United States v. Dale A. Swart

Citations: 679 F.2d 698; 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18746Docket: 81-1938

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 3, 1982; Federal Appellate Court

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Dale A. Swart appeals his conviction for multiple counts related to the sale and receipt of stolen vehicles under 18 U.S.C. § 2313. His conviction followed a bench trial, during which he sought to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his business premises, 'The Truck Stop.' A magistrate recommended denial of the motion to suppress, which the district court adopted.

The case centers on events from September 14, 1979, when a vehicle fire at Swart's business led Deputy Sheriff Daniel Homs to investigate. Homs noted a Mustang involved in the fire lacked a vehicle identification number, raising suspicions that Swart operated a 'chop shop' for stolen cars. After speaking with an employee who indicated Swart was not present, officers sought to search the premises. The employee denied them access, and after he left, the officers entered the property, observed vehicles, and recorded their identification numbers. One of these identified numbers belonged to a stolen vehicle, prompting the officers to obtain a search warrant to gather further evidence.

The court found that the initial search violated the Fourth Amendment, leading to the conclusion that all evidence obtained thereafter, including that from the search warrant, was inadmissible as it was derived from the unlawful search. The appeal resulted in the reversal of Swart's conviction and a remand for a new trial. The court also outlined a two-step analysis for Fourth Amendment claims, focusing on governmental conduct and reasonable expectations of privacy regarding the items seized.

Key issues include the validity of the search warrant and whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search. The Government argues that Swart lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle identification numbers, citing minimal intrusion as a basis, and claiming no expectation of privacy in the area outside his garage where the officers recorded those numbers. 

The Government references four cases to support its claim that searching for vehicle identification numbers does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search; however, these cases are distinguishable because the police were in legitimate locations when they observed the identification numbers. The crux of the analysis hinges on whether the police had the right to stand near the vehicles on Swart's property, specifically concerning Swart's reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.

The private property nature of the search does not automatically grant a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established in Katz, which notes that what is knowingly exposed to the public is not protected under the Fourth Amendment. After reviewing the facts, it was determined that the vehicle identification numbers were not publicly exposed.

The Government also attempts to justify the officers' presence by referring to a business's implied invitation to the public. The Supreme Court acknowledges that businesses may allow certain intrusions not permissible in private contexts, affirming that government agents can enter premises for business-related purposes, similar to private individuals.

The Court has narrowed the application of the business-premises doctrine, clarifying that a mere invitation to enter a business does not imply authorization for a general search for incriminating evidence. A warrant is required to search areas of commercial premises not accessible to the public, and government agents cannot justify a warrantless search based on a diminished expectation of privacy if the items are not visible to customers. In this case, the officers could enter the premises due to a general public invitation; however, the business was closed at the time of the search, which negated any implicit invitation to enter. Additionally, there was no indication that the cars in question were in a publicly accessible area, as no customers were present. An employee explicitly denied the officers permission to search, reinforcing the lack of a general invitation. The situation would differ if the officers had begun searching without asking for permission, but the employee would likely have instructed them to halt. Furthermore, even if the employee's denial applied only to the garage, the closure of the business would render any business-premises exception inapplicable. The 'open fields' doctrine, which states that the Fourth Amendment does not extend protection to open fields, does not apply here, as the search occurred outside a closed business, not in an open field. The Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, underscoring that the nature of the search location does not resolve Fourth Amendment issues.

Only the curtilage of a private dwelling or business is protected under the Fourth Amendment, as established in United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger. In that case, a goosehouse 400 feet from a farmhouse was deemed outside the curtilage, suggesting that anything more than 75 feet away is similarly unprotected. However, the current case differs because it involves nearby sheds and a garage where vehicles were located, possibly placing them within the curtilage. If these vehicles are determined to be within the curtilage or a non-public area, the district judge may deny a renewed motion to suppress evidence. 

The court found that Swart had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the vehicle identification numbers on his property, despite the cars being on closed business premises. The warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, leading to the reversal of Swart's conviction and a remand for a new trial. 

The government briefly suggested exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search, citing the mobility of the evidence, but this assertion lacked supporting record citations and was contradicted by their own claims of the vehicles being in good condition and disassembly stages. No sufficient findings were made to establish exigent circumstances that would justify bypassing the warrant requirement. Additionally, the government’s arguments were found to be unclear and overlapping. The issue of whether public invitations to a property allow police access has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court.