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State of Iowa v. Cameron Covert Franklin
Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-1779
Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; October 28, 2015; Iowa; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Cameron Franklin appeals a restitution order following her guilty plea to unauthorized use of a credit card. She argues that the restitution should be limited to the $180 in withdrawals related to her offense and contends that the district court relied on uncorroborated victim testimony regarding the total restitution amount. The court found that restitution amounts are not confined to the specific offense for which a defendant pleads guilty and upheld the district court's restitution award. In October 2013, Franklin faced charges including credit card fraud, and in June 2014, the State sought restitution totaling $7,872 for two victims. After pleading guilty to credit card fraud in exchange for dismissing other charges, Franklin was sentenced on July 10, 2014. A restitution hearing on August 14, 2014, revealed that one victim, Tami Evig, claimed over $12,000 in losses, having received partial insurance compensation. The other victim, Rebecca Hawley, reported $1,360 in stolen items and $180 withdrawn without her consent, without any insurance recovery. The district court subsequently ordered Franklin to pay $5,000 to Evig and $1,000 to Hawley. The court reviews restitution orders for legal errors, focusing on whether there is substantial evidence supporting the findings. Under Iowa law, defendants must make restitution to victims of their criminal acts, and the court must identify victims and assess pecuniary damages based on potential recovery in civil actions. The district court must assess what losses can be factored into the restitution calculation. Restitution may encompass damages directly linked to criminal activities and is deemed reasonable if it correlates with the harm caused by the offense. Franklin argues that restitution should be confined to the amount associated with the crime for which she pleaded guilty, specifically $500. However, legal precedents clarify that restitution in criminal cases is not restricted to the offense tied to the guilty plea. The court is permitted to extend restitution to any amount appropriate for tort recovery. Thus, the district court acted correctly in not limiting the damages to the specific crime. Franklin further claims that the restitution amount lacks substantial evidentiary support, asserting that the court relied solely on the victims' uncorroborated testimony. Both victims provided detailed accounts of the stolen items and their values, having researched prices for items purchased or received. Evig reported over $12,000 in stolen property, with insurance covering $5,921.92, while Hawley stated that more than $1,360 in items were taken, along with an additional $180 from her bank account. Franklin failed to contest their testimony or provide contradictory evidence. Therefore, the court's restitution awards of $5,000 to Evig and $1,000 to Hawley are supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed its decision, noting minimal evidence regarding Evig's insurance claim and emphasizing that while restitution typically aligns with the deductible, a larger amount can be substantiated. In this case, no evidence of Evig's deductible was presented.