Black, Lloyd, No. 81-1646 v. Bayer, Ronald Jay, Esquire, Pelletreau, Charles L., Esquire, Hurd, Thomas, Esquire, Public Defender. Bartee, John H., No. 81-1763 v. Yanoff, Michael, Esq., Rossanese, Maurino J., Esq., Yollin, Hubert D., Esq. Stoica, Eugene, No. 81-1926 v. Stewart, William P., Public Defender and Terry, Otis, Investigator

Citation: 672 F.2d 309Docket: 81-1646

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; February 7, 1982; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Black v. Bayer, Bartee v. Yanoff, and Stoica v. Stewart, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed appeals from former state criminal defendants against their public defenders and an investigator from the Defender Association of Philadelphia County. The court referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Polk County v. Dodson, which established that public defenders do not act "under color of state law" when performing their traditional roles in state criminal proceedings, thereby impacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The court affirmed the district court's judgments for Black and Bartee, concluding the defendants did not act under color of law and were absolutely immune from civil liability. In Stoica's case, while the court acknowledged the allegations of a conspiracy that could convert private conduct into state action, it ultimately held that both the public defender and the investigator still enjoyed absolute immunity. The judgments of the district courts were affirmed in all cases.

Lloyd Black, the appellant in case No. 81-1646, was arrested for stabbing a girlfriend and faced charges including attempted murder. Initially represented by public defender Thomas Hurd, he later chose to represent himself until the fourth day of his trial, when private attorney Charles L. Pelletreau was appointed, followed by Ronald Jay Bayer for sentencing. Black received a sentence of five to ten years and subsequently filed a 1983 action against Hurd, Pelletreau, and Bayer, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking damages. The district court dismissed Hurd's complaint as frivolous, citing precedents that grant public defenders immunity in 1983 actions, and dismissed the claims against Pelletreau and Bayer, noting that their actions did not constitute state action. Black acknowledged that precedent from Polk County likely supported the judgment but argued that it might allow for 1983 liability regarding certain administrative functions and contended that public defenders and court-appointed attorneys do not have absolute immunity. 

In case No. 81-1763, John H. Bartee, convicted of robbery and related offenses, initially retained private attorney Michael Yanoff but later opted for public defender Maurino J. Rossanese for trial. After his conviction, Bartee sought post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance and was subsequently represented by private attorney Hubert D. Yollin, appointed by the court and compensated by the County under the Pennsylvania Public Defender Act.

Bartee, currently incarcerated at Graterford, filed a complaint in district court for damages under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985(2) and (3), 1986, and 1988, as well as violations of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. He also sought the court's pendent jurisdiction for a malpractice claim against Yanoff under state law. The district court dismissed the claims against Rossanese and Yollin, citing precedents including Ross v. Meagan, and declined to hear the state law claims against Yanoff, stating that dismissal of all federal claims before trial necessitates dismissal of any related state claims. Bartee appealed, focusing solely on the section 1983 claim and the pendent jurisdiction issue.

Separately, Eugene Stoica, convicted of a sex crime and represented by William P. Stewart of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, filed a section 1983 complaint against Stewart and investigator Otis Terry, alleging ineffective representation and conspiracy to suppress evidence. The district court dismissed Stoica's claims, relying on similar precedents. On appeal, Stoica contended that public defenders and their investigators should not have absolute immunity under section 1983, and argued that the alleged conspiracy with a prosecuting attorney converted their actions into state action. The court referenced a past case, Brown v. Joseph, where it was determined that public defenders do not act under color of state law, affirming the judgment based on a different rationale. It acknowledged distinctions between public defenders and private attorneys but concluded that a County Public Defender, established under Pennsylvania law, is immune from liability.

Ten years of legal precedent support Judge Weis' original view that public defenders do not act under "color of state law" in their role as defense attorneys, as established in Polk County v. Dodson. Defense lawyers function as personal counselors and advocates, opposing state representatives, which is essential for maintaining the adversarial nature of the legal system aimed at truth and fairness. The Supreme Court affirmed that public defenders performing traditional legal functions do not engage in state action under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, leading to the dismissal of complaints against them. Appellants Black and Bartee acknowledge that Polk County requires upholding the dismissals of their claims against public defenders Hurd and Rossanese. The court further extends this reasoning to privately retained counsel and court-appointed attorneys, confirming that such attorneys also do not act under color of state law for 1983 claims. This aligns with a longstanding judicial consensus emphasizing that attorneys, although officers of the court, owe their allegiance to their clients, whose interests are often opposed to the state's. The court rejects the appellants' argument that court-appointed counsel should be subject to qualified immunity, reiterating the absence of state action in their roles.

The Supreme Court has developed a nuanced relationship between constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and state tort liability as it pertains to lawyers involved in state criminal cases who later face federal 1983 claims. The Court has integrated tort principles into its interpretation of Section 1983, beginning with Justice Douglas's assertion in Monroe v. Pape that 1983 should be understood in the context of tort liability. By 1976, the Court emphasized that 1983 aligns with general tort immunities and defenses, as evidenced by Imbler v. Pachtman, which established that public policy considerations for absolute immunity of prosecutors in tort also apply under 1983. This principle has extended to judges and certain executive officials, who receive absolute or qualified immunity for actions within their official duties. While it has been suggested that similar immunity should extend to defense counsel appointed by the court, the Supreme Court in Ferri v. Ackerman declined this extension in the context of a state malpractice claim. The rationale is that appointed counsel's responsibilities differ significantly from those of judges and prosecutors, who serve societal interests and face broader implications in their official conduct, thereby justifying their immunity.

Immunity for officials aims to prevent intimidation that could hinder their ability to perform their duties effectively. Appointed counsel, while serving under statutory authority to ensure criminal defendants receive representation, primarily owes their responsibility to their client rather than the public. The Court noted a lack of empirical evidence supporting claims that malpractice litigation deters private attorneys from representing indigent defendants. The appellants reference the case of Ferri to argue that qualified immunity should be granted to court-appointed defense counsel facing lawsuits under Section 1983. For qualified immunity to apply, defendants must demonstrate reasonable grounds for their belief and act in good faith, as established in Scheuer v. Rhodes and Wood v. Strickland. This defense cannot be claimed under Rule 12(b)(6) and must be substantiated through affidavits or depositions during summary judgment proceedings or at trial. Unlike public officials who can access state-funded legal counsel, court-appointed private counsel face challenges in securing representation for a subsequent 1983 action. It raises a public policy issue regarding the expectation that these attorneys should personally finance their defense against lawsuits arising from their court appointments. The Court questioned whether, knowing the potential legal repercussions and financial burdens, a lawyer would accept the court appointment to represent an indigent defendant.

The determination of whether exposing court-appointed counsel to liability under 1983 actions could deter qualified lawyers from accepting such appointments is crucial. The argument emphasizes that assessing this risk requires understanding the legal context and trial dynamics rather than relying solely on empirical data, which is scarce. The document asserts that imposing liability on court-appointed lawyers would likely discourage competent legal professionals from participating in criminal defense. Consequently, it concludes that court-appointed counsel should be granted absolute immunity from civil liability under 1983.

In the case of Stoica v. Stewart, the court references Polk County, which indicated that a public defender is not considered a state actor based on their functional role. This reasoning extends to investigators working with public defenders since their role is to assist in opposing the state in criminal matters, rather than acting on behalf of the state. However, Stoica's complaint, which alleges a conspiracy between attorney Stewart, investigator Terry, and a state prosecutor to suppress evidence, creates an exception. It is established that private individuals engaging in joint action with state officials can be deemed to act under color of law, despite the officials' immunity. Thus, the complaint against Stewart and Terry is not subject to dismissal based on Polk County, warranting further examination of their immunity from liability.

Public defenders are granted absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as upheld by various federal appellate courts, with the notable exception of Dodson v. Polk County, which recognized only qualified immunity. This immunity is aimed at encouraging recruitment of skilled attorneys by preventing liability that could deter experienced lawyers from public defense roles. The court highlights the implications of liability on the public defender's ability to perform effectively, given their heavy caseloads and the need for independent professional judgment to prioritize and make strategic decisions in representing indigent clients. Additionally, complaints under the Civil Rights Act are generally treated favorably towards plaintiffs, allowing for broader interpretations that support inclusion. The court emphasizes that exposing public defenders to civil liability would not only hinder their recruitment but could also disrupt their critical role in ensuring competent representation within the criminal justice system.

Public defenders are not free to exercise their best judgment in representing clients if they face potential liability, as this could lead to a chilling effect on their advocacy. The threat of civil rights litigation under Section 1983 from dissatisfied clients could distract attorneys from effectively serving other indigent clients. The Supreme Court’s decision in Polk County v. Dodson acknowledged the need for absolute immunity for public defenders, emphasizing the importance of confidence in the adversary system. Imposing liability for traditional defense functions would deter the provision of post-conviction assistance to indigent defendants. Indigent defendants still have remedies for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel through state law, including motions for new trials, appeals, and habeas corpus proceedings. Additionally, there is a pathway for redress under state malpractice law without the challenges associated with federal 1983 claims. Consequently, the court reaffirms that public defenders and court-appointed counsel are absolutely immune from civil liability under Section 1983 when performing their professional duties.

Appellee Otis Terry, an investigator for the Defender Association of Philadelphia County, assisted Attorney Stewart in the defense of appellant Stoica. Although there is an argument that defense investigators lack the same protections as defense attorneys under Section 1983, it has been established that absolute immunity can extend to prosecutors performing investigative functions closely related to the judicial process. This immunity applies when securing information is essential for a prosecutor's decision to initiate criminal prosecution. In cases such as Waits v. McGowan, it has been determined that employees of attorneys involved in the judicial process are afforded immunity if their actions are closely tied to that process. Consequently, Terry, acting as an investigator for a public defender, is granted absolute immunity for his role in Stoica's defense, as this function directly relates to the judicial process. Therefore, the judgments from the district courts regarding this matter will be upheld. Additionally, it is noted that the Pennsylvania Public Defender Act excludes the County of Philadelphia from its requirements, and the appeal involved private attorneys appointed by the court.

The district court dismissed the appellant's constitutional claims, ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations under state law. Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3) were rejected due to the absence of alleged conspiracy, and it was determined that §§ 1986 and 1988 do not provide independent causes of action; specifically, § 1986 claims are contingent on § 1985 claims, and § 1988 serves only as a procedural provision without adding remedies beyond those in the Civil Rights Act. While the rationale from Polk County was not applied in this case, an alternative basis was found to uphold the district court's judgment.

The appellants acknowledged that the Ferri case did not directly apply, as it pertained to state malpractice rather than federal civil rights. State laws can define defenses, such as immunity, unless they conflict with federal law. However, when a claim arises under federal law, the federal interest dictates the definition of defenses, including immunity.

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal for failure to state a claim. Despite the challenges of summary judgment in cases dependent on state of mind, the Supreme Court has confirmed that government officials can be granted summary judgment on immunity grounds in damage suits for constitutional violations. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot obstruct the process with unfounded lawsuits.

The excerpt noted that prior to Ferri, only one appellate decision allowed a public defender to be liable for actions in a criminal case. Finally, the district court's decision to decline pendent jurisdiction over Bartee's state claim against practitioner Yanoff was upheld.

The court found that without valid federal claims against co-defendants Rossanese and Yollin, or against Yanoff, the application of legal precedents from Aldinger v. Howard and Tully v. Mott Supermarkets was appropriate. In appeal No. 81-1646, the court did not consider appellant Black's assertion that public defenders' administrative functions occur under color of law, as Black's complaint failed to demonstrate any harm resulting from those functions. Additionally, the court acknowledged a fourth circuit's dictum suggesting doubt about the Minns immunity doctrine's validity following Ferri v. Ackerman. However, the court maintained that the principles from Minns and similar cases are still relevant and significant today. The excerpt also emphasizes the social purpose of law, advocating that legal decisions should be made through an objective analysis of their potential impact on societal quality of life, as articulated by Professor Harry W. Jones.