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Robert S. Leiterman v. Ruth Rushen, Director, California Department of Corrections, Gary L. Barni v. Ruth Rushen, Director, California Department of Corrections

Citations: 704 F.2d 442; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28734Docket: 82-5088

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 18, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert S. Leiterman and Gary L. Barni, California parolees, appeal the dismissal of their habeas corpus petitions regarding their convictions, arguing that the police conduct during their arrest was excessively violent, warranting federal intervention. On June 2, 1978, police officers observed the suspects, along with Kenneth Wells, transferring large packages, which led to probable cause for arrest and search for marijuana. When plainclothes officers attempted to apprehend them, the suspects fled, resulting in gunfire that left one individual dead and Barni injured, while Leiterman escaped unharmed. Officers discovered 75 pounds of marijuana and $5,000 during the subsequent search.

At their state trial, Barni and Leiterman did not challenge the evidence based on police violence or the legality of the arrest, arguing solely a lack of probable cause. After conviction, they appealed to the California Court of Appeals, raising issues of excessive police violence violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights and ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court declined to address the due process claim due to its absence in trial proceedings and did not discuss the ineffective counsel issue. The petitioners exhausted all state remedies and subsequently sought federal relief in the United States District Court, which held a hearing but ultimately dismissed their petitions.

Petitioners contended that excessive police violence violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, warranting the invalidation of their state court convictions. Although the district court acknowledged the police violence as excessive, it ruled that this conduct did not compromise the trial's fairness, was supported by probable cause for arrest and search prior to the shooting, and did not reach the level of outrageousness necessary to overturn the convictions. 

While it was noted that extreme misconduct by law enforcement could undermine a conviction on due process grounds, no precedent was found that actually invalidated a state conviction based on such conduct unless it was directly linked to the conviction. The court referenced limited instances where federal convictions might be overturned due to outrageous government conduct, but noted that in this case, the misconduct involved local law enforcement. 

The court pointed out that although excessive police violence could potentially affect criminal jurisdiction, no such ruling had been established in precedent. The petitioners could have raised the issue of illegal arrest through timely motions in state court, but failed to do so, leaving unresolved questions about the implications of an illegal arrest on the state’s prosecutorial power. 

Furthermore, the court emphasized that not every error by defense counsel in a state trial justifies federal habeas relief. A procedural default, such as not making necessary pretrial motions or objections, requires the petitioner to demonstrate cause and actual prejudice to seek federal habeas relief.

The state argues that the trial court correctly denied relief due to a procedural default stemming from the failure to raise the issue of illegal arrest in state court, which lacked both cause and actual prejudice. The district court, however, identified cause based on counsel's inadvertence, noting counsel's failure to recognize the legal significance of known police violence. The district court also found prejudice, relying on Myers v. State of Washington. Despite this, the court concluded there was no "actual prejudice" because any illegality of the arrest did not impact the evidence used for conviction or the prosecution's decision. The petitioners claimed a significant due process violation but failed to demonstrate its causal relationship to their conviction. While police misconduct can lead to various claims, habeas corpus requires a direct causal link between the alleged constitutional violation and the conviction in question. The decision was affirmed.