United States v. John S. Langford

Citation: 688 F.2d 1088Docket: 81-2503

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 8, 1982; Federal Appellate Court

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John S. Langford was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for knowingly mailing obscene materials depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct. The jury was instructed to apply community standards from the jurisdiction where the materials were mailed to determine their obscenity. The conviction included the mailing of obscene photographs and negatives to an undercover postal inspector in Minnesota and New York, as well as to a photography lab in Pennsylvania. Langford argued that his trial was unfair due to improper venue and that the jury could not assess community standards relevant to the receiving jurisdictions. The district court rejected these arguments, asserting proper venue under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), which allows prosecution in any district through which the mail matter moves. Additionally, Langford requested that the jury apply standards from the receiving communities, but the court instructed them to assess obscenity based on a three-question test regarding prurient interest, offensive depiction, and lack of serious value.

Determining whether materials are obscene involves assessing how "the average person applying contemporary community standards" perceives them, specifically in Wisconsin. The evaluation includes whether the materials appeal to the prurient interest, particularly in relation to pedophilia, distinguishing between morbid and candid sexual interests. The defendant was not charged with any direct involvement with minors concerning the material in question, and the jury's deliberation should not consider the circumstances surrounding the production of the material. The defendant was found guilty on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 and sentenced to three consecutive years for each count.

Two key legal issues arose: whether it was erroneous for the district court to instruct the jury to apply the community standards of the sending jurisdiction instead of the receiving jurisdiction, and whether mailing obscene negatives for developing constituted mailing obscene material for sale, as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 

Obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment, allowing for regulation without constitutional breach. The U.S. Supreme Court defines obscenity as materials that, taken as a whole, appeal to prurient interest, depict sexual conduct offensively, and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The determination of obscenity is factual and does not require uniform national standards, as noted in various Supreme Court cases. The jury may apply the standards of a "contemporary community" without needing precise definition.

Contemporary community standards are crucial in obscenity cases, as established by the Supreme Court, which emphasizes the importance of a juror's understanding of their community's views in assessing whether material is obscene. Jurors can rely on their personal knowledge and the perceptions of the average person in their community, negating the need for expert testimony on obscenity. The Supreme Court's ruling in New York v. Ferber indicates that Congress does not need to classify materials as obscene to restrict them under the First Amendment, specifically regarding child pornography. The Ferber case involved a statute prohibiting the sale or distribution of materials depicting minors under 16 in sexually explicit conduct, without requiring proof of obscenity. The Court recognized that many states have enacted laws targeting child pornography that do not necessitate an obscenity determination. Prior to Ferber, the Miller v. California standard was the benchmark for assessing obscenity, but Ferber concluded that this standard was inadequate for addressing child pornography, as the welfare of children involved is paramount. Thus, the Court deemed such materials outside First Amendment protection due to their significant impact on child welfare.

The test for child pornography differs from the obscenity standard established in Miller, though comparisons can aid in understanding. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251, it is illegal to use children under 16 in producing pornographic material without an obscenity test, while § 2252 requires that such material be deemed obscene to constitute a violation. The distinction is highlighted by the absence of an obscenity requirement in § 2251, contrasting with the inclusion of obscenity in § 2252. The appellant's case, convicted under § 2252, is evaluated using Miller's obscenity guidelines.

The appellant argues that the community standards of the receiving jurisdiction should apply, claiming jurors can only interpret standards from their own community. He asserts that this improper venue choice in the sending jurisdiction violated his due process rights. To support his position, he presents three arguments: first, a law review article advocating for the application of receiving jurisdiction standards in federal obscenity cases to align with the statute's goal of combating local pornography; second, the argument that the government's proof of obscenity, based on the materials appealing to pedophiles, necessitates applying the community standards of the intended recipients; and third, a claim that § 2252 aims to protect the ultimate viewer, thus requiring the standards of the viewer's community.

18 U.S.C. 3237(a) allows federal obscenity cases to be tried in the sending, receiving, or any jurisdiction through which obscene material is mailed. Accepting the appellant's argument to apply community standards from the receiving jurisdictions would impose significant burdens on the court system, potentially requiring multiple trials in each jurisdiction or complicating a single trial with differing standards. This could lead to increased costs, multiple appeals, and arguments of due process violations due to the complexity of applying distinct community standards.

The appellant's assertion that the community standard of the sending jurisdiction is invalid attacks the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) regarding forum selection in obscenity cases tied to 18 U.S.C. 2251, et seq., which focuses on protecting viewers, particularly minors. The legislation emphasizes the government's interest in preventing harmful materials from entering commerce, reflecting Congress' broader concern for public safety and morality. The overarching goal is to safeguard minors from sexual exploitation within the extensive and organized child pornography industry, underscoring that the distribution of such materials directly contributes to the exploitation of children.

The Supreme Court emphasized that distributing photographs and films of juveniles engaged in sexual activity is closely linked to child sexual abuse. This connection arises from the permanent nature of such materials, which exacerbate the harm to children through their circulation, and the necessity to eliminate the distribution network to effectively combat the production of exploitative materials. It is acknowledged that merely targeting producers is insufficient, as child pornography is often part of a hidden industry that requires an open distribution system. Therefore, imposing severe penalties on those involved in the sale or promotion of such materials is a crucial enforcement strategy.

The state's compelling interest in protecting minors' physical and psychological well-being is underscored, alongside the need for healthy youth development in a democratic society. The argument that legal provisions are solely focused on protecting viewers is dismissed as unreasonable. Additionally, local community standards are highlighted, allowing citizens to determine what is considered obscene, thus preventing a jurisdiction from becoming a hub for the sale of obscene materials.

The Supreme Court has indicated that it is unrealistic to expect all communities to accept standards from more permissive areas. Consequently, citizens of Wisconsin should not be subjected to community standards from jurisdictions like New York or Pennsylvania. Congress's decision to allow cases to be pursued in either the sending or receiving jurisdiction reflects an intent to protect both sets of communities from the production and distribution of obscene materials.

Finally, the court determined that the case could be properly venued in Wisconsin, affirming that this choice did not violate the defendant's due process rights. This venue choice promotes judicial economy and ensures consistent legal standards without the complications of differing community standards across jurisdictions. The jury was correctly instructed to apply Wisconsin's community standards in evaluating the case.

The appellant contests his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 on the grounds that mailing negative photographs to a laboratory for processing does not constitute a violation of the statute, which specifically addresses mailing obscene materials "for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale." The appellant emphasizes that he did not sell the negatives to the laboratory and argues that the statute's wording limits its application. However, the court clarifies that the statute's use of the term "purpose" is broader, encompassing any intent related to the commercial distribution of obscene materials.

The court reviews legislative history, noting that Congress aimed to eliminate the entire commercial chain of child pornography, which includes not only the creation and sale of obscene materials but also the processing of such materials. Evidence indicates that the appellant was involved in a commercial operation, as he sought processing for a significant volume of prints (800 to 1500 per month) and requested volume discounts. This suggests that the negatives were not intended for personal use but rather for eventual sale or distribution.

The court concludes that the appellant's actions fall within the legislative intent to criminalize the entire spectrum of child pornography activities, affirming the district court's decision. Circuit Judges Wood and Pell concur, agreeing on the sufficiency of the government's prosecution and the application of the statute to the appellant's actions. The jury was instructed on the elements necessary to establish the charges, which included knowingly mailing obscene materials involving minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The defendant was indicted for mailing obscene material to an individual in Green Bay, Wisconsin; however, this charge was dismissed as the court determined that the photographs did not feature minors under 16. The definition of patently offensive sexual conduct encompasses representations of sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of genitals. In obscenity cases, the trier of fact must consider whether an average person, using contemporary community standards, would find the material appeals to prurient interests, depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. While instructing a jury to apply a national standard may be deemed a nonreversible error if it does not significantly influence deliberations, the defendant argued for trial in the receiving jurisdiction based on 3237(a), which allows prosecution in any district involved in the obscene commerce. The court noted that adopting the appellant's argument could complicate trials involving multiple jurisdictions with different standards. The potential for trials under varying community standards does not violate the constitutional requirement for notice. The appellant also argued that because the materials were aimed at pedophiliacs, the receiving state's standards should apply; however, the court maintained that the prurient appeal could be assessed regardless of whether it was to the general population or a specific group.

The jurisdiction's ability to apply its community standards in regulating the appellant's activities hinges on whether it has a legitimate interest to justify the power it seeks to exercise. The appellant does not contest that the definition of "visual and print medium" under 2253(4) includes negatives. The document highlights the alarming growth of child pornography as a lucrative and organized industry, citing that it has become a multimillion-dollar operation across the nation. Over 260 magazines featuring children in sexually explicit conduct have been documented, with some children as young as three to five years old depicted in various sexual acts, including lewd poses and intercourse. In Los Angeles, police reported that 30,000 children have been sexually exploited. The production of child pornography is noted to be minimal in cost while yielding enormous profits, facilitated by the ability to make thousands of copies from a single negative. The clandestine nature of this industry makes it difficult to assess its full extent, but a wide variety of child pornography is reported to be available throughout the country, with its prevalence continuing to increase due to the potential for substantial profit.