Benedict Kudish, M.D. v. Robert E. Bradley, Executive Director of the Board of Registration and Discipline in Medicine

Citations: 698 F.2d 59; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 31058Docket: 82-1521

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; January 24, 1983; Federal Appellate Court

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Benedict Kudish, M.D., the plaintiff-appellant, was previously licensed to practice medicine in Massachusetts but faced seven criminal complaints for violations of the controlled substance law in 1978. As part of a plea bargain, Kudish agreed to resign from medical practice, which led to the criminal charges being placed on file without findings. He submitted an affidavit on May 16, 1978, stating his desire to resign and acknowledging the finality of this action, which the Board of Registration and Discipline in Medicine accepted on May 26, 1978, without holding any hearings.

Kudish subsequently applied multiple times for reinstatement, all of which were denied by the Board on the grounds that his resignation was final. The Board eventually issued an order preventing him from filing for reinstatement. Although Kudish claimed he acted under duress when resigning, the record shows no evidence of improper filing of charges, deception, or undue pressure beyond the normal stress of facing criminal charges. Massachusetts law grants the Board the authority to investigate and discipline physicians for misconduct, and its regulations specify that resignation under certain conditions results in the permanent loss of the right to practice medicine. The court emphasized that Kudish was entitled to a trial and the protections afforded by the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions before any revocation of his license could occur, and reiterated that there was no evidence of external coercion influencing his plea bargain.

A plaintiff was free to withdraw from a plea bargain before its acceptance, indicating that while the decision was not as trivial as choosing between dessert options, it was still a voluntary choice between perceived lesser evils. The plaintiff referenced Union Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission to argue that choices made under duress are not voluntary; however, this case is deemed unpersuasive because the railroad faced an extortionate fee that was illegally imposed. The plaintiff also claimed a denial of due process when the Board refused to hear his reinstatement petition, asserting that a medical license is a valuable property right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, since the plaintiff resigned, he forfeited his right to practice medicine and, consequently, any due process rights related to reinstatement. The finality of his resignation means there is no basis for re-evaluation of that decision. The regulation requiring finality is constitutional, and the Board holds the authority to enforce this requirement, ensuring that investigations and hearings occur while evidence and witness recollections are fresh. The judgment is affirmed, and the resignation process requires a written statement acknowledging the finality and irrevocability of the decision to resign.

Plaintiff's resignation was explicitly aligned with the regulatory language stating that resignation under specific conditions results in a permanent loss of the right to practice medicine. Although the plaintiff claims coercion, he was entitled to a trial and protections under both Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions before any potential revocation of his license. There is no evidence of external pressure influencing his plea bargain; he had the freedom to reject the bargain before its acceptance. While the plea bargain was not as simple as a choice between flavors, it was a considered decision between two undesirable outcomes. The plaintiff referenced Union Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission to support his claim of duress, but this case is not applicable as it involved illegal compulsion under distinctly different circumstances. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the Board denied him due process by not hearing his reinstatement petition, asserting that a medical license is a protected property right. However, since the plaintiff resigned, he no longer possesses the right to practice medicine, and his final resignation negates any due process claims regarding reinstatement.

Finality in an order or judgment does not violate due process, and the regulation mandating such finality is constitutional. Boards with disciplinary powers can require hearings for charges made and a charged party cannot unilaterally waive or indefinitely postpone the hearing without Board consent. If a charged individual requests no hearing, the Board can conditionally grant this request, provided that the resignation is final, as stipulated by the governing regulations. The necessity for finality is underscored by the public's interest in resolving allegations of illegal conduct promptly, ensuring that evidence is fresh and witnesses available. Allowing non-final resignations could complicate future reinstatement applications, potentially making it difficult to substantiate true charges due to the passage of time. Thus, the finality requirement is deemed reasonable, authoritative, fair, and constitutional. The judgment is affirmed.