Glennis Rae Williams, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bruce Williams, and as Guardian Ad Litem for Robert Bruce Williams, Richard Ray Williams, Nancy Jo Williams, Vickie Marie Williams, and Mary Ann Williams, Minor Children v. West Jordan City, a Municipal Corporation, Robert Stockwell, Glendon H. Leak, Junias H. Burton, Clifton Treglown, Max A. Finlayson, John L. Price, David Schmidt and Judd Parr, Jointly and Severally in Their Public and Private Capacities

Citations: 714 F.2d 1017; 1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1744; 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3488; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25039Docket: 81-1330

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; August 10, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Glennis Rae Williams and her children as plaintiffs against West Jordan City and various officials, following the termination of Bruce Williams from his position as a police sergeant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed a district court's summary judgment favoring the defendants. Bruce Williams was suspended on August 1, 1978, after being confronted with misconduct allegations. He was subsequently given an opportunity to resign but refused and was fired on August 4, 1978. A written statement of charges was provided on August 7, and after appealing to the City Council, his termination was upheld.

Following Bruce Williams' death in 1979, the amended complaint named his wife and children as plaintiffs. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any property or liberty interest in Williams' employment, which is necessary for due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that a "legitimate claim of entitlement" existed based on the Utah Public Safety Retirement Act, the West Jordan City Personnel Manual, and an implied contract. However, the court found that property interests must arise from existing rules or understandings, which were not established in this case under Utah law. The plaintiffs did not assert an express contract or that a property right originated from a statute or ordinance.

The plaintiffs claim that the Utah Public Safety Retirement Act guarantees ongoing employment through retirement and death benefits for Williams and his family. However, the court finds no specific provision in the Act that creates a property right in continued employment; it only offers benefits contingent upon ongoing employment until retirement or death. The plaintiffs also reference a city-wide personnel manual and a police department manual, arguing they establish a property right through implied contracts. However, they fail to cite specific provisions that support this claim. The manuals outline procedures for dismissal, including grounds for immediate dismissal and rights to appeal, but do not establish a contractual right to employment. Additionally, Utah state law indicates that employment contracts without specified duration are generally considered terminable at will, offering no right of action for wrongful termination. The court defers to the district judge's interpretation of state law due to a lack of clear state precedent on the matter.

The district court determined that the personnel manual did not establish a property right under Utah law. Although the manual could be interpreted as entitling employees to continued employment unless discharged for cause, it could also be seen as merely outlining procedures for termination without granting any substantive rights. The court found no evidence to support the conclusion that the absence of formal adoption of the police manual negated the existence of a property interest, as informal rules and practices could suffice. However, the central issue—whether the police manual constituted an actual practice—was deemed immaterial for the summary judgment motion.

The court accepted for argument's sake that the police manual was an established policy but maintained that this did not create a property interest, given the prior finding regarding the personnel manual. The two manuals were largely similar, with the personnel manual providing a stronger argument for property rights due to its "dismiss for cause" clause. Consequently, the court concluded that the lack of property interest found in the personnel manual precluded a different finding for the police manual.

Additionally, the plaintiffs' claim of an "implied contract" based on a supposed de facto tenure system and other vague allegations was insufficient. They failed to specify any concrete understandings or representations that would support their assertion. Merely having expectations from years of service and promotions did not, on its own, establish a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Summary judgment was affirmed regarding the plaintiffs' liberty interest claim tied to Williams' termination. The district court found no due process protections existed related to a claimed liberty interest stemming from the firing. Even assuming such an interest did arise, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief. A due process hearing's purpose in liberty interest cases is to allow individuals the chance to refute charges and clear their names, not to regain employment. Since Williams did not contest the truth of the charges against him, a hearing was unnecessary. Citing *Codd v. Velger*, the court noted that without a challenge to the substantial truth of the allegations, there could be no claim for a due process violation. Williams admitted to the incidents leading to his dismissal but only disputed their sufficiency for termination. The absence of a property interest in continued employment meant that the reasons for non-rehire were not a constitutional issue. Additionally, Williams had already received a post-termination hearing, making further discussion of its sufficiency irrelevant. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate for the liberty claim due to the lack of any material factual dispute and affirmed the district court's judgment, deeming the other raised issues unnecessary for consideration.