Edward Hearn v. Anna Hearn (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 64A05-1504-DR-280

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; July 12, 2016; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Memorandum Decision, filed on July 12, 2016, in the Indiana Court of Appeals, addresses the appeal of Edward Hearn regarding rulings from the Porter Superior Court after the dissolution of his marriage to Anna Hearn. Following the approval of their divorce settlement in March 2010, which included terms about property division, spousal maintenance, child support, and attorney’s fees, both parties filed numerous motions concerning the implementation of this agreement. 

Key elements of the settlement included a provision where Edward would quit-claim his interest in a rental property to Anna, and upon fulfilling certain financial responsibilities, Anna would assume all related obligations. If Anna failed to fulfill these obligations, Edward had the right to cover the payments and receive credit from the sale proceeds. The settlement also required Edward to pay Anna $35,000 in attorney fees and $2,000 monthly in spousal maintenance for a year.

Despite the agreement, Edward continued to pay expenses on the Oak Street property without officially bringing them current, which would have transferred the financial responsibility to Anna. He deducted these payments from the spousal maintenance he owed, ultimately paying only $3,610.57 over the twelve months required.

From April 2010 to December 2012, both parties engaged in extensive litigation concerning the enforcement of the settlement terms, including disputes over maintenance and child support. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decisions on these issues, upholding the implementation of the settlement agreement.

Following extensive hearings from 2012 to 2014, the trial court issued an order addressing all motions, which included three key rulings challenged by Father on appeal. First, the court determined that Father's payments on the Oak Street property expenses did not reduce his maintenance arrearage, which exceeds $20,000. Second, it established Father's weekly child support obligation at $367 for 2014 and beyond. Lastly, the court ruled that Father owed $500 to Mother's attorney, James Daugherty, per their Agreed Dissolution Decree.

Father argued that his financial obligation to Mother should have included a credit for the Oak Street property expenses he paid after Mother began receiving rental income. He contended that, under their settlement agreement, he should have been entitled to the rents while covering the expenses. However, he conceded that Mother was the sole owner of the property and recognized her entitlement to the rents under Indiana law. Father asserted a different agreement allowing him to receive rents as long as he was responsible for expenses, referring specifically to a sentence in paragraph 20 of their settlement agreement. This sentence indicated that upon bringing mortgage and other expenses current, Mother would then take over financial responsibilities, which Father interpreted as permitting him to retain rents until expenses were fully paid.

The court, however, emphasized that contract interpretation should be considered in full context rather than isolating phrases. The overall wording of paragraph 20 undermined Father’s claim, as it did not stipulate that he could continue receiving rents while expenses were in arrears. The court pointed out that multiple sentences in the agreement clarified that Mother was to take full financial responsibility for the property without conditions tied to Father's payment status.

Father did not include specific parts of paragraph 20 in his brief, likely because they contradict his interpretation of the provision. The overall meaning of the paragraph indicates that Mother is the owner of the Oak Street property and entitled to receive rents under Indiana law, regardless of Father's timely payment of expenses. The trial court correctly interpreted this provision. Additionally, the court ordered Father to pay $25,000 of Mother's attorney fees due to various issues related to the Oak Street property. Father argues that if the ruling on the property is reversed, the attorney fee award should also be reversed; however, since the property ruling is affirmed, the fee award does not need to be addressed.

Regarding child support, Father seeks a recalculation of his obligation set at $367 per week, partly based on Mother's claimed weekly child-care expense of $175. Father contends that this figure is erroneous as it contradicts Mother's prior IRS filings, where she reported much lower child-care expenses. He claims Mother should be "judicially estopped" from asserting the higher amounts. However, the court identifies three flaws in Father's argument: 

1. The judicial estoppel claim is incorrect because it pertains to inconsistent positions in judicial cases, while Father's argument involves inconsistencies between court claims and prior tax forms, which are not judicial proceedings.
   
2. Father failed to provide a complete record for appellate review, as he did not transcribe all necessary testimony and exhibits, leading to a waiver of his argument.

3. Even if the waiver did not apply, Father has not shown a direct inconsistency that would warrant judicial estoppel, distinguishing this case from the precedent he cites, where clear inconsistencies occurred in insurance claims.

Father failed to establish that Mother’s statement regarding her expenses of $200-$250 per week referred specifically to the years 2011 or 2013, as she could have been discussing expenses from other years, including 2010, 2012, or anticipated expenses for 2014 or 2015. Without a clear inconsistency, Father’s claim for judicial estoppel is rejected, and the trial court's child-support calculations are affirmed.

Regarding attorney fees, the trial court incorrectly stated that Father owed $500 to Attorney Daugherty under the settlement agreement, as Daugherty's representation began after the settlement was reached. However, the trial court subsequently ordered Father to pay this amount based on a post-settlement court order, which Father does not contest. Instead, he argues for reversal due to the misidentification of the obligation's source. The court ruled that this error was minor and did not affect the substantial rights of the parties; thus, the order for Father to pay $500 to Daugherty is upheld. The decision is affirmed.