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United States v. Harold Smith Chancey
Citations: 695 F.2d 1275; 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22991Docket: 81-7618
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; December 29, 1982; Federal Appellate Court
Harold Smith Chancey appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which extended his probation from July 12, 1981, to July 12, 1982. He raises two main arguments: first, that the court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation because it had expired when his probation officer filed for the extension; second, that even if the court had jurisdiction, the evidence did not justify the extension. The court found both arguments unpersuasive, affirming the extension. The relevant facts include Chancey's sentencing on February 16, 1973, to four years imprisonment followed by four years probation, and his eventual parole on May 19, 1975. A parole violator's warrant was issued but not executed on February 2, 1977, as Chancey faced a federal indictment. After his acquittal on July 13, 1977, the warrant was withdrawn, marking the commencement of his probation which the court determined did not begin until that date. Consequently, the court ruled that Chancey’s probation did not expire until July 13, 1981, contrary to his assertion of an expiration on February 12, 1981. The court also noted that Chancey had violated probation terms by receiving traffic tickets in unauthorized jurisdictions. Thus, the appeal was denied, and the probation extension upheld. The judge's intent in sentencing Chancey was clearly outlined by the imposition of a four-year prison sentence followed by four years of probation, with explicit instructions for consecutive terms to eliminate any gap or overlap. The commencement of probation depended on the completion date of the prison sentence, which, under the Parole Commission's regulation (28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.44(d)), was determined to be July 13, 1977, the date the parole violator's warrant was withdrawn. Consequently, Chancey's probation was set to expire on July 13, 1981, granting the district court jurisdiction to address a petition to extend his probation filed in March 1981. Chancey's claim that there were insufficient grounds for extending his probation was unfounded. The trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding probation extensions, focusing on the societal interest in continued supervision. Evidence indicated Chancey had traveled outside permitted jurisdictions on two occasions, contradicting his assertion that he had permission from his probation officer. The judge chose to believe the probation officer's account over Chancey's, affirming the court's discretion in this credibility determination. The case remains relevant despite the passage of time since July 12, 1982, due to a federal district court's probation warrant issued on June 11, 1982, which necessitated Chancey to justify why his probation should not be revoked. The district court did revoke Chancey's probation on October 29, 1982, making the validity of the extension under appeal critical to this decision. The Parole Commission's regulation preventing the expiration of a sentence during pending criminal charges remains valid and has not been contested by Chancey. The regulation aligns with the statutory authority granted to the Parole Commission under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210.