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United States v. Albert Juan Nunez

Citation: 668 F.2d 1116Docket: 79-1500

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 23, 1982; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This appeal concerns a conviction for possession of a counterfeit obligation with intent to defraud under 18 U.S.C. § 472. The defendant was found guilty after a jury trial focused on a single count involving a $10 counterfeit Federal Reserve Note, following pretrial dismissal of a related count. The prosecution's case relied on fingerprint evidence and testimony from a cooperating witness, who invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege regarding collateral matters tied to a pending state drug charge. The defense challenged the trial court’s handling of the witness’s privilege assertion, the adequacy of cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment, and the refusal to instruct the jury on the implications of a witness invoking the Fifth Amendment. Additional claims included alleged prosecutorial misconduct, prejudicial testimony, the provision of an accomplice instruction, and the sufficiency of evidence linking the defendant to the counterfeit bill. The appellate court found no reversible error, holding that the witness's privilege was properly managed, the defendant’s confrontation rights were not unduly restricted, and the jury was appropriately instructed. The court further determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the indictment was valid on its face, and no prejudice resulted from the witness’s protective custody status or the accomplice instruction. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

Legal Issues Addressed

Accomplice Instructions—Sufficiency of Evidence and Prejudicial Effect

Application: The court found that giving an accomplice instruction did not constitute error or prejudice where the instruction was consistent with established law and did not imply guilt by association.

Reasoning: However, a review of the jury instructions indicated no prejudicial error, and the trial judge appropriately informed the jurors that they were responsible for assessing the credibility of witnesses.

Fifth Amendment Privilege—Judicial Determination and In Camera Hearings

Application: The court held that an in camera hearing was not necessary when the circumstances supporting a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege were already apparent from the record, particularly where the incriminating potential was clear.

Reasoning: The court deemed it unnecessary to hold an in camera hearing since the circumstances supporting the privilege were already known.

Grand Jury Proceedings—Limits on Attacking Indictment for Insufficient Evidence

Application: The court reaffirmed that the sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury cannot be challenged if the indictment is valid on its face, and did not find prejudicial error or bias in the grand jury process.

Reasoning: However, established precedent, including United States v. Kysar, indicates that an indictment, if fair on its face, is a conclusive determination of probable cause, and the trial court cannot investigate the evidentiary basis behind it.

Grant or Denial of Mistrial—Prejudicial Testimony and Curative Instructions

Application: The court held that a brief, unsolicited mention of a witness’s protective custody status, despite being contrary to a motion in limine, did not warrant a mistrial where the objection was promptly sustained and curative instructions were deemed unnecessary to avoid highlighting the issue.

Reasoning: The court acknowledged the comment was 'unfortunate' but denied the mistrial request, indicating that an instruction would only emphasize the issue.

Jury Instructions—Informers and Accomplices

Application: The trial court’s instructions admonishing jurors to scrutinize the testimony of informers and accomplices with care were upheld as consistent with established precedent and not prejudicial.

Reasoning: The jury instructions included guidance on weighing an informer's testimony with caution due to potential bias and emphasized that an accomplice’s testimony, while admissible, should also be scrutinized carefully.

Jury Instructions—Refusal to Instruct on Fifth Amendment Invocation and Witness Credibility

Application: The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that a witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment could be considered in assessing credibility, because established law prohibits juries from drawing adverse inferences from a witness’s exercise of this constitutional right.

Reasoning: However, established case law maintains that juries cannot draw inferences from a witness’s exercise of this constitutional right, whether for the prosecution or defense, and thus the court's refusal to give the instruction was appropriate.

Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation—Limitations Due to Witness's Fifth Amendment Privilege

Application: The court found that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was not violated when a key government witness invoked the Fifth Amendment on collateral matters, as the defense had ample alternative means to impeach the witness’s credibility.

Reasoning: Ultimately, the court found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination was not materially prejudiced by Schmidt's refusal to answer one question, as the defense had sufficient alternative means to challenge Schmidt's credibility.

Sufficiency of Evidence—Possession of Counterfeit Obligations

Application: The court concluded that both direct and circumstantial evidence, including fingerprint identification and witness testimony, were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find possession of counterfeit currency beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reasoning: However, the court concluded that both direct and circumstantial evidence allowed a reasonable jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the counterfeit bill around the alleged date in the indictment, October 27, 1978.