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Com. v. Goslin, A.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1114 MDA 2015

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; July 6, 2016; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Andrew Josiah Goslin appeals pro se from a judgment of sentence of one year of probation for possessing a weapon on school property, following his conviction on June 2, 2015. The case originated with a complaint filed by the Commonwealth on November 19, 2014, after Pennsylvania State Trooper Kendra Kaley was called to Providence Elementary School regarding a prior incident involving Goslin's son possessing a knife at school.

During a bench trial, Principal Christina M. McLaughlin testified about an informal hearing held on September 4, 2014, where Goslin admitted to having a knife and forcefully placed it on the table, questioning whether he would be arrested for it. McLaughlin described the atmosphere as tense and noted that although Goslin did not point the knife at anyone, his demeanor felt threatening. The defense stipulated to Goslin's possession of the knife on school grounds.

Goslin testified that he carries a pocket knife for practical purposes, such as work and everyday tasks, and expressed disbelief that possessing a knife could be considered a criminal act. He indicated that his comments were intended to highlight the absurdity of the situation regarding the police involvement with his son for having a whittling knife. Ultimately, the court affirmed the conviction.

Appellant put away a knife after being informed by the assistant superintendent that he was violating school policy. During the trial, the court reviewed testimonies and closing arguments before delivering a guilty verdict, emphasizing the confusion surrounding the statute regarding weapons on school property. The court acknowledged the broader context of school safety policies and expressed understanding of Appellant's frustration with the situation. However, it clarified that the statute requires a distinction between bringing a weapon for lawful versus unlawful purposes. The court argued that while certain defenses exist for bringing weapons onto school property, Appellant's case did not meet those criteria, as the knife he carried was prohibited under the statute. Consequently, the court found Appellant guilty of violating Section 912(a) of the Crimes Code and sentenced him to one year of probation. Following this, Appellant filed a timely appeal, questioning whether the trial court appropriately interpreted "lawful purpose" under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 912(c). The appeal references guidance from the state Supreme Court on statutory construction, emphasizing the importance of the statute's clear language in discerning legislative intent.

The statute 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912 criminalizes the possession of weapons on school property, defining "weapon" broadly to include knives, firearms, and other implements capable of causing serious injury. A first-degree misdemeanor is established for individuals found with weapons in or around educational institutions, with a potential defense if the weapon is used for a lawful school activity or another lawful purpose. The Appellant acknowledged possessing a knife on school grounds but contended it was for an "other lawful purpose," arguing the term's vagueness should favor his case due to his lack of criminal intent. The Commonwealth argued that this term must align with the statute's broader intent, which is to safeguard public welfare and protect students from weapons. The court emphasized that Section 912 is not a strict liability offense and must be construed to avoid absurd outcomes while reflecting legislative intent. The court's analysis, focusing on specific statutory factors, underscored a commitment to enhancing school safety in response to historical instances of school violence, thereby highlighting the statute's purpose and necessity.

The Commonwealth's policy emphasizes school safety, illustrated by a case involving a school employee who was dismissed for unintentionally bringing a gun onto school property. An arbitrator reinstated the employee but recognized the significant implications of the situation for the school district and community. The arbitrator noted the gravity of weapons in schools, commending school districts for their role in preventing violence. Although the employee did not intend to violate the weapon prohibition, the case highlights the importance of adhering strictly to school safety policies.

The discussion includes the "other lawful purpose" exception in Section 912(c) of the law, clarifying that lawful possession of a firearm on school premises is only permitted during supervised activities or by individuals fulfilling their duties, such as security personnel. The trial court emphasized that any lawful purpose must be related to the individual's reason for being on school property; otherwise, it would undermine the statute's intent. The court concluded that the employee, being present as a parent without a legitimate purpose for possessing the weapon, could not invoke this exception. Accepting a broader interpretation of lawful purpose would contradict the legislature’s intent to prohibit weapons on school grounds and protect public welfare. Consequently, the court upheld the conviction for possession of a weapon on school property, affirming the judgment, with a dissenting opinion from Judge Dubow.