Koczkodan v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Hopkinton, 98-0356 (2002)

Citation: Not availableDocket: C.A. No. 98-0356

Court: Superior Court of Rhode Island; December 8, 2002; Rhode Island; State Appellate Court

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An appeal by Plaintiff Vincent Koczkodan challenges the June 25, 1998 decision of the Town of Hopkinton Zoning Board of Review, which granted an appeal from neighboring landowners, Mr. and Mrs. Roland Baton. Koczkodan owns property at 53 Skunk Hill Road, designated as Lot 10B, located in an RFR-80 zone. The Batons, whose property is adjacent, objected to Koczkodan's use of the premises for parking trucks related to his gravel business, Coop Sand and Gravel Co., located across the street. 

The gravel business had previously operated under a special exception from 1987, which required that trucks be garaged in Hopkinton. However, following a 1994 amendment to the zoning ordinance that prohibited trucking and storage in RFR-80 zones, Koczkodan obtained a building permit in 1996 to construct a garage at the subject premises without mentioning a nonconforming use. Complaints from the Batons regarding truck operations led to their filing an appeal in early 1998, seeking the removal of trucks and cessation of business activities at that location. The Board held hearings throughout early 1998, ultimately concluding on June 25, 1998, that the Batons' appeal was timely and compliant with zoning ordinances.

The Board concluded that the property in question is primarily used for the storage, repair, and servicing of vehicles and farm equipment as part of Coop Enterprises, Inc.'s commercial operations in the sand and gravel business. It determined that the certificate of occupancy issued on March 16, 1998, was illegal under Rhode Island General Laws § 23-27.3-1201, as the activities conducted on the premises do not qualify as residential use, which is not permitted under the Hopkinton Zoning Board regulations. Mr. Koczkodan was found to lack grandfathered rights for the vehicle-related activities, and even if he had such rights in 1994, the construction of the building in 1996 constituted an increase in non-conformity, rendering it illegal due to lack of proper notification to abutters.

In response to these findings, the Board ordered the Building and Zoning Inspector to cease all commercial activities at the property, including the storage of non-residential vehicles, and to remove all junk and commercial vehicles. The Board also directed the rescindment of the illegal certificate of occupancy.

The plaintiff subsequently appealed the Board's decision, seeking its reversal. The appellate court's standard of review, outlined in G.L. 1956, § 45-24-69(d), indicates that it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board regarding factual evidence but can affirm, remand, or reverse the decision if the appellant's substantial rights are prejudiced due to legal violations, excess authority, unlawful procedures, or clear errors. The court must find substantial evidence exists to support the Board's findings, defined as sufficient relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate.

In the appeal, the plaintiff raised several arguments, including claims of lack of jurisdiction for the Board to hear the appeal, untimeliness of the appeal, that the property use is an accessory use, that the parking and storage of trucks constitutes a lawful preexisting nonconforming use, that the Board overstepped its authority, and that equitable estoppel should prevent the Board from disallowing the current use of the property.

The Plaintiff argues that the Board exceeded its authority by granting the Batons' appeal, as the petition did not represent an appeal from any specific action by Bart Fraser, the Building and Zoning Inspector. The Board contends that the appeal was based on Fraser's May 9, 1997 letter, which indicated the property was not being used as a gravel pit and justified the issuance of a building permit. The Rhode Island Supreme Court limits the zoning board's authority to what is explicitly conferred by statute, as cited in Noonan v. Zoning Board of Review. The Town of Hopkinton's Zoning Ordinance grants the zoning board power to hear appeals alleging errors in decisions made by the zoning enforcement officer. While the Batons did not specify their appeal was from Fraser's May 9 letter, their application indicated they were contesting the property's use. During the hearings, confusion arose regarding the specific decision being appealed, but it was ultimately clarified that the Batons were appealing the property's usage. Prior to the appeal, the Batons had lodged multiple complaints with Fraser regarding the property's use, who advised them to file an appeal due to their dissatisfaction with his responses.

The Batons appealed the usage of a property after unsuccessful attempts to resolve their concerns with Fraser. The Board identified a May 9, 1997 letter from Fraser as containing relevant findings about the property in question. Although the Batons did not explicitly cite this letter in their appeal, they adequately outlined the grounds for their appeal, providing sufficient notice for the Plaintiff to prepare a defense. The appeal was deemed timely by the Zoning Board, despite the Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary. Referencing Zeilstra v. Barrington Zoning Bd. of Review, the Court noted that the timeliness of an appeal is based on when a party becomes aware of the decision being challenged. In this case, the Batons and neighboring landowners were not aware of the garage's intended use until winter 1997, as the trucks were not stored there until then. After realizing the increased usage of the property, the Batons filed their appeal in February 1998, which the Court found to be reasonable and timely.

Regarding the use of the property, the Plaintiff argued that the storage and parking of trucks constituted a permitted accessory use under G.L. 1956, § 45-24-31(3) and the local Zoning Ordinance, which define accessory uses as incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the land. The Plaintiff contended that the agricultural nature of the property allows for the storage and use of farm equipment, aligning with the permitted uses in the RFR-80 zone.

The Board did not reach a conclusion regarding whether the storage and repair of farm equipment is a permitted use, nor did it instruct the Building and Zoning Inspector on this matter. Consequently, the Court does not need to determine if such activities qualify as accessory uses. The Board affirmed that the storage, servicing, and repair of commercial vehicles are not residential uses and are not permitted under the Hopkinton Zoning Board regulations. It did not assess whether these activities could be considered accessory uses, prompting the Court to remand the case for further examination by the Board.

The Plaintiff claims that his storage of trucks and farm equipment constitutes a nonconforming use, as these activities occurred before the zoning laws prohibiting such use were enacted. While zoning boards may lack authority to determine nonconforming uses in some instances, the issue was appropriately before the Board in this appeal. The Board's decision did not classify the storage and repair of farm equipment as non-permitted or direct its removal, so the Court will not evaluate whether it constitutes a nonconforming use. Instead, the Court will verify if there is substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision that the Plaintiff's activities do not constitute a nonconforming use.

A nonconforming use is defined as a property use that was legal before new zoning restrictions were established. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming the nonconforming use, requiring evidence that the use was lawfully established before the new zoning laws. The 1994 amendment to the Zoning Ordinance prohibits local and long-distance trucking in the RFR-80 district. Therefore, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was lawfully using the property in a manner that contradicted this new prohibition at the time of its enactment.

Plaintiff claims the right to park his trucks at 53 Skunk Hill Road based on a special exception granted by the zoning board for operating a gravel bank, which he interprets as allowing parking on the Barszcz Family Farm, allegedly including 53 Skunk Hill Road. However, the zoning board's records specify that the special exception applies to property on Arcadia Road, identified as Lot 32, not to 53 Skunk Hill Road, designated as Lot 10B. The court finds substantial evidence supporting the board's interpretation that "premises" refers to Lot 32. 

Plaintiff also asserts he established a nonconforming use by parking at 53 Skunk Hill Road before a 1994 zoning amendment. The board concluded, based on testimony, that Plaintiff did not have a nonconforming use, as the premises were not used for trucking at the time of the amendment; they were being cleared, and trucks were not in use for hauling. Although Plaintiff’s brother claimed trucks were used for hauling hay, Plaintiff contradicted this by stating he was building a garage at the time.

Plaintiff argues that the board erroneously considered factors such as the Tax Assessor's letter regarding truck registration and notification of abutters, which he deemed irrelevant. The court agrees on irrelevance but notes that the board's decision was also based on Plaintiff's testimony, thus affirming the board's determination of no nonconforming use. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had established a nonconforming use, the board noted that construction of a garage for truck storage represented an illegal increase in nonconforming status without proper notice to abutters, a point Plaintiff has not contested.

Lastly, Plaintiff contends the board's order to the Building and Zoning Inspector to abate zoning violations was invalid due to lack of authority under enabling legislation.

The Board has instructed the Building and Zoning Inspector to cease all commercial activities at 53 Skunk Hill Road and to remove junk and commercial vehicles from the property. The Plaintiff contends these orders contradict a Supreme Court ruling which states that zoning boards lack the authority to enforce local ordinances. However, the Court highlights that the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991 introduced provisions allowing zoning boards to enforce ordinances, including designating a zoning enforcement officer responsible for issuing violation notices. Section 17 of the Zoning Ordinance confirms this officer's role in enforcement.

The Board's directives may require the zoning enforcement officer to terminate commercial use and remove vehicles, but if judicial enforcement is necessary, only the town can initiate such actions. The Court is uncertain whether the Building and Zoning Inspector is the zoning enforcement officer and thus remands the case to ensure directives are issued to the correct official, pausing all actions until the Board determines if an accessory use exists.

Additionally, the Plaintiff argues that equitable estoppel should prevent the Board from prohibiting the storage of his trucks and farm equipment, claiming reliance on a building permit and a letter from the Tax Assessor for his $200,000 garage investment. The Zoning Board counters that the reliance on these documents is unfounded, as the issue lies with the use of the building rather than its legality. The Court recognizes that while equitable estoppel could apply against a municipality in rare cases, it defers judgment on this matter until the Board resolves the accessory use question.

The Court concludes that the Board had jurisdiction over the Batons' appeal, which was timely filed. The Court finds that the Board's determination regarding the Plaintiff's failure to establish a nonconforming use is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. However, the Board did not address whether the Plaintiff's truck storage and repair qualifies as an accessory use, necessitating a remand for this specific determination. Additionally, the Court notes that while the Board can instruct the zoning enforcement officer to take corrective actions, it issued its orders to the Building and Zoning Inspector, whose role as the zoning enforcement officer remains ambiguous. The Court remands the case for the Board to direct its orders specifically to the zoning enforcement officer as outlined in the Zoning Ordinance. All directives will be on hold until the Board resolves the accessory use issue. Counsel is instructed to prepare an appropriate order for implementation in line with this decision.