Major D.M. Edwards, Cross-Appellant v. Lee P. Brown, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, Cross-Appellee

Citations: 699 F.2d 1073; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 29917Docket: 81-7841

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 6, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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An appeal was made regarding a summary judgment in favor of Major D.M. Edwards, a former officer of the Bureau of Police Services in Atlanta, against Commissioner Lee P. Brown. The trial court determined that, although the Commissioner had the authority to hire and fire officers, he could not terminate Edwards without a trial as mandated by Section 11-2031 of the City of Atlanta's Code of Ordinances. The central issue was whether this section or the constitutional due process clause entitles officers to a trial before discharge.

Edwards, who had a lengthy career in the Bureau, submitted a letter of resignation on December 10, 1979, which criticized the Bureau's operations. In response, Commissioner Brown removed Edwards from his position effective immediately, citing the authority granted under Section 11-2001 of the City Code. Edwards later attempted to retract his resignation and filed a grievance, which did not comply with the city’s grievance procedures. Brown ultimately ruled against Edwards' grievance.

Section 11-2001 allows the Commissioner to assign and remove personnel at will, without the need for competitive examinations. Upon removal, individuals are to return to their previous rank held prior to their assignment under that section.

The provision in question does not explicitly state that an employee can be completely discharged but allows for removal or transfer by the commissioner. The district court interpreted this as granting the commissioner the authority to terminate Edwards' position, leading to the conclusion that this action constituted a "discharge" requiring compliance with Section 11-2031 of the City Code. This section mandates that bureau directors and officers serve without fixed terms, contingent on good behavior and efficient service, and may only be discharged after a trial as prescribed by law or regulation. The trial court determined that Edwards could only be discharged following such a trial.

The appellant argues that Section 11-2031 restricts the commissioner's discharge authority to instances where applicable laws or regulations necessitate a trial. The appellant contends no regulations exist that require a trial for a deputy director of the Bureau of Police Services. For the appellant's interpretation to hold, evidence of a trial provision for other employees under the City's personnel regulations is needed. Brown references Section 11-1010, which outlines grievance procedures within the Bureau of Police Services, as a potential basis for such a requirement. This section details a specific process for grievances, culminating in the commissioner's decision, which differs based on the employee's sworn status. Sworn employees are informed that the commissioner's decision is not subject to further administrative appeal but may seek civil court remedies, while non-sworn employees can appeal to the civil service board. Copies of the final letters are distributed to relevant parties in both scenarios.

The grieving employee, being sworn, has different rights than a non-sworn employee, particularly regarding the appeal process through the civil service board, as outlined in Chapter XIX of the city's personnel regulations. This chapter allows representation during appeals, which Brown argues is relevant under Section 11-2031, indicating that non-sworn officers cannot be discharged without a trial. For a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, it is critical to demonstrate that Edwards' discharge constituted state action that denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The consensus among the parties is that Edwards must establish a property interest in his employment, which is defined by state law, supported by precedents such as Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann.

The trial court’s interpretation of Section 11-2031 as necessitating a trial for discharge is acknowledged, but the appellant's argument suggests that a trial is only mandated for those explicitly entitled to it by law or regulation. Thus, the ordinance does not, in itself, guarantee a trial. Nonetheless, under his employment terms, Edwards had a reasonable expectation of continued employment based on meeting standards of "good behavior and efficient service," which are to be evaluated by the commissioner or designee. The Fifth Circuit Court has established that civil employment with termination only "for cause" creates a constitutionally protected expectation of continued employment. Therefore, the conclusion is that Edwards could only be discharged for cause.

The ordinance grants the commissioner the authority to discharge employees for "good behavior and efficient service," with the power to determine the existence of these reasons. This provision suggests that the discharge can occur at the commissioner's discretion, comparable to an "at will" termination, as supported by Georgia case law. Consequently, Major Edwards did not possess a property interest in his position, and the trial court's ruling requiring a trial upon discharge was reversed. 

However, a dissenting opinion argues for a different interpretation of the ordinances, specifically section 11-2031, which governs the discharge of appointed employees and implies a right to challenge the commissioner's judgment through a trial process. The dissent highlights grievance procedures outlined in sections 11-1008, 1009, and 1010, which provide steps for employees to address grievances, culminating in a review by the commissioner. The final decision varies based on the employee's sworn or non-sworn status, with sworn employees advised that the commissioner's decision is not subject to further administrative appeal but can pursue civil court action independently. 

In summary, the majority concludes Edwards lacked a property right in his job and thus could be terminated without a formal hearing, while the dissent emphasizes procedural protections available to employees under the city's grievance framework. The final judgment was reversed and remanded to dismiss the complaint.

Non-sworn employees are informed that they can appeal the commissioner's decision regarding grievances to the civil service board under relevant civil service rules. Section 11-1010 of the Atlanta City Code is interpreted as the legal basis for trials mentioned in section 11-2031, providing non-sworn employees with a right to redress, while the majority opinion claims that sworn employees lack such a right. The dissent argues that sworn employees, like non-sworn employees, possess a vested interest in their jobs, suggesting that both should have access to trials or appeals. The court expresses confusion regarding what kind of trial was implied for Edwards, a sworn employee, since he was not entitled to the civil service board appeal available to non-sworn employees. The court relies on Fifth Circuit precedents unless overruled. Additionally, section 11-2034 outlines the commissioner's authority to discharge police bureau members in alignment with applicable rules, which apply to all sworn personnel. The commissioner is empowered to create rules for departmental operations, allowing for disciplinary actions, including dismissals for violations, subject to grievance procedures. Edwards, having filed a grievance after retracting his resignation, did not follow the city's grievance procedure, and the commissioner ruled against him without providing information on appealing to civil courts. There is no claim that Edwards is prevented from suing due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.