Gregory v. Gregory

Citations: 877 N.E.2d 333; 172 Ohio App. 3d 822; 2007 Ohio 4098Docket: No. 22011.

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; August 10, 2007; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Steven Gregory is appealing a divorce judgment from the Montgomery County Court, where he and Nancy Gregory's marriage, initiated in August 1985 and resulting in two children, ended. Nancy was the primary earner, while Steven worked as an electrician. In early 2003, due to downsizing at Steven's workplace, they mutually agreed for him to accept a severance package and pursue education. However, following this decision, their marriage deteriorated, and Steven delayed starting school or finding work, eventually enrolling part-time at Sinclair Community College but performing poorly academically.

Nancy filed for divorce on September 30, 2004, requesting a restraining order against Steven regarding property. The court granted this order on October 14, 2004, and after a hearing on January 24, 2006, finalized the divorce and shared parenting agreement on January 5, 2007, marking the end of the marriage as October 14, 2004. The court divided assets and designated Nancy as the residential parent.

Steven raises ten assignments of error in his appeal, particularly claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing his income at $42,000 for child support calculations. He argues that the factors in R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a) did not justify this imputation, while Nancy asserts he was voluntarily underemployed. The parties agree on the context of Steven's departure from his job and his initial commitment to pursue education. He did not maintain full-time studies or seek employment, relying instead on loans for living expenses. Steven attributes his lack of progress to personal challenges, including a "psychotic episode," and argues that the court's income imputation disregarded his circumstances. R.C. 3119.01(C)(11) defines factors for income imputation, including potential earnings, prior experience, education, and any disabilities.

The trial court's decision to impute income to Steven and its calculation of that income were upheld, as he earned $42,000 in 2003 before returning to school to pursue a second associate degree, which was deemed reasonable until the marriage began to deteriorate. The court found that Steven neither attended school nor worked after Nancy requested he seek part-time employment, and he failed to demonstrate an inability to work full-time while studying. Thus, the trial court reasonably imputed his previous earning capacity.

In a separate matter, the court's order for Steven to pay half of his children's parochial school tuition was also upheld. The court concluded that maintaining the children's current school was in their best interest during the divorce. The parties had agreed to this educational choice, and the court required a shared financial responsibility for tuition costs, resulting in a reimbursement arrangement involving tax returns and a raffle win for Nancy.

However, the court's handling of tuition payments raised questions regarding the clarity of obligations for specific school years and the amount awarded to Nancy to offset tuition. The trial court's order was remanded for clarification on whether the total tuition obligation assigned to Steven was correctly calculated.

Lastly, the trial court's spousal support award was deemed inadequate, as Steven argued that the length of the marriage, income disparities, and his lack of earnings were not sufficiently taken into account, suggesting that a greater support award was justified.

The trial court granted Steven spousal support of $650 per month for five years, based on annual incomes of $42,000 for Steven and $95,000 for Nancy. The court noted the couple's above-average standard of living and found Steven's monthly expenses of $1,421 to be reasonable. Steven had pursued further education, which could enhance his earning potential, and the court retained jurisdiction over the spousal support amount. The court's decision was deemed reasonable, particularly as Steven's previous unemployment was attributed to his personal choices.

Steven challenged the division of marital assets, claiming inequity, particularly concerning the marital home, where he was not credited for equity accrued from payments made by Nancy during their separation. The court deemed it equitable to use the separation date for asset division, citing Steven's actions that prolonged the process. Steven also contested the allocation of costs related to dividing his deferred compensation and retirement accounts but failed to demonstrate unfairness in the court's decisions. Additionally, he argued against being assigned more than half of two credit-card debts; however, the review indicated he was actually responsible for less than half. Overall, the court's asset allocation decisions were upheld as reasonable.

The couple had two credit cards with outstanding balances at the time of their separation: a Shell card with a balance of $2,340.52 and a VISA card with $2,391.73. During the divorce proceedings, Nancy paid $474 towards the Shell card, leading the court to order Steven to pay a total of $1,644.50, which included reimbursement for Nancy's payment. This amount exceeded half of the Shell card's balance because it included her full payment. In contrast, regarding the VISA card, Nancy paid $1,289.98, and the court ordered Steven to pay this amount without adjusting for his share of the outstanding balance, which should have totaled $1,840.86 if calculated correctly. However, any errors in these orders did not prejudice Steven.

Steven also contended he was entitled to interest on proceeds from the sale of a vacant lot, held in trust during the divorce. The record indicated that most proceeds were paid to his attorneys, and he had agreed to the trust arrangement without requesting interest, so the court's decision not to award interest was upheld.

Furthermore, Steven contested the trial court’s order for him to pay all expenses related to the sale of a time-share. However, the court's directive was for Nancy to manage the sale prudently, with her costs being reimbursed from the sale proceeds, and remaining proceeds divided equally, which did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Lastly, Steven challenged the valuation of the couple's vehicles, claiming his Tahoe was overvalued and Nancy's Impala undervalued, and he disputed the sale of a 1985 Chevrolet Camaro without a specified value. The trial court relied on Nancy's presented evidence for vehicle valuations, and Steven did not provide evidence to refute this. The court’s decisions were deemed appropriate, and the assignment of the Lumina to Nancy without offsetting benefits to Steven was justified, particularly since the Tahoe was valued higher than the Impala. The claim regarding the valuation of the marital residence was noted as an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The trial court valued the family home at 4832 James Hill Road in Kettering at $200,000, based on the appraisal by Denver Williams, mutually agreed upon by the parties. Steven contested this valuation, citing the home's tax value of $229,200, the recent sale of a nearby house for $240,000, and alleged flaws in Williams' analysis. However, Nancy argued that the comparable house was not relevant due to significant differences. The court found Williams' appraisal to be credible and thorough, rejecting Steven's claims and affirming the $200,000 valuation without abuse of discretion. 

Regarding attorney fees, the trial court ordered Steven to pay Nancy's legal expenses, citing his actions causing delays and additional costs. Although the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce indicated that Steven was to pay all fees incurred by Nancy from December 22, 2005, the court's rationale for this broad payment order lacked clarity. The earlier December 23, 2005, entry noted that Steven was responsible only for fees resulting from his delays and failure to provide discovery. The final decree's broader language implies a more extensive liability for Steven, which requires clarification. The court recognized its discretion in awarding fees but remanded the case for the trial court to specify the scope and justification of its fee award.

Additionally, the trial court failed to include necessary language in the final decree regarding shared parenting, which constitutes an error.

Steven contends that the final decree lacked necessary language regarding the relocation of children, as mandated by Montgomery County Loc.R. 4.24(G). Nancy argues that such language exists within the standard order of parenting time, which is included in the shared-parenting plan, and this claim is validated. The court finds Steven's seventh assignment of error unmeritorious.

Additionally, Steven claims the trial court abused its discretion by imposing all transportation responsibilities for parenting time solely on him, asserting he is the disadvantaged party. The court did not clarify its reasoning for this allocation, yet Nancy notes that the standard order assigns transportation to the nonresidential parent. The court concludes that Steven did not demonstrate the transportation burden was excessive or that distance was an issue, thus overruling his eighth assignment of error.

Regarding spousal support arrears, Steven argues the trial court improperly awarded Nancy a $3,462 arrearage as an offset against her property settlement. Although he claims the decision lacks rational justification, he fails to provide sufficient evidence of prejudice, leading the court to overrule this ninth assignment of error.

In his tenth assignment, Steven objects to the final decree’s language regarding shared parenting, asserting it ambiguously grants custody to Nancy despite labeling it as shared parenting. Testimony indicated that both parties' attorneys acknowledged Nancy would have custody while Steven would be the nonresidential parent, supporting the trial court's characterization of their agreement. The court found Steven largely responsible for procedural delays and failures, concluding that his refusal to sign the plan did not negate its reflection of the agreement. Thus, this assignment of error is also overruled.

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with the case remanded for further proceedings specifically related to tuition and Nancy's attorney fees.