Gump v. Hobart Corp.

Citations: 472 N.E.2d 368; 15 Ohio App. 3d 52; 15 Ohio B. 80; 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11951Docket: No. 83AP-451

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; February 15, 1984; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Robert Gump has filed a complaint seeking a court order to compel the Industrial Commission to recognize him as temporarily and totally disabled, which would entitle him to compensation. In response, Hobart Corporation, Gump's employer, has filed a cross-claim requesting the court to vacate all orders related to Gump's claim after July 8, 1981, and to suspend consideration of the claim from that date. Gump's back injury from January 1979 is undisputed, and his claim for this condition was allowed. In December 1980, Gump sought to add 'depressive neurosis' to his claim, but Hobart claims it did not receive notice of this motion until July 13, 1981, making earlier medical examination requests related only to the original injury. A request for a change of physicians by Gump led to an objection from Hobart, resulting in a scheduled hearing. Hobart had also requested a medical examination, citing Gump's failure to attend previous scheduled examinations. The district hearing officer granted Hobart's request for a medical examination and postponed the hearing on Gump's change of physicians. There is no evidence of an appeal or reconsideration regarding the officer's order, though Gump's counsel has referenced an appeal. Relevant Ohio administrative codes support the employer's right to request medical examinations and outline procedures for objections and further actions by the bureau. In early July 1981, Hobart applied for an emergency hearing to mandate Gump's appearance for a medical examination and to halt his compensation until compliance; Gump did not attend a scheduled examination on July 8, 1981.

A hearing was held on August 6, 1981, to address four issues: the termination of temporary total compensation, an employer request for a medical exam, a change of physicians, and the allowance of a psychiatric condition. Following the hearing, the district hearing officer granted the claimant, Gump, the change of physicians and approved the inclusion of 'mild depression' as an additional condition. Temporary total disability compensation was ordered until August 6, 1981, but further compensation was terminated pending a medical exam by a physician chosen by the employer. Both parties appealed to the regional board, which upheld the district hearing officer's order but modified the date for termination of compensation to July 8, 1981. Subsequent appeals to the Industrial Commission resulted in an order denying the employer's appeal and affirming the regional board's decisions, while allowing the claimant's appeal to refer the case back to the district hearing officer to address the extent of disability. The Commission ruled that the employer could file a motion for a medical examination, which would be heard before discussing the extent of disability.

In reviewing a cross-claim in mandamus from respondent Hobart, no abuse of discretion was found despite some confusion in the records. Although the claimant claimed an appeal was filed following a May 27, 1981 hearing, there was no clear record of such a filing, even though references to the appeal existed. Under R.C. 4123.53, employees may be mandated to undergo medical examinations, and failure to comply can suspend compensation claims. While R.C. 4121.34 does not grant district hearing officers the authority to order examinations, the administrative rules provide such power. The Commission's decision to suspend payments pending resolution of these matters was deemed appropriate, necessitating a new request for a medical examination by the employer before further action on the claimant’s case.

The employer, Hobart, lacks a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus and has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion by the Industrial Commission. An appeal under R.C. 4123.519 provides Hobart with an adequate remedy. The potential for further medical examination, if ordered and subsequently refused by the claimant, could provide the remedy sought. Despite concerns regarding prior examinations, the time lapse may justify a new examination. The case of State, ex rel. Molden, v. Callander Cleaners Co., supports the Commission's authority to order examinations without indicating an abuse of discretion. Relator Gump's request for mandamus similarly shows no abuse of discretion, as he has been given another opportunity for a medical exam at the employer's request. Additionally, no temporary total compensation will be paid until entitlement is confirmed, as the Commission upheld the suspension order. Both Gump's and Hobart's requests for a writ of mandamus are therefore denied, with no clear legal right or abuse of discretion established.