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Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Cross-Appellees v. City of Akron, Cross-Appellants, Francois Seguin, Intervenors

Citation: 651 F.2d 1198Docket: 79-3700, 79-3701 and 79-3757

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 22, 1981; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves consolidated appeals challenging the constitutionality of a City of Akron ordinance regulating abortions. The plaintiffs, consisting of outpatient abortion clinics and a physician, contested various provisions of the ordinance, arguing they imposed unconstitutional burdens on abortion rights. The district court analyzed the ordinance section by section, upholding some provisions while invalidating others. Key rulings included the invalidation of requirements for parental notice and consent for minors (Section 1870.05) and specific informed consent requirements (Section 1870.06(B)), which were deemed unconstitutional due to significant intrusions on decision-making. The court upheld provisions mandating informed written consent (Section 1870.06(A)) and hospital requirements for post-first trimester abortions (Section 1870.03), aligning with recognized state interests. The ordinance's 24-hour waiting period (Section 1870.07) was reversed for imposing undue burdens. Additionally, the court found Section 1870.16, concerning fetal remains disposal, to be unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs argued the ordinance applied a less stringent standard than the strict scrutiny required by Roe v. Wade. However, the district court concluded that regulations imposing minimal interference do not necessitate compelling state justification. The outcome affirmed some sections of the ordinance while reversing others, reflecting an ongoing judicial balancing of abortion regulations against constitutional protections.

Legal Issues Addressed

24-hour Waiting Period for Abortion

Application: Section 1870.07, which enforced a 24-hour waiting period, was found unconstitutional as it imposed undue burdens without serving a compelling state interest.

Reasoning: The court finds that the waiting period causes significant delays without medical justification and does not align with the state's interest in abortion decision-making.

Hospital Requirement for Post-First Trimester Abortions

Application: Section 1870.03's requirement for hospital abortions after the first trimester was upheld, aligning with the state's compelling interest in maternal health.

Reasoning: Section 1870.03, which requires that abortions after the first trimester be performed in hospitals, is in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade.

Informed Consent Requirements for Abortion

Application: Provisions mandating informed written consent (Section 1870.06(A)) were upheld, while those imposing specific information requirements (Section 1870.06(B)) were invalidated for infringing on medical judgment.

Reasoning: The district court found section 1870.06(C) to serve a legitimate state interest in female health by mandating that physicians counsel patients about risks associated with their pregnancy and the abortion procedure.

Parental Consent and Notification for Minors

Application: The court invalidated Section 1870.05, which required parental notice and consent for minors, citing constitutional protections against third-party vetoes over abortion decisions.

Reasoning: The district court deemed sections 1870.05(A) and 1870.05(B) concerning parental notice and consent for minors seeking abortions as invalid.

Regulation of Abortion by Municipal Ordinance

Application: The City of Akron ordinance regulating abortions was challenged on constitutional grounds, with specific sections being upheld or invalidated based on their impact on abortion rights.

Reasoning: Consolidated appeals challenge the constitutionality of a City of Akron ordinance regulating abortions, effective May 1, 1978.

Standing to Challenge Abortion Regulations

Application: The district court determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the ordinance, such as section 1870.04, which relates to post-viability abortions.

Reasoning: The district court determined that no plaintiff had standing to challenge various provisions of the ordinance, except where appeals were made.

Vagueness in Statutory Language

Application: Section 1870.16 concerning the disposal of fetal remains was invalidated for vagueness, particularly due to the undefined term 'humane'.

Reasoning: Regarding section 1870.16 on the disposal of fetal remains, the court deemed the language vague and potentially unconstitutional, emphasizing the need for clear legislative directives.