Tarsitano v. The Board of Education of Township High School District 211

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1-07-2041 Rel

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; November 29, 2008; Illinois; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The case involves an appeal by William A. Tarsitano, representing taxpayers of Township High School District 211, against the Board of Education of the District following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the District. The court ruled that the District's no-bid contracts with the Illinois Energy Consortium, Inc. (IEC) for electricity and natural gas purchases were exempt from competitive bidding requirements under the Illinois School Code.

Tarsitano, a taxpayer and resident, sought a declaratory judgment to prevent the District from entering into these contracts without a competitive bidding process, arguing that such contracts, exceeding $10,000, should comply with the School Code's bidding requirements. He claimed that electricity and natural gas are commodities available from multiple suppliers, thus necessitating a bidding process.

The District contended that the contracts were exempt under section 10-20.21(a)(xiii) of the School Code, which allows such exemptions for energy contracts. The District asserted that the IEC provided the lowest price for the contracts in question. Tarsitano filed for summary judgment, claiming the contracts were void due to non-compliance with bidding requirements, while the District filed a cross-motion asserting the exemption applied.

The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's on June 22, 2007, determining that the District's energy contracts did not require competitive bidding. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the court erred in exempting the District's no-bid vendor contracts from bidding under section 10-20.21(a)(xiii) of the School Code, asserting that such contracts must qualify as goods or services obtainable from a single source to be exempt. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them favorably toward the nonmoving party. While summary judgment is encouraged for expeditious litigation, it should only be granted when the moving party's right is clear and free from doubt. The Board of Education's contracting powers are defined by statute, which mandates awarding contracts to the lowest responsible bidder except for specific exemptions, including those for utilities. The relevant statutory provision has not been previously interpreted in Illinois case law. When interpreting unjudicially reviewed statutes, courts rely on the statute's plain language and legislative intent as primary guides.

Both parties assert that the statute's language is clear; however, their conflicting arguments indicate otherwise. Ambiguity is defined as having multiple meanings. The plaintiff argues that subsection (xiii) of the statute exempts single-source supply contracts from competitive bidding, with the 'such as' language encompassing various contract categories influenced by market conditions. Conversely, the District claims that this section exempts utility contracts from the competitive bidding requirements for school supply purchases.

Statutory interpretation is a legal question reviewed de novo, aiming to discern legislative intent primarily through the statute's language. Clear and unambiguous terms should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, without resorting to extrinsic aids unless necessary to uphold legislative intent. The statute specifies that contracts for goods or services economically procurable from one source, including utility services, are exempt from bidding.

The doctrine of the last antecedent dictates that modifying phrases apply only to the nearest preceding terms. In this case, the phrase 'such as for the purchase of magazines, books, periodicals, pamphlets, and reports' modifies the clause about single-source contracts. The conjunction 'and' connects the two clauses, suggesting both types of contracts are exempt from competitive bidding. Thus, the legislature intended that both single-source contracts and utility service contracts are exempt.

The trial court's ruling granting the District's motion for summary judgment is affirmed, confirming that the District’s no-bid vendor contracts are exempt under the statute's plain meaning.