State v. Farthing

Citations: 767 N.E.2d 1242; 146 Ohio App. 3d 720Docket: C.A. Case No. 2000 CA 108, T.C. No. 00 CR 406.

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; December 27, 2001; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Justin Farthing appeals a judgment from the Greene County Court of Common Pleas, where he was found guilty of retaliation and sentenced to four years in prison. The state's evidence showed that Farthing had a troubled history with his former parole officer, Susan Johnson, including a prior altercation that led to his incarceration and revocation of parole. While incarcerated at Pickaway Correctional Institution (PCI) in early 2000, Farthing sent a letter to inmate Brian Lewis, making threatening sexual comments about Johnson, which raised concerns among prison officials. A mental health counselor, Wynona Douglas, warned Johnson of potential danger due to Farthing's expressed anger and delusional fantasies about her. Farthing was indicted on several counts, ultimately being convicted of retaliation, while the other charges were dismissed. On appeal, Farthing argues that the state failed to prove proper venue for the offense, asserting that the alleged threats were made in Pickaway County and that Johnson's duties were primarily conducted in Montgomery County. The court found that the evidence did not support that any element of retaliation occurred in Greene County, leading to the conclusion that venue was improper there. Consequently, the first assignment of error was sustained.

Farthing argues that he did not communicate a threat of harm against Johnson, an essential element for a retaliation charge under R.C. 2921.05(A). The statute prohibits retaliation against public servants or witnesses involved in legal proceedings through unlawful threats. It clarifies that threats do not need to be communicated directly to the victim, but if a defendant is aware that their threats may reach the victim through a third party, they can be found guilty of retaliation. Farthing's private letter to an inmate did not constitute a threat because he had no reasonable expectation that the inmate would inform Johnson of its contents. This case differs from precedents where threats were communicated to individuals in trusted positions related to the victim. Additionally, there was no evidence suggesting Farthing should have anticipated that Johnson would be informed of his letter due to prison mail inspections. Although Farthing expressed anger and sexual delusions about Johnson to a mental health counselor, the counselor’s concerns did not derive from a direct threat made by Farthing. Instead, her assessment was based on her professional experience, identifying a pattern associated with "anger rapists." Consequently, Farthing could not be convicted of retaliation based on his statements in the letter.

Farthing's statements towards Johnson were not deemed unlawful threats, indicating the trial court incorrectly interpreted them as such. The second assignment of error was sustained, leading to the conclusion that the trial court made a prejudicial error in admitting testimony from a psychiatric aid, Douglas, regarding Farthing's statements during their interview. Farthing argued that the state failed to establish that he waived the physician-patient privilege, as required by O.R.C. 2317.02, with respect to his communications with Douglas. The state contended that no waiver was necessary because Douglas was not a licensed psychologist. However, the court clarified that communications between licensed psychologists and clients have similar protections to those between physicians and patients, and a written waiver is not mandated. The state provided evidence that all inmates sign a waiver upon entering the facility, which states that not all communications are confidential, particularly if there is a danger to others. Douglas, while lacking a copy of Farthing's specific waiver, expressed confidence that he must have signed it due to standard procedures. Farthing did not provide evidence to dispute this. The trial court was justified in determining that Farthing waived his privilege regarding potential threats to others. The argument that R.C. 2317.02(B)(1) and R.C. 4732.19 did not apply due to Douglas's unlicensed status was rejected, as Douglas operated under the supervision of licensed psychologists, distinguishing this case from State v. Wood, where no supervisory relationship was established. The third assignment of error was overruled, and the judgment of the trial court was reversed, resulting in the vacating of Farthing's conviction and his discharge.