Tyrone Perry v. J.W. Fairman and Tyrone Fahner, Carl D. Adams v. J.W. Fairman and Tyrone Fahner

Citations: 702 F.2d 119; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 29621Docket: 81-2479, 82-1630

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 16, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed two appeals concerning habeas corpus petitions dismissed by a district court for failure to exhaust state remedies. In Tyrone Perry's appeal (No. 81-2479), the court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that Illinois' post-conviction statute provides a meaningful remedy for the petitioner. Conversely, in Carl Adams' appeal (No. 82-1630), the court determined that the statute does not offer a meaningful remedy, vacating the dismissal and remanding the case for further proceedings.

The court highlighted the exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b), which mandates that a state remedy must be available before a federal habeas petition can be granted. This requirement aims to prevent conflicts between federal and state courts and to ensure that state courts can address constitutional claims adequately. The distinction between exhaustion and waiver doctrines was noted, emphasizing that exhaustion concerns currently available remedies, while waiver pertains to previously bypassed opportunities for state court review.

In the case of Carl Adams, who was convicted of multiple crimes, he raised five claims on appeal regarding trial errors, all of which were rejected by an Illinois appellate court. His subsequent habeas corpus petition reiterated these claims. The court's analysis focused on whether Illinois courts could still provide meaningful review of these claims.

The district court dismissed the petition under Rule 4 of Sec. 2254 cases, ruling that the petitioner, Adams, had not exhausted his state remedies because he did not pursue post-conviction remedies as outlined in the Illinois post-conviction statute (Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38 p 122-1). This statute allows imprisoned individuals to seek relief for substantial constitutional rights violations. However, pursuing this remedy may be unnecessary if it would be futile, as established in Duckworth v. Serrano. The Illinois courts have often deemed attempts at post-conviction relief as futile, particularly when issues have been resolved or waived in prior appeals, per People v. James.

The court noted that previous rulings, including United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, indicated that a petition for habeas corpus should only be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies if there is clear precedent suggesting the waiver and res judicata doctrines would be relaxed in the context of the prisoner's case. The court declined to mandate that all Illinois prisoners seek post-conviction relief, recognizing the futility of such efforts where claims were already decided or could have been raised in direct appeals.

In Adams' case, since the claims he raised in his federal petition were identical to those rejected by the Illinois appellate court, the res judicata doctrine would prevent reconsideration in a post-conviction context. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing his petition on the grounds of failing to seek relief under the Illinois post-conviction statute.

Tyrone Perry was convicted of murder in Illinois and sentenced to 14 years. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient for a murder conviction, suggesting it only supported voluntary manslaughter, but the Illinois appellate court upheld his conviction. Perry subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Court of Livingston County, which was dismissed due to the unavailability of habeas corpus for nonjurisdictional errors, with the option to seek relief under the Illinois post-conviction statute.

While a motion to reconsider the habeas dismissal was pending, Perry filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming denial of access to courts, lack of sentencing authority, failure to disclose favorable evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed this petition as unexhausted, primarily due to the pending motion in state court. However, the court indicated a reluctance to affirm based solely on the pending motion, especially since it appeared futile and was later withdrawn.

The district court's dismissal was instead supported by the Illinois courts' readiness to consider one of Perry's claims, specifically ineffective assistance of counsel. Although this claim was not raised on appeal, Illinois precedent allows for the relaxation of the waiver doctrine in such cases, permitting Perry to present this claim in a post-conviction proceeding due to the nature of the allegations involved, which typically extend beyond the trial record. This principle aligns with the recognition that ineffective assistance claims often require facts not included in the direct appeal record.

Perry's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel hinges on allegations beyond the trial record, asserting that his counsel failed to call favorable witnesses and utilize exculpatory evidence. This claim is actionable under the Illinois post-conviction statute, necessitating state court relief before seeking federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for the Sixth Amendment violation. The appellate court confirmed the dismissal of Perry's habeas corpus petition due to this unexhausted claim, aligning with the precedent set in Rose v. Lundy. In contrast, the court vacated the dismissal of Carl Adams' petition, indicating distinct treatment for each case. The appellate court noted a harmless error by the prosecutor in closing arguments regarding family members but refrained from commenting on the merits of Adams' claims. Additionally, while some Illinois cases suggest a waiver for failing to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, they do not address claims based on facts outside the trial record. The court acknowledged the potential for relaxed waiver under the Illinois post-conviction statute, advising Perry to combine his claims when filing in state court. The district court dismissed Perry's petition under Rule 4, citing a lack of exhausted state remedies related to his post-conviction options.

Petitioner Adams is eligible to seek post-conviction relief under the Illinois post-conviction statute, which allows any imprisoned individual asserting a substantial denial of constitutional rights during their conviction proceedings to file for relief. However, he is not required to do so if such efforts would be futile, as established in Duckworth v. Serrano. Illinois courts have interpreted the statute in a way that often renders post-conviction relief efforts futile, particularly when issues have been raised or could have been raised during prior appeals, as outlined in People v. James.

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that issues decided on appeal become res judicata, meaning they cannot be revisited in post-conviction proceedings unless there are exceptional circumstances. In the case of Adams, the claims he presents in his federal petition are identical to those rejected by the Illinois appellate court during his appeal, where each claim was decided on its merits. Therefore, Illinois law would invoke the res judicata doctrine to prevent reconsideration of these claims in a post-conviction context.

Additionally, there is no direct precedent suggesting that the res judicata doctrine would be relaxed in Adams' case. The district court's dismissal of Adams' petition on the grounds of not seeking relief through the Illinois post-conviction statute was deemed erroneous, considering he would likely face a preclusive barrier due to the prior appellate decision.

Tyrone Perry, convicted of murder and sentenced to 14 years in an Illinois court, appealed on grounds that the evidence was insufficient for his conviction and only supported voluntary manslaughter. The Illinois appellate court affirmed the conviction. Subsequently, Perry filed a habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Court of Livingston County, which was dismissed due to the unavailability of habeas corpus for nonjurisdictional errors, but without prejudice to seek relief under the Illinois post-conviction statute. While a motion to reconsider the dismissal was pending in state court, Perry initiated a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting claims of denied access to courts, lack of sentencing authority, failure to disclose favorable evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court dismissed the federal petition as unexhausted, citing the pending state motion. However, the appellate court noted that the futility of the reconsideration motion and its subsequent withdrawal did not prevent federal jurisdiction. It affirmed the dismissal based on the Illinois courts' readiness to consider at least one constitutional claim. Notably, although Perry did not raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal, precedent allowed for relaxation of waiver doctrine, permitting him to pursue this claim in state post-conviction proceedings due to the nature of such claims often involving facts outside the trial court record.

Claims based on allegations not included in the official record cannot be considered on direct appeal and are not waived, as established in *Goins v. People* and *People v. Dennis*. Perry's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relies on such external allegations, asserting that his trial counsel failed to call favorable witnesses and utilize exculpatory evidence. This claim falls under the Illinois post-conviction statute, necessitating that Perry seek state post-conviction relief before a federal court can address his Sixth Amendment claim. Due to at least one unexhausted claim in Perry's habeas corpus petition, it was correctly dismissed in line with *Rose v. Lundy*. Conversely, in the appeal of Carl Adams, the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Although the appellate court acknowledged a prosecutorial error regarding closing arguments in Adams' case, it deemed the error harmless. Some Illinois cases suggest that failing to raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal may constitute a waiver; however, these did not address claims based on facts outside the trial record. Given the precedent supporting post-conviction claims, it appears Perry has not exhausted state remedies. Additionally, another claim concerning prosecutors' failure to disclose favorable evidence also relies on facts outside the record, and while its exhaustion status is uncertain, it may benefit from a relaxed waiver doctrine under the Illinois post-conviction statute. Perry would be advised to consolidate this claim with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a state post-conviction petition.