People v. Severson

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2-07-0134 Rel

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 6, 2008; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Defendant Marc Severson was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and subsequently served with a notice of statutory summary suspension for refusing to submit to alcohol testing. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Severson’s petition to rescind the suspension, concluding that he had not actually refused testing. 

At the hearing, De Kalb County sheriff's deputy Paul Delisio testified that he encountered Severson in a hospital after a motor vehicle accident, administered a sobriety test which Severson failed, and then requested a chemical test. Delisio warned Severson that refusal would lead to suspension. Severson initially stated, "I respectfully refuse," but later indicated a willingness to cooperate without physical restraint. A phlebotomist then drew Severson's blood with his cooperation, which later showed a blood alcohol level exceeding 0.08.

Sergeant Ryan Braden, who arrived after the initial refusal, testified that he explained to Severson that he had no right to refuse testing, and Severson expressed that he wanted it noted as a refusal but would not resist the blood draw. The trial court ultimately ruled that Severson did not refuse the test, granting his petition to rescind the suspension, which the State appealed. The appeal proceeded even though Severson did not file an appellee's brief, as the court found sufficient grounds to review the case's merits.

Section 11--501.1 of the Illinois Code, known as the "implied consent law," establishes that motorists operating on public highways in Illinois are considered to have consented to chemical testing for blood alcohol content if arrested for DUI. Upon a motorist's refusal to submit to testing or if their test shows a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher, the arresting officer must file a sworn report with the Secretary of State, which triggers a summary suspension of the motorist's driving privileges. The duration of the suspension is longer for refusal compared to a high blood alcohol level result.

In a specific case, the defendant initially refused a blood test but later allowed it after being informed he could not refuse. The State argued that the defendant's desire for officers to note his refusal indicated that he did not consent to the blood draw. The court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant's compliance under protest does not negate consent, emphasizing that the purpose of the implied consent law is to facilitate evidence collection for DUI cases. The court concluded that the language used by the defendant should not override the fact that testing was completed. It noted that previous cases, such as People v. Shaffer, demonstrated that courts do not reward or punish defendants based on their wording when the intent to comply with testing is clear. Additionally, the court found no legal basis for the State's claim that a motorist's motivations for consenting to testing are relevant.

The State relied on *People v. DuBose*, 348 Ill. App. 3d 992 (2004), regarding a summary suspension under section 11--501.6(a) of the Code, which allows law enforcement to request testing from a motorist involved in an accident causing personal injury or death. In *DuBose*, the defendant was arrested for DUI after an accident and initially refused testing. However, the arresting officer's supervisor indicated that blood could be drawn without consent. The defendant later expressed willingness to have his blood drawn, but insisted it be noted that he had refused initially. The officer reported the refusal to the Secretary of State, resulting in a suspension of the defendant's driving privileges.

On appeal, the defendant attempted to use judicial estoppel, claiming the State's position in suspending his license was inconsistent with its later use of blood-test results in the DUI prosecution. The court disagreed, stating that the State's ability to draw blood without consent did not imply consent had been given. The court noted that the defendant did not challenge the suspension through a hearing, leaving the merits of the State's position unexamined. Consequently, the trial court's finding that the defendant did not refuse testing was upheld, leading to the rescission of the suspension of his driving privileges.

The court acknowledged that the defendant could have faced suspension based on blood alcohol results, but emphasized that his suspension was solely due to the alleged refusal, which could not be upheld on unreported test results introduced after the fact. The court highlighted the importance of the defendant being notified of the suspension's basis, asserting that a suspension based on unknown test results would violate fairness in judicial proceedings. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, with justices O'Malley and Grometer concurring.