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Barrie Deon Shelton v. Jack B. Heard
Citation: 696 F.2d 1127Docket: 82-2226
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; April 18, 1983; Federal Appellate Court
Barrie Deon Shelton was convicted of burglary on May 16, 1979, and sentenced to six years in prison. He has remained incarcerated while awaiting the resolution of his appeal, unable to post bond. His federal habeas corpus petition was denied by the district court, which cited Shelton's failure to exhaust state remedies. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, instructing the federal court to evaluate the merits of Shelton's petition. Shelton's appeal faced significant delays, with his notice of appeal filed on July 23, 1979, and the case record submitted to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on February 14, 1981. He has served over half of his sentence without a ruling on his appeal, leading to a "Catch 22" situation where he cannot seek relief effectively due to state procedural delays. Shelton argues that the prolonged delay violates his due process rights and contends that he is not required to exhaust state remedies that are ineffective. The State of Texas counters that the delays are a common occurrence due to a backlog during changes in the appellate process, arguing that any potential prejudice to Shelton is speculative. The court noted that while state remedies must typically be exhausted before seeking federal relief, an ineffective state process could render exhaustion unnecessary. The exhaustion requirement is based on comity rather than jurisdictional limits, and if state procedures are inadequate to protect constitutional rights, federal courts may intervene. The court has ruled that delays in state procedures can render the exhaustion requirement ineffective, particularly when such delays prevent swift vindication of claims. Previous cases have established that significant delays, such as a fifteen-month delay in the appellate process and a one-year delay in a habeas corpus petition, justify waiving the exhaustion requirement. Specifically, the court found that a 16-month delay in filing Shelton's appeal constituted an "inordinate delay," thereby making the state remedy ineffective. Consequently, Shelton is not required to exhaust state remedies before filing his habeas corpus petition. The district court's dismissal of Shelton's petition was deemed erroneous, and the court directed that the merits of Shelton's petition be considered. The ruling to reverse and remand the case remains unchanged following sua sponte reconsideration, focusing on the significant delay as the primary reason for the decision. The mandate will be issued immediately.