State v. Brown

Citations: 607 N.E.2d 540; 79 Ohio App. 3d 445; 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2271Docket: No. CA91-08-056.

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; May 4, 1992; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Ohio is appealing a dismissal order from the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas regarding an indictment against Donald Wayne Brown for complicity in passing a bad check. The dismissal was based on the state's failure to trial Brown within the time limits set by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.), specifically Article III, which ensures a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Brown was indicted on July 7, 1988, but could not be located until January 20, 1990, when he was found in custody in Michigan. The Clermont County Prosecutor filed a request for temporary custody under the I.A.D., which was forwarded to Michigan's Department of Corrections when Brown was transferred to a correctional facility. During this time, Kentucky also sought custody of Brown for separate charges.

Despite being tried in Kentucky from April 17 to May 21, 1990, no communication regarding Brown's status was sent to Clermont County, which still had a pending indictment against him. Brown filed motions to dismiss the charge in Clermont County on February 11 and March 15, 1991, citing violations of his speedy trial rights under the I.A.D. The trial court ultimately found that Brown had requested final disposition of the charge on February 20, 1990, and ruled that the prosecutor failed to bring him to trial within the required timeframe. Consequently, the court dismissed the pending bad check charge, emphasizing the procedural guidelines established by the I.A.D. which mandates that a defendant must be tried within 180 days of such a request for final disposition.

Written notice and requests for final disposition must be sent by the prisoner to the warden or relevant custody official, who must then forward it to the appropriate prosecuting official and court via registered or certified mail. Such requests operate as a demand for final disposition of all untried charges related to detainers against the prisoner in the specified jurisdiction. The custody officials are required to notify relevant prosecuting officers and courts about the prisoner's request. Under Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.), a prosecutor with a detainer can request the prisoner's temporary custody for trial by presenting a written request, for which the custodial authorities must provide a certificate detailing the prisoner's commitment status. If the prosecution initiates the return under Article IV, trial must commence within 120 days of the prisoner's return; if the prisoner initiates under Article III, trial must start within 180 days of the request's receipt. The court found that a Form 4 submitted by Brown constituted a valid Article III request for the disposition of all pending charges, including a bad check charge from Clermont County, despite it being addressed to Kentucky authorities. The I.A.D. is to be broadly interpreted to fulfill its objectives, allowing for substantial compliance by the defendant, which entails taking all reasonable steps to invoke its protections. Brown’s awareness of the charges in both jurisdictions was implied by their inclusion on the Form 4 he signed.

Some appellate courts have determined that the 180-day timeline for Article III actions commences only when the receiving state's prosecuting attorney receives the prisoner's notice and request for final disposition, along with an offer for temporary custody. However, in Brown's case, he made all necessary efforts to request disposition of the Clermont County charge, but the Michigan authorities failed to act on both his Article III request and the Clermont County Prosecutor's Article IV request. Once a defendant submits a request form to the appropriate prison officials, they have met their obligation under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.). The failure of the sending state to adhere to proper procedures upon receiving the request should not negate the inmate's right to a speedy trial. Citing State v. York, the court affirmed that the 180-day period starts when a defendant formally requests final disposition and submits the required documents. Brown made his request on March 27, 1990, establishing that the Clermont County Prosecutor had 180 days from that date to bring him to trial. Since this did not occur, the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss. The assignment of error was overruled, and the judgment was affirmed, noting that the trial court mistakenly conflated the dates of Kentucky's request for temporary custody and the offer for custody.