29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1256, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,020 William Waters, Sylvester Williams, Willie G. Pearson, Vandy Hawkins, Curtis Gilmore, Donald Samuels, Robert Nemhard, and William Smith v. Furnco Construction Corporation

Citation: 688 F.2d 39Docket: 75-1347

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 2, 1982; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Waters et al. v. Furnco Construction Corporation, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a prior decision affirming a judgment against five of eight plaintiffs while acknowledging that three plaintiffs—Nemhard, Samuels, and Smith—had established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework. The district court determined that Furnco's hiring practices, which prioritized experienced firebricklayers known to the job superintendent, were justified by business necessity and were not a pretext for racial exclusion. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the requirement for an application method that maximized consideration of minority applicants, prompting further proceedings. The court found that Furnco provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting Nemhard and Samuels, specifically the need for known, qualified workers, and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims of pretext lacked merit given the presence of black bricklayers hired on the project. Thus, the judgment against Nemhard and Samuels was affirmed. However, the court identified that Smith's case included additional significant factors that had not been fully addressed by the district court's findings.

Smith had prior work experience with Dacies in 1958, 1962, 1969, and 1971, during which he met Dacies' standards. Dacies recalled a conversation with Smith at the gate during the Interlake job, expressing surprise at Smith's presence and indicating he would hire him once additional workers were needed. However, Dacies' two accounts of this conversation differ regarding the timing relative to hiring. Although Smith was recognized as experienced and qualified in firebrick, he was not hired until late in the job.

Dacies testified that his primary method for hiring bricklayers involved maintaining a list of contacts he had worked with over the years and consulting other superintendents for available manpower. He acknowledged a conversation with John Wright, who expressed a desire to include black bricklayers, specifying a target of at least 16 percent. Dacies admitted he did not have specific names or contact information for black bricklayers and would need to reach out to Urbanski for assistance.

Crucially, Dacies' hiring list did not include any black bricklayers, and Smith's exclusion despite his qualifications raises an inference of racial discrimination. Smith testified that Urbanski suggested he inquire about work on the Interlake job and that he met with Dacies multiple times before ultimately being called to work, though he was told there would be no additional hires at that time. Smith's timeline indicates he was likely reporting for work no earlier than September 27, when the number of bricklayers increased significantly.

Smith, an experienced firebricklayer, was not initially considered for a position by Dacies, despite being known to them. This lack of consideration was attributed to Dacies relying on a list that was suggestively racially discriminatory. Furnco acknowledged responsibility for Dacies' actions on the Interlake job but claimed that Smith’s hiring was non-discriminatory and random. However, there was no clear evidence supporting this assertion, nor was there a legitimate non-discriminatory reason provided for the delay in Smith’s hiring. The district court recognized Smith's previous work with Dacies but failed to address the core issues of Smith's discrimination claim. Consequently, the decision regarding Smith was reversed and remanded for further proceedings with a new district judge, who may consider additional evidence while referencing the previous trial's transcript. The judgment against Smith was reversed, while other aspects of the judgment were affirmed. Costs incurred in the Supreme Court would be recovered by the defendant from plaintiffs Samuels, Nemhard, and Smith, with each party bearing their own costs before this court. Additionally, a claim regarding Samuels’ work with Dacies was unsupported by the record.