Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Decavitch v. Thomas Steel Strip Corp.
Citations: 585 N.E.2d 879; 66 Ohio App. 3d 568; 4 Ohio App. Unrep. 493; 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2174Docket: No. 89-T-4182.
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; June 4, 1990; Ohio; State Appellate Court
In 1983, Patricia DeCavitch was employed by Ajax Magnethermic Corporation, which faced uncertain business prospects. To secure a new position, she contacted the Deane Farester Employment Agency, resulting in several interviews, including one with Thomas Steel Strip Corporation, which did not lead to employment. DeCavitch later began working with G.F. Furniture while continuing her job search. In January 1985, Thomas Steel contacted her for an interview, where she expressed a desire for job security. Although company representatives assured her of their stability, no guarantees of employment duration were made. Following the interviews, Lou DeNome from Thomas Steel offered DeCavitch a job, contingent upon her passing a physical and agreeing to remain for at least two years, with a stipulation to repay a prorated placement fee if she left early. DeCavitch, despite believing the agency was not entitled to the fee, signed the agreement. At trial, she claimed this agreement indicated a two-year employment contract. She also signed an application stating her employment could be terminated at any time. After approximately 1.5 years, she was terminated and subsequently sued for breach of contract. Thomas Steel denied any contractual obligation beyond at-will employment and cited the Statute of Frauds as a defense against the alleged oral agreement. The trial court denied their motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The jury found in favor of DeCavitch, awarding her $10,573.62. Thomas Steel appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motions based on the lack of proof for a breached contract and the Statute of Frauds. Appellant's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court misapplied the law by not granting a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (NOV), arguing that reasonable minds would conclude that appellee was an employee at will. The Ohio precedent set in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. establishes that either party in an at-will employment agreement can terminate the relationship for any lawful reason. However, Mers also allows for consideration of various factors, such as the employment's nature and company policy, to determine the agreement's terms regarding discharge. Appellant contends that the evidence clearly supports the conclusion of an at-will relationship, pointing to a signed fee agreement acknowledging the possibility of leaving before a two-year commitment and an application that defined her status as an at-will employee. Appellee's argument, which suggests a two-year contract based on company policy, is deemed irrelevant since the promise did not guarantee employment for that duration and was interpreted as a one-way commitment. Thus, the court concludes that the evidence, viewed favorably towards appellee, still indicates an at-will relationship. In the second assignment of error, appellant argues that even if a two-year contract were hypothetically recognized, it would be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, which requires such agreements to be in writing if not performed within one year. This statute necessitates a written and signed document for any agreements that extend beyond one year. In Pullar v. UpJohn Health Care Serv. Inc., the court found that there was no written contract between the parties, as neither the fee agreement nor the employment application included any reference to a contract for years. The only potential basis for a contract was an oral conversation between DeNome and the appellee, which would be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The trial court should have granted the appellant's motion for a directed verdict or judgment NOV. Although the Statute of Frauds can be circumvented by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the appellee did not include this theory in her complaint, nor was it discussed during the trial or included in jury instructions. As promissory estoppel was not argued at trial, it cannot be raised on appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment for the defendant, with Judge Mahoney concurring and Judge Donofrio dissenting.