State v. Koons, 06-Co-43 (9-28-2007)

Citation: 2007 Ohio 5242Docket: No. 06-CO-43.

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; September 28, 2007; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Samuel Koons, the defendant-appellant, appeals a conviction for domestic violence from the Columbiana County Municipal Court following a bench trial. Koons resided with his girlfriend, Brenda Bell, and her two sons, Justin and Cody. On April 14, 2006, police responded to a domestic incident involving Koons and the boys, leading to his arrest and subsequent charges for assaulting Justin under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2919.25(A), which addresses domestic violence. The trial court found Koons guilty, sentencing him to 180 days in jail (120 days suspended), three years of probation, and a $750 fine. Koons filed a notice of appeal on August 4, 2006, and his sentence was stayed pending the appeal.

Koons raises a single assignment of error, arguing that Ohio’s Defense of Marriage Amendment (Article XV, Section 11) invalidates R.C. 2919.25 as it pertains to unmarried individuals. This amendment, effective December 2, 2004, defines marriage strictly as a union between one man and one woman and prohibits the recognition of any legal relationship between unmarried individuals. Koons contends that the definition of "family or household member" in R.C. 2919.25, which includes individuals living as spouses, creates a legal relationship that the Defense of Marriage Amendment does not allow. He asserts that since he and Brenda were not legally recognized as spouses, he cannot be guilty of domestic violence for actions against her son, Justin.

It is noted that Koons did not raise the constitutionality of R.C. 2919.25 in the trial court, leading to a waiver of this issue on appeal, as established by precedent in State v. Bowersock. Thus, the court may not review the constitutionality claim.

The court acknowledges that it will consider the appellant's constitutional challenge to R.C. 2919.25 despite the appellant's failure to raise this issue at the trial level, following a precedent set in State v. Rodriguez. The challenge can be either facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied. Previous rulings, including those from the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Carswell, establish that R.C. 2919.25 is constitutional on its face. The Supreme Court clarified that the term "person living as a spouse" serves only to identify a category for domestic violence statutes and does not confer any legal rights akin to marriage, thus not violating the Ohio Constitution's marriage provisions. The court emphasizes that the distinction between domestic violence and assault lies in the relationship between the parties involved, with R.C. 2919.25 aiming to protect a broad class of individuals. The statute recognizes multiple victim classifications beyond those living as spouses and does not create additional rights associated with marriage. The definition of "living as a spouse" pertains to a cohabitation arrangement that individuals determine independently, and the state does not establish this relationship. Consequently, R.C. 2919.25 is deemed constitutional and not in conflict with the Defense of Marriage Amendment.

The appellant contends that R.C. 2919.25 is unconstitutional as applied to him, an unmarried individual living with his girlfriend and her children during the offense. This argument mirrors the issue addressed in State v. Carnes, where the court considered the constitutionality of R.C. 2919.25 under similar circumstances: an unmarried couple cohabiting as boyfriend and girlfriend. Evidence presented at the bench trial confirmed that the appellant and his girlfriend had lived together for two-and-a-half years without marriage yet appeared to function as spouses, as defined by the domestic violence statute.

The court referenced its earlier decision in Gough v. Inner, which examined R.C. 3113.31 regarding domestic violence civil protection orders (DVCPO). It noted that the definition of "person living as a spouse" in R.C. 3113.31 closely resembles that in R.C. 2919.25. The court concluded that R.C. 3113.31 creates a legal status for unmarried individuals that allows them to seek a DVCPO based on their relationship. However, it emphasized that this legal status does not equate to marriage, which is recognized by law as a distinct status with specific rights and benefits, such as dower interests, spousal support, and various legal privileges. Therefore, R.C. 3113.31 does not conflict with the Defense of Marriage Amendment, as the status it creates does not approximate marriage's design, qualities, or significance.

The reasoning applied in the case of Gough was utilized to assess the constitutionality of R.C. 2919.25, the criminal domestic violence statute. It was determined that the legal status established for cohabiting couples under this statute does not equate to the comprehensive legal status of marriage, thus posing no conflict with constitutional provisions. Most courts have similarly concluded that R.C. 2919.25 bases its applicability on the factual determination of cohabitation rather than on legal marriage, supporting the view that it does not conflict with the 'Defense of Marriage' Amendment. Although Gough did not specifically address this issue, its reasoning is relevant, affirming that there is no constitutional conflict. Consequently, the appellant's argument is deemed without merit, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment, with Judge Vukovich concurring in judgment only and Judge Waite also concurring.