis was implicated as the driver in a drive-by shooting, facing five counts as a repeater, including serious charges like first-degree recklessly endangering safety and possession of a firearm by a felon. He pleaded guilty to two lesser charges — attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent — while the more severe counts were dismissed but read in for sentencing purposes. Following his plea, the circuit court mandated a presentence investigation, which included a COMPAS risk assessment. This assessment, created by Northpointe, Inc., is designed to aid the Department of Corrections in managing offenders and predicting recidivism based on the defendant's criminal history and an interview, ultimately generating risk scores for different types of recidivism. However, it does not provide a precise prediction of an individual's likelihood to reoffend, instead offering a comparative risk analysis. Loomis was assessed with high COMPAS risk scores indicating a substantial risk of recidivism, which were detailed in his Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report. The PSI emphasized that COMPAS scores should identify offenders for intervention and target specific risk factors, not determine sentencing severity or incarceration status. During sentencing, the State urged the circuit court to consider the COMPAS report, highlighting Loomis's high risks of violence and recidivism. The circuit court ultimately decided against probation, citing the seriousness of Loomis's crime and his history of supervision, supported by the COMPAS risk assessment. The court also addressed read-in charges, assuming their factual accuracy and considering them as aggravating factors in sentencing. Despite defense counsel's objections regarding the assumption of Loomis's involvement in the read-in offenses, the court referenced a Supreme Court decision that allowed read-in offenses to influence sentencing, explaining the implications and likelihood of a higher sentence due to these charges. Loomis acknowledged his understanding of this explanation. Loomis faced a maximum penalty of seventeen years and six months for two charges, and the court sentenced him within this limit after he entered a plea. He later filed a motion for post-conviction relief, seeking a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that the circuit court's use of a COMPAS risk assessment violated his due process rights and that it improperly assumed the truth of read-in charges. The circuit court held two hearings on this motion. During the first hearing, the court addressed Loomis's claim regarding the read-in charges and concluded it had applied the appropriate standard, denying the motion on that point. The court noted it found Loomis's explanation inconsistent with the facts, favoring the State's version during sentencing. At the second hearing, Loomis presented expert testimony from Dr. David Thompson, who criticized the use of COMPAS assessments for sentencing, arguing it could lead to overestimating an individual's risk and misinforming the court due to lack of contextual information about the assessment's comparison population. Despite this testimony, the circuit court maintained its position, stating the COMPAS assessment merely corroborated its findings and asserting it would have issued the same sentence regardless of the risk scores. Loomis appealed, with the court of appeals certifying the matter for review, specifically whether the circuit court's use of the COMPAS assessment violated Loomis's due process rights. This issue is evaluated as a question of law, with the reviewing court applying independent scrutiny. Sentencing decisions are assessed under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard, which considers whether the court provided a reasoned justification and relied on proper, relevant factors, with the burden on the defendant to demonstrate any misapplication of the law. A circuit court's discretionary sentencing decision is valid if grounded in factual records and applicable law. The defendant, Loomis, does not contest the use of the COMPAS risk assessment for non-sentencing decisions or its needs portion during sentencing; he only challenges the risk assessment component. Loomis argues that its use at sentencing infringes on due process rights for three reasons: it relies on potentially inaccurate information due to COMPAS's proprietary nature, it undermines individualized sentencing, and it incorporates gender biases. The court ultimately affirms the use of COMPAS at sentencing but emphasizes the need for limitations and caution to avoid due process issues. The discussion situates Loomis's arguments within the context of evidence-based sentencing evolution in Wisconsin, highlighting the state's commitment to such practices since the establishment of a subcommittee in 2004. In 2012, COMPAS was adopted as the statewide assessment tool for evaluating risk of pretrial misconduct and recidivism. Previous cases, notably State v. Samsa, sanctioned the use of COMPAS at sentencing but did not address the due process concerns raised here. The court reiterates that COMPAS is merely one tool and advises against ad hoc sentencing decisions, advocating for more comprehensive and accurate information to inform judicial decisions in the criminal justice system. Sentencing decisions are influenced by due process protections, which are distinct from those applicable to standard correctional decisions. Risk and needs assessment tools, originally designed for use within the Department of Corrections, are now being adapted for sentencing, which operates under different principles. Several states have enacted laws mandating that judges receive risk assessments and recidivism data during sentencing to help reduce recidivism, while others allow their use but do not require it. Critics of evidence-based sentencing argue that the limitations of risk assessment tools are often overlooked, warning that judges must be informed of these limitations to prevent misuse. The Department of Corrections acknowledges that risk scores should not dictate the severity of a sentence or the decision regarding an offender’s community supervision. In addressing Loomis's due process claim, the document highlights concerns regarding the COMPAS risk assessment, which Loomis argues violates his right to be sentenced based on accurate information due to its proprietary nature. He contends that this lack of transparency prevents him from challenging the validity of the assessment, thereby denying him full access to the information in the presentence investigation report (PSI). Citing Gardner v. Florida, it is established that defendants have a constitutional right to review and verify information used for sentencing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has ruled that denying a defendant access to the PSI is an erroneous exercise of discretion, as defendants are typically in the best position to contest inaccuracies. Loomis compares the proprietary nature of COMPAS to the PSI issues highlighted in previous cases, asserting that the lack of disclosure regarding how risk scores are determined undermines his right to challenge the information considered during sentencing. Loomis asserts his ability to challenge the COMPAS risk assessment but argues that he needs to review the weighting of factors and the methodology behind risk score calculations to fully verify its accuracy. Unlike the Gardner and Skaff cases, where defendants lacked the opportunity to contest evidence, Loomis has access to the COMPAS report and can challenge the risk scores based on the static factors it lists, such as his criminal history. The risk scores are largely derived from static information, with some dynamic variables, as outlined in Northpointe's 2015 Practitioner's Guide. Loomis had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the questions and data used in his assessment. Both the circuit court and Loomis had the same access to the risk assessment, enabling Loomis to argue against the accuracy of his scores. While he acknowledges the importance of being sentenced based on accurate information, he cites studies, including a 2007 CDCR study, which question the reliability of COMPAS as a risk assessment tool. This study found insufficient evidence supporting COMPAS's effectiveness in predicting recidivism and recommended against its use. The State recognizes that no risk assessment method is error-free. The State references a primer on COMPAS, indicating its predictive validity ranges from moderate scores of .50 to .73 across multiple studies. Some studies report higher internal consistency scores of .70 and re-test reliability scores between .70 and 1.0. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) published a 2010 validation report concluding that COMPAS is a reliable instrument, achieving a .70 score for general recidivism risk, while the violence risk scale did not meet this standard. Concerns are raised about potential racial bias in risk assessments, with findings suggesting COMPAS may classify minority offenders, particularly black defendants, as higher risk more frequently than their white counterparts. A specific analysis from Broward County, Florida, indicates black defendants are more likely to be misclassified as high-risk. Northpointe disputes these findings, yet the studies highlight significant racial disparities in risk assessments. Additionally, it is emphasized that risk assessment tools require ongoing monitoring and re-norming to maintain accuracy across changing populations. Due to these considerations, the use of COMPAS in sentencing should be approached with caution, alongside the already noted limitations. A presentence investigation (PSI) that includes a COMPAS risk assessment must inform the sentencing court of specific cautions: 1. The proprietary nature of COMPAS limits disclosure on how risk scores are calculated. 2. COMPAS compares defendants to a national sample, but lacks a validation study for Wisconsin's population. 3. Research suggests that COMPAS may disproportionately label minority offenders as higher risk for recidivism. 4. Risk assessment tools require ongoing monitoring and recalibration for accuracy due to demographic changes. Educating courts about these limitations allows for a better evaluation of the assessment's accuracy and relevance in sentencing decisions. The argument against COMPAS assessments being used for individualized sentencing is significant; using group data could lead to due process violations. COMPAS is designed to evaluate group behavior, akin to insurance risk assessments, potentially misclassifying individuals without violent histories as high-risk. The Department of Corrections (DOC) acknowledges that staff may disagree with COMPAS assessments in about 10% of cases due to unaccounted factors, suggesting the need for professional judgment in such instances. Judicial discretion is necessary when interpreting COMPAS scores alongside other relevant information. The use of COMPAS in sentencing, when combined with additional context, can enhance the information available to courts, aiding in the pursuit of individualized justice. The Indiana Supreme Court has similarly addressed the use of risk assessment tools in sentencing contexts. Assessment tools like COMPAS assist judges in evaluating various statutory sentencing factors, such as a defendant’s criminal history and potential for rehabilitation. However, concerns arise regarding their due process implications, as these tools rely on group data, identifying high-risk offender groups rather than individual risks. Circuit courts must heed this limitation when considering sentencing factors. Loomis challenges the inclusion of gender in COMPAS assessments, arguing it violates due process by potentially leading to biased sentencing. The State defends this practice, asserting that gender is necessary for statistical accuracy due to differing recidivism rates between men and women. Both parties acknowledge that statistical evidence shows men generally have higher recidivism and violent crime rates, but Loomis argues that reliance on such generalizations is unconstitutional, citing a Supreme Court case that struck down gender-based legal distinctions. State officials provided sociological justifications for a gender-based legal distinction; however, the Equal Protection Clause should not be undermined by generalizations about the drinking habits of groups. Loomis does not assert an equal protection claim but questions whether his due process rights are violated when a circuit court uses a COMPAS risk assessment that incorporates gender in sentencing. He misinterprets a precedent case, Harris, claiming sentencing based on gender is impermissible. In Harris, the defendant argued that his gender was unjustly penalized for being a stay-at-home father, but the court found that the sentence was based on valid factors unrelated to gender. The court determined that the use of gender in COMPAS assessments has a factual basis, as omitting gender could lead to inaccuracies in predicting recidivism risk. This inclusion, therefore, is not discriminatory but aims to enhance accuracy for both institutions and defendants. Additionally, the Harris decision stated that the defendant did not prove the court relied on gender in sentencing. The court had considered appropriate factors, including the severity of the crime and the defendant's character. Similarly, Loomis has not demonstrated that the circuit court relied on gender in his sentencing, as the court referenced multiple relevant factors, including the seriousness of the crime and Loomis's criminal history, along with the risk assessment results indicating a high risk of re-offending. The court must articulate how the components of a sentence align with sentencing objectives, referencing relevant factors such as the defendant's criminal history and behavior patterns. The use of the COMPAS risk assessment tool is deemed beneficial for the justice system, including defendants, as it does not violate due process rights. Specifically, the court outlines permissible uses of COMPAS at sentencing, which include: 1. Diverting low-risk offenders from prison to alternative options. 2. Assessing the ability to safely supervise offenders in the community. 3. Informing probation terms and conditions. COMPAS can help identify low-risk offenders for non-prison alternatives and assist in decisions regarding sentence suspension. It also aids in evaluating public safety risks and determining appropriate community supervision levels. The assessment may guide conditions such as reporting, drug testing, and treatment strategies. While COMPAS enhances judicial decision-making, it is one among multiple tools the court can use, allowing judges to selectively utilize parts of the assessment. Limitations on its use are acknowledged, as the Department of Corrections provides guidance on its application. Risk scores should not influence the severity of a sentence or the decision regarding an offender's incarceration, as emphasized by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC). Their first guiding principle states that risk and needs assessments should inform public safety considerations but not serve as aggravating or mitigating factors in sentencing. Additionally, these assessments should not be the primary determinant of an offender's ability to be safely supervised in the community, aligning with NCSC's second guiding principle. The Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in Malenchik reinforces this by clarifying that risk assessments are not meant to dictate sentence length but can aid in shaping how a sentence is served. The COMPAS risk assessment specifically targets treatment needs and recidivism risk rather than the multifaceted goals of sentencing, which include deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and segregation. Consequently, using risk assessments to determine sentence length is deemed inappropriate, as it does not align with the principles of blameworthiness and deterrence. Sentencing courts may consider COMPAS assessments with strict limitations: they cannot dictate incarceration decisions or sentence severity, nor can they be the sole factor in deciding community supervision capability. Courts must articulate additional factors beyond the COMPAS assessment that justify the imposed sentence, acknowledging that the assessment is merely one of many elements in the sentencing process. Presentence Investigation Reports (PSIs) that include COMPAS assessments must adhere to these guidelines. The excerpt outlines critical considerations regarding the use of COMPAS risk assessment scores in sentencing. It emphasizes that COMPAS, which was not originally designed for sentencing but rather for corrections-related decisions, has limitations and cautions that must be communicated to sentencing courts. The proprietary nature of COMPAS means that its methodology and the factors influencing risk scores are not publicly disclosed. Studies suggest that COMPAS may disproportionately classify minority offenders as high-risk, and there is no completed cross-validation study for Wisconsin's population, indicating potential inaccuracies. Sentencing courts must receive a written advisement detailing these limitations when a COMPAS assessment is included in a presentence investigation report, as mandated by Wisconsin law. The advisement should be updated regularly to reflect new data and research findings. In the case of Loomis, he contends that his due process rights were violated because the circuit court relied on the COMPAS assessment for sentencing. However, he does not dispute the sufficiency of other sentencing factors. The court found that the circuit was aware of the limitations of the COMPAS assessment, which should not dictate the severity of the sentence or determine an offender's ability to be supervised in the community. Ultimately, the court concludes that if COMPAS is used properly, awareness of its limitations does not infringe on due process rights. Sentencing courts are cautioned to carefully evaluate the weight of COMPAS risk scores to avoid potential due process violations. In this case, the circuit court acknowledged the COMPAS assessment during sentencing but assigned it minimal significance, stating that the same sentence would have been imposed without its consideration. The court used the COMPAS tool primarily to corroborate its evaluation of other sentencing factors, emphasizing the low probability of successful supervision and the serious nature of the crimes. The court also factored in the gravity of the offense, the defendant's criminal history, and public safety needs. Despite lacking awareness of the recommended cautions regarding COMPAS, the court's approach ensured that the scores did not unduly influence its sentencing decision. Consequently, the court determined that Loomis's due process rights were not violated. Additionally, Loomis contended that the circuit court improperly assigned excessive weight to read-in charges, mistakenly conflating them with dismissed charges and assuming their factual basis was accurate. The court referred to precedent clarifying that uncharged or unproven offenses can be considered in sentencing, regardless of the defendant's consent to read-in or dismiss the charges. A circuit court should acknowledge and discuss dismissed charges when sentencing, as they relate to a defendant's character and behavior. Open discussion aligns with the sentencing methodology from Gallion and allows defendants to contest these charges. Read-in charges, which may influence the sentence up to the maximum for the conviction, should also be considered, understanding their potential impact on sentencing. In this case, the circuit court initially misinterpreted the treatment of dismissed versus read-in charges but corrected its approach after reviewing relevant case law. During the plea hearing, the court clarified how it would evaluate these charges, allowing both sides to present their arguments. Ultimately, the court found the state's version of events more credible than Loomis's explanation. The circuit court effectively weighed the facts and applied appropriate legal standards regarding read-in charges, affirming that its actions were not an erroneous exercise of discretion. Additionally, the court's use of a COMPAS risk assessment in sentencing was deemed compliant with due process rights, leading to the affirmation of the circuit court's order. Chief Justice Roggensack concurred, emphasizing that while the court may consider COMPAS, it should not solely rely on it for sentencing decisions. The majority opinion's interchangeable use of "consider" and "rely" in relation to the COMPAS risk assessment tool could lead to misconceptions about its role in sentencing. At sentencing, a circuit court must focus on three key factors: the gravity of the offense, the offender's character, and public protection, as established in State v. Alexander (2015). Proper sentencing discretion requires an individualized approach based on case facts, and courts must articulate the factors considered and their impact on the sentence. Importantly, defendants have a due process right to avoid being sentenced based on improper factors such as race or gender. The circuit court's decisions are given a strong presumption of reasonableness, with oversight to ensure no irrelevant factors were considered. In this case, the circuit court appropriately referenced the COMPAS assessment in passing while detailing the primary factors and case facts that justified the sentence. Thus, the circuit court may consider the COMPAS risk assessment alongside other relevant factors during sentencing. The certified question addresses whether due process prohibits circuit courts from using COMPAS assessments during sentencing. The majority opinion concludes that when used properly, considering COMPAS does not violate a defendant's due process rights. However, the interchangeability of "consideration" and "rely" in the opinion may suggest that circuit courts are permitted to rely on COMPAS, which would infringe on due process protections. It is clarified that while consideration of COMPAS is acceptable, reliance on it to dictate sentencing is not. Justice Abrahamson concurs with the majority but emphasizes two key points: first, that circuit courts must provide a clear record detailing the reasoning behind their consideration of COMPAS, including its strengths and weaknesses; and second, that the court's lack of understanding of COMPAS hindered the proceedings, as evidenced by inadequate responses during oral arguments and the denial of Northpointe's request to file an amicus brief to provide context on COMPAS's accuracy and utility. She asserts that courts must critically evaluate the relevance of COMPAS or similar risk assessment tools when determining sentences. Risk assessment tools, such as COMPAS, have received mixed evaluations in both academic literature and public discourse. Former Attorney General Eric Holder supported their use for offender reentry planning but warned against their application in sentencing due to potential unintended consequences. He highlighted concerns that reliance on static and immutable factors—like education, socioeconomic status, or neighborhood—could compromise individualized justice, which aims for sentences tailored to the specific conduct of each defendant and the nature of their crime. These concerns are echoed in various studies that question the accuracy of COMPAS's recidivism predictions, particularly for violent offenses. Circuit courts must demonstrate awareness and consideration of these issues during sentencing, as part of their obligation to explain their discretionary decisions. Despite the pressures and limited resources faced by circuit courts, creating a record that addresses the strengths and limitations of evidence-based tools is essential. This practice encourages courts to stay informed about advancements in evidence-based decision-making and the characteristics of the tools they employ. Studies suggest that simpler models using basic static variables can perform comparably to COMPAS in predicting recidivism, and there is limited evidence supporting COMPAS's predictive validity. The excerpt highlights concerns regarding the COMPAS risk assessment tool's ability to evaluate criminogenic needs and changes over time. It references studies indicating COMPAS's recidivism scale has a predictive accuracy of 71%, with findings from researchers at Northpointe affirming its satisfactory predictive capabilities. The text discusses the implications of evidence-based decision-making in the judicial system, emphasizing the potential importance of amicus briefs in providing transparency and understanding in sentencing decisions. It notes the court's inconsistent approach to accepting amicus briefs, particularly in relation to Northpointe's proprietary interests in COMPAS, which it considers trade secrets. The absence of clear explanations for the court's acceptance or rejection of such briefs is criticized, suggesting that a more open approach could guide future submissions. The author expresses concurrence with the overall opinion while advocating for broader acceptance of amicus briefs to enhance judicial clarity.