United States v. John T. Robinson

Citations: 698 F.2d 448; 225 U.S. App. D.C. 282; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27891Docket: 82-1247

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; January 4, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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John T. Robinson appeals his conviction for interstate transportation and sale of stolen property, contesting the legality of the government's electronic surveillance and investigative methods. The court, however, dismisses his arguments for reversal while emphasizing the necessity for strict adherence to statutory requirements governing electronic surveillance.

On February 19, 1981, District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson authorized the installation of an electronic listening device at 'Royal Carpet,' a second-hand shop linked to owner Joseph Martin, suspected of dealing in stolen goods. The application was sanctioned by Assistant Attorney General Sanford M. Litvack and the U.S. Attorney for D.C., Charles F.C. Ruff, following the necessary statutory provisions. Litvack had been specifically designated to authorize such applications by Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti prior to the arrival of Attorney General William French Smith, who revalidated Litvack’s designation on February 27.

On March 21, FBI agents observed Robinson entering the store while under surveillance. Agents overheard a transaction where Martin purchased jewelry from Robinson, instructing him to conceal the cash payment. Following this, Agent Christopher Kerr stopped Robinson upon his exit from the store, questioning him while other agents searched the premises, discovering the jewelry in Martin's coat lining and $250 in Robinson's socks. To maintain the secrecy of the surveillance, Robinson was not arrested but asked to visit the FBI office later, which he did not do. Subsequently, the jewelry was identified as belonging to a family whose home had been burglarized. The surveillance device remained operational until late that day, with the tape recordings sealed days later.

On March 26, FBI agents, including Kerr, executed an arrest warrant for Howard Parker at 600 Keefer Place, despite the homeowner's assertion that Parker was not present. The agents conducted a search and discovered Robinson lying on a bed with a stolen stamp album. Kerr, having previously encountered Robinson, escorted him outside, and Robinson agreed to visit the FBI office under the condition of being handcuffed to avoid appearing as a 'snitch.' After being read his Miranda rights at the office, Robinson confessed to a burglary before being formally arrested. 

On May 19, 1981, a grand jury indicted Robinson for interstate transportation of stolen property and for selling stolen goods. Robinson filed two motions to suppress evidence, arguing that the electronic surveillance procedures were not followed and that his arrest was illegal, rendering his confession involuntary. Judge Pratt denied both motions. Robinson was subsequently tried and found guilty, receiving a concurrent three-year sentence for each count. 

On appeal, Robinson raised four challenges: the government's failure to adhere to electronic surveillance procedures, the alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights during the arrest, the involuntariness of his confession, and the government's failure to prove an essential element of interstate transportation of stolen goods. The analysis begins with the standards for suppression regarding electronic surveillance, highlighting that not every procedural misstep warrants suppression unless it undermines the intent of the statutory requirements.

The court addressed the principles established in Supreme Court opinions related to the suppression of electronically obtained evidence, specifically referencing *United States v. Johnson*. The court concluded that violations of statutory requirements do not automatically warrant suppression if the government can show that the underlying purpose of the statute was achieved despite such violations. In evaluating the appellant's claims of unlawful interception of conversations, the court examined the authorization process outlined in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This statute stipulates that only the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General can authorize applications for electronic surveillance.

Assistant Attorney General Litvack was designated by then-Attorney General Civiletti on January 19, 1981, but Civiletti was succeeded by William French Smith on January 22, 1981. The core issue was whether Litvack's designation remained valid for an application submitted after Civiletti left office. The government contended that the earlier designation was sufficient and that requiring revalidation would disrupt Justice Department operations. However, the court emphasized that the authorization for electronic surveillance is tightly regulated and that Congress intended for only a limited number of officials to have this authority. Despite the appellant's objections, the court determined that Litvack's authorization complied with the statutory requirements, as he was a clearly identifiable, politically accountable official within the Department of Justice.

The court expresses concern regarding the Justice Department's lack of diligence in promptly revalidating outdated special designations, yet declines to overturn the District Court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress due to the relatively brief delay in revalidation and the adequate fulfillment of statutory purposes. The appellant argues that the affidavit supporting the government's request for a listening device was insufficient as it did not fully detail why other investigative methods were unlikely to succeed. However, the court finds the affidavit sufficiently detailed, explaining the necessity of the listening device to understand the illegal fencing operation, identify involved parties, and gather evidence of knowledge regarding the illicit activities. The court emphasizes that the affidavit must specifically demonstrate why traditional methods would fail in this case, and concludes that the government met its burden by detailing prior investigative efforts and their inadequacies. Additionally, the appellant claims that the evidence from the listening device should be suppressed due to a four-day delay in judicial sealing. The court dismisses this argument, referencing previous case law that indicates evidence demonstrating the tapes' protection from tampering would satisfy the government's obligation.

The government's justification for a four-day delay in a legal process is deemed barely adequate, attributed to the need for tape duplication for the prosecutor and the simultaneous preparation of a new wire intercept application. Although the delay was brief, it does not align with the strict statutory requirements, indicating that further toleration for such deficiencies is limited.

The legality of a police search and the appellant's arrest at 600 Keefer Place raises more complex issues regarding the appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy. On March 26, police entered the residence to execute an arrest warrant for Harold Parker, despite the homeowner denying Parker's presence and refusing entry. The search, which did not yield Parker but resulted in the appellant's arrest, is considered illegal under Steagald v. United States, which mandates that police cannot search a third party's home for a subject of an arrest warrant without a warrant. 

However, the protection of Fourth Amendment rights is personal, thus the exclusionary rule applies only if the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. The court explores whether the appellant, as an invited guest, could assert rights against the unlawful search of the host's home. It is recognized that a person may have sufficient interest in a non-home location to warrant Fourth Amendment protections. The Fifth Circuit's criteria for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy include factors such as possessory interest, the right to exclude others, subjective expectations of privacy, precautions taken to maintain privacy, and legitimacy of presence on the premises. A relevant case illustrates that an illegal alien using a house as a smuggling point had no reasonable expectation of privacy, thus a warrantless search did not violate his rights.

Appellant failed to demonstrate a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' regarding the Keefer Place home, where he was a guest amidst a chaotic environment used by multiple individuals. The lack of evidence regarding his duration of stay, living arrangements, or relationship with the owner undermines any claim of privacy, supporting the District Court's findings. Consequently, appellant cannot contest the legality of the search or his arrest.

Regarding the voluntariness of Robinson's confession at the FBI field office, the court assessed whether it was a product of free choice, as outlined in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. The confession must not be obtained through threats, violence, or improper influence. The totality of circumstances was considered, including Robinson's age (30), education (11th grade), and prior felony convictions, indicating he understood his Miranda rights. Robinson did not present evidence of coercive threats, only alleging that the government made promises about informing the prosecutor of his cooperation and potential release on bail. However, these promises did not constitute coercion sufficient to overpower his free will, as established by precedent. Thus, Robinson's confession was deemed voluntary, even in light of any plea bargain agreements.

Appellant contends that he believed he would not be arrested and charged on the day in question, based on FBI Agent Kerr's intention to delay the arrest, which was ultimately overruled by a superior officer. Appellant claims this promise was significant for him as it allowed time to arrange his personal affairs. However, it is deemed insufficient to negate his will, as it merely suggested a delay rather than an outright promise. The trial judge ruled the confession was voluntary despite these circumstances, and the court affirms this determination.

Regarding the value of the stolen goods, the appellant argues the government did not prove the property exceeded $5,000 in value, relying initially on Mrs. Ryan's testimony alone. Although the trial court initially found this testimony sufficient, it later permitted a jeweler's appraisal to be introduced post-verdict. The appellant claims the initial testimony was inadequate and the appraisal inadmissible. However, the court found no grounds to reverse the trial court's decision. The agreement for the stipulated non-jury trial indicated both parties expected the prosecutor could supplement the record, and the reopening of trials is within the trial court's discretion unless it prejudices the defendant's rights. Mrs. Ryan testified her stolen property was worth at least $12,000, and her testimony on objective market value is relevant. Furthermore, the jeweler's appraisal confirmed that the jewelry's value exceeded $6,000. Thus, the District Court reasonably inferred that the stolen property had a value over $5,000, despite procedural irregularities in evidence presentation.

The District Court's judgment is affirmed. Circuit Judge Mikva concurs, reiterating his previous stance from United States v. Johnson, where he argued that violations of key provisions in wiretapping statutes necessitate evidence suppression. However, in this case, the wiretap application received proper authorization from Assistant Attorney General Litvack, who was specifically designated under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). The Judge acknowledges that although the Department of Justice failed to renew Mr. Litvack's designation timely, this lapse does not warrant suppression of evidence here.

The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, prohibits using content from intercepted communications if disclosure violates the chapter. Under § 2518(10)(a), evidence may be suppressed if the communication was unlawfully intercepted, the authorization order is facially insufficient, or the interception did not conform to the authorization. In this case, only the first point is applicable. D.C. Code § 551(b) similarly mandates suppression under equivalent circumstances, and recent rulings confirm that "unlawfully intercepted" has the same meaning in both federal and D.C. statutes. Notably, Mr. Litvack's designation was renewed on February 27, addressing any concerns regarding the lapse.

Congress intended to limit the use of intercept authority through specific preconditions. The appellant argues that Mr. Litvack's involvement in a previously voted-out administration renders him non-responsive to the political process. However, this argument suggests that no official from a lame-duck administration could authorize electronic surveillance, which is an untenable conclusion. The appellant also challenges the compliance of an affidavit with D.C. Code Sec. 547(c)(3), which necessitates evidence that normal investigative methods have been attempted and failed, or would likely fail if attempted. Additionally, D.C. Code Sec. 551(b)(5) requires a satisfactory explanation for the absence of a seal, with any delay in sealing also needing justification to avoid suppression. It is assumed that the appellant's detention and subsequent request to report for interrogation qualify as an "arrest" under the Fourth Amendment. The court declines to address arguments regarding a specific arrest on March 21, as this issue was not preserved for appeal, and notes that there was sufficient probable cause for a warrantless arrest in a public space, as established by precedent.