Buckles v. Buckles

Citations: 546 N.E.2d 965; 46 Ohio App. 3d 118; 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1186Docket: No. 87AP-824

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; March 28, 1988; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Gretchen S. Buckles appeals an order from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, presenting three assignments of error. First, she argues the court erroneously granted the defendant-appellee a stay on alimony payments due within a year of the divorce decree, contrary to Ohio Civil Rule 75(G). Second, she contends the court improperly modified the divorce decree's alimony terms during her appeal, lacking jurisdiction to do so under the same rule. Third, she asserts the court abused its discretion by denying her financial discovery related to the defendant's post-trial motion to stay alimony enforcement.

The divorce decree, issued on July 24, 1986, mandated a lump-sum alimony payment by the defendant by July 24, 1987, with monthly interest payments of $1,500 until the principal was fully paid. After the decree, the defendant sought a partial stay on the alimony payment pending appeal and was granted a stay secured by a $190,000 bond, later replaced by a mortgage on real estate. Buckles argues the trial court's jurisdiction to modify alimony post-appeal is limited, referencing the case Rahm v. Rahm, which dealt with temporary alimony awards and is not directly applicable to her situation.

The Rahm court indicated that a stay order would restore a temporary alimony award during ongoing litigation. The relevance of the Rahm decision is not essential to the current matter, though its language appears to conflict with various unreported decisions from this court regarding the trial court's jurisdiction during an appeal. This court maintains that a trial court retains jurisdiction while an appeal is pending, provided it does not obstruct the appellate court's ability to review the appeal. Actions by the trial court that may render the appeal moot, such as ordering execution, do not detract from the appellate court's jurisdiction. Additionally, Civil Rules do not influence the jurisdiction of either court, as Civ. R. 82 explicitly states that these rules do not extend or limit court jurisdiction. The Ohio Constitution establishes that jurisdiction is defined by constitutional provisions and statutes, not procedural rules. Specifically, the Ohio Constitution grants common pleas courts original jurisdiction over justiciable matters and empowers courts of appeals to review judgments from lower courts. Relevant statutes, such as R.C. 2305.01 and R.C. 3105.011, affirm the original jurisdiction of common pleas courts in civil matters and their equitable powers in domestic relations cases. Consequently, Civ. R. 75(G) does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction but governs its procedural aspects, aligning with appellate rules.

Application for a stay of a trial court's judgment or order pending appeal must typically be made first in the trial court, as specified by App. R. 7(A). A motion can be made to the court of appeals or a judge thereof only if showing that it is impractical to apply to the trial court or if the trial court has denied such relief. While Civ. R. 75(G) does not explicitly address stays of execution, it must be interpreted alongside App. R. 7(A), reinforcing the requirement for initial applications to the trial court. The use of "ordinarily" in App. R. 7(A) allows for exceptions, but no such exception is present here since the trial court granted the stay.

R.C. 2505.09 states that an appeal acts as a stay only if obtained under the Appellate Rules, which again emphasizes the need for initial application in the trial court. Civ. R. 75(G) clarifies that the automatic stay provisions of Civ. R. 62(B) do not apply to custody, alimony, or support orders, requiring parties to seek court determination on both the supersedeas bond and the stay itself, which remains within the trial court's discretion. Civ. R. 75(G) focuses on modifications of orders rather than stays, indicating that a stay merely postpones compliance without altering the order's terms.

In this instance, the court set a deadline for a lump-sum alimony payment but granted a partial stay, delaying the defendant's payment obligation until the appeal concludes while requiring periodic interest payments at the legal rate. This does not constitute a modification of the original award but a mere delay in payment. Even if Civ. R. 75(G) were applicable, it would not change the outcome, as the focus remains on securing the rights of the adverse party and the interests of any children involved.

Civ. R. 75(G) allows for modifications to existing orders regarding support, alimony, or custody during the appeal process, differing from a stay, which halts the entire order. Modifications can adjust the amounts paid or custody arrangements while an appeal is pending, serving as a procedural alternative to a stay without affecting the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate courts. Any interim relief must first be sought from the trial court as per App. R. 7(A). The trial court's decision is evaluated for abuse of discretion, not jurisdictional errors. In this case, the court found sufficient grounds to maintain the status quo to protect the parties' interests during the appeal, noting that the plaintiff was adequately protected by interest payments and a supersedeas bond. The plaintiff's assignments of error were rejected; Civ. R. 75(G) does not prevent a stay, the trial court's jurisdiction is unaffected, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order. Consequently, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.