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Goss v. Kmart Corporation, 2006-T-0117 (6-22-2007)

Citation: 2007 Ohio 3200Docket: No. 2006-T-0117.

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; June 22, 2007; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Ricky A. Goss appeals the dismissal of his complaint by the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the case for "failure to state a cause of action." Goss, who worked as a computer operator at Kmart's Warren, Ohio distribution center and had been on short-term disability leave, was terminated in October 2005 due to alleged medical fraud, specifically reported incidents of him jet skiing. After denying the allegations in a February 2006 letter and receiving no response, Goss filed a two-count complaint against Kmart in May 2006, claiming Disability Discrimination under Ohio law and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Kmart responded with a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Goss's claims were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act because he was subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which they claimed restricted him to the CBA's grievance procedure. Kmart contended that this meant Goss was not an "at-will" employee and could not pursue a wrongful discharge claim.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Kmart's motion to dismiss, stating that the motion was well taken and dismissing Goss's complaint without addressing the merits of the claims. Goss appealed, asserting that the trial court erroneously considered the CBA, which was outside the pleadings, effectively treating the motion as one for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss. The appellate court agreed with Goss, highlighting that Civ. R. 12(B) allows certain defenses to be raised by motion, but the trial court's consideration of extraneous material was inappropriate for a dismissal under this rule.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of a complaint and is procedural in nature. Courts are limited to the allegations within the complaint when considering such motions. Appellate courts conduct a de novo review to assess the appropriateness of a dismissal under Civ. R. 12(B)(6). All factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed true, with reasonable inferences made in favor of the non-moving party. The principles of notice pleading apply, meaning a plaintiff does not need to prove their case at the pleading stage. A complaint should only be dismissed if it is evident from its face that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would entitle them to recovery. 

In the current case, the plaintiff, Goss, alleges disability discrimination under R.C. 4112.02 and wrongful discharge. The statute prohibits discrimination based on disability, stating it is unlawful for an employer to discharge someone without just cause due to their disability. To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show they have a disability, experienced adverse employment action partly due to that disability, and could perform essential job functions despite their disability. A "disability" is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities, and each determination of disability is made on a case-by-case basis.

Goss's complaint alleges he suffers from spinal stenosis, depression, diabetes, and other spinal issues, all of which he claims Kmart was aware of. He asserts these conditions limit major life activities and led to his physician ordering him on disability leave until December 5, 2005. The conditions are classified as "physical impairments" that could qualify as disabilities under Ohio law (R.C. 4112.01(A)(13)). Goss contends he was terminated due to these disabilities and disputes Kmart's claim that he was observed lifting a jet ski, labeling it as false. He states that he met his job duties satisfactorily as a computer operator, which is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6). 

To establish a wrongful discharge claim, a plaintiff must show a clear public policy, jeopardy to that policy from the dismissal, causation linking the dismissal to the policy, and a lack of legitimate business justification from the employer. Goss claims his discharge violates the public policy against discharging employees based on disability, as stated in R.C. 4112.02. He argues that Kmart's reliance on false allegations for his dismissal indicates a lack of legitimate justification. The court concludes that Goss's claims under R.C. Chapter 4112 and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are sufficient to withstand Kmart's motion to dismiss. Kmart's assertion that the trial court should have treated its motion as one for summary judgment is countered by the court's finding that Goss had adequate opportunity to address the motion's content, deeming any error harmless.

A motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B) that includes matters outside the pleadings must be treated as a motion for summary judgment if those matters are not excluded by the court. Courts can only consider specific matters enumerated in Rule 56, and all parties must be notified of the conversion to summary judgment at least fourteen days prior to the hearing. In this case, the trial court did not provide such notice when it conducted a hearing on Kmart's motion to dismiss, which constitutes an error in treating the motion as a summary judgment. Kmart's dismissal motion, claiming Goss was subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) preempting his discrimination complaint, relied on an unauthenticated CBA. Civ. R. 56(C) dictates that only evidence specified in that rule is permissible for summary judgment. Since Kmart's CBA was not properly authenticated, it lacked evidentiary value and could not be considered by the court, which further undermines the validity of the summary judgment in favor of Kmart. Proper procedure requires that evidentiary materials be included in a properly framed affidavit, and unauthenticated documents are inadmissible.

Kmart's motion to dismiss was based on three claims: the existence of a valid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), that the CBA covered Goss, and that the CBA precluded Goss' claims. The trial court's decision relied on an improperly authenticated document, which constituted reversible error, as the court held a hearing on the motion. According to relevant case law (Dresher v. Burt), the moving party must initially demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. The court concluded that the trial court erred by considering information not properly certified or authenticated, regardless of whether Kmart's motion was viewed as a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. This ruling allows both parties to file a properly supported motion for summary judgment in the future. Goss' assignment of error was deemed meritorious, leading to the reversal of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas' judgment and a remand for further proceedings. Additionally, it was noted that R.C. 4112.01(13) had been amended to replace "Handicap" with "Disability" without altering the definition.