In re Marriage of Reynard

Citation: Not availableDocket: 4-06-0897 Rel

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 15, 2008; Illinois; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mary Anne Schierman appealed a trial court decision that denied her petition to modify maintenance payments from her ex-husband, Charles Reynard, arguing for an increase from $1,600 to $2,800 per month. The original maintenance arrangement was established during their divorce in 2002 after 33 years of marriage, during which they had two daughters. Charles, who had transitioned from teaching to a successful law career, was earning over $136,000 annually as a circuit judge at the time of the divorce. Mary Anne had health issues, specifically fibromyalgia, and was earning approximately $29,000 annually as a museum volunteer coordinator, plus $300 from a boarder.

The trial court divided their marital property, with Mary Anne receiving slightly more, including the marital residence valued at $166,000. Charles' share included two properties and some nonmarital assets. The court ordered Charles to pay for their youngest daughter Meghan's college expenses and set the maintenance amount considering Charles' financial burdens, which included multiple mortgage payments and educational expenses. The maintenance was to terminate upon specific contingencies, including death, Mary Anne's remarriage, cohabitation, or completion of a payment due by January 1, 2013. The appellate court upheld the initial maintenance decision, concluding that the amount was reasonable given Charles's financial obligations.

Mary Anne filed a petition on July 28, 2005, to modify the original order under section 510(a-5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, citing substantial changes in circumstances. Key points include:

1. **Charles' Financial Changes**: 
   - His income increased to approximately $157,000, with total income exceeding $163,000.
   - No longer responsible for Meghan's college expenses and one mortgage payment.
   - Remarried to Judith Valente, who is employed, potentially lowering his living expenses.
   - Investments grew to $422,000; he spends about $4,257 monthly on his home, including significant capital improvements and mortgage payments.
   - Incurred approximately $68,000 in new debt, mainly for his daughter's education and home repairs, with monthly payments of $1,360.

2. **Mary Anne's Financial Changes**: 
   - Her salary increased to about $34,000, totaling $39,306 from all sources.
   - Lost $300 monthly income from a lodger.
   - Sold the marital home for $212,000, netting $206,700, and purchased a smaller home for $142,500. 
   - Increased her investment portfolio value from $194,162 to $375,606 through asset reallocation post-sale.
   - Made three trips for vacations since the original award.

Overall, both parties experienced significant financial changes since the original award, affecting their respective incomes, expenses, and overall financial health.

Mary Anne's monthly expenses for entertainment, social clubs, vacations, and gifts have increased by $250, with total monthly expenses now at $4,132. She plans to retire in six years at age 65 and contributes $1,116 monthly to a 403(b) retirement account and $416 to a Roth IRA. The trial court ruled against her motion to increase maintenance payments, citing no substantial change in circumstances. Mary Anne's income rose from $31,141 to $39,306 (26.22%), while Charles' income increased from $143,965 to $163,733 (13.73%). Mary Anne's expenses increased from $3,060 to $3,496 (14.25%), but the court excluded her excess mortgage payment and Roth IRA contributions from its calculations. Charles' expenses, excluding maintenance payments, rose from $7,027 to $8,473 (20.58%). The court found a significant decrease of $58,000 (34.9%) in the value of Mary Anne's real estate, while Charles' real estate value remained stable. Mary Anne's savings and investments grew from $194,162 to $375,606 (93.45%), compared to Charles' increase from $350,392 to $422,772 (20.66%). The court did not factor in the value of Charles' joint account due to lack of information and noted his accumulated debt of $68,000 since the original maintenance order. It rejected Mary Anne's argument regarding Charles’ improved financial situation post-college expenses for their daughter, citing ongoing loan repayments. The court deemed Charles' estimated $2,833 monthly for home improvements reasonable. Mary Anne appeals for an increase in her maintenance award to $2,800 per month, arguing that the trial court erred in its denial. The court has discretion in maintenance decisions, considering various factors outlined in Section 504(a) of the applicable Act.

The trial court must reasonably balance interests in light of section 504's goals, as established in prior case law. Historically, maintenance was deemed necessary for women due to restrictions on property ownership and the awarding of property to husbands. The 1977 Dissolution Act shifted focus to property division for financial support, aiming for spouses to achieve future financial independence. Amendments in 1993 made maintenance awards more accessible, but these awards are not guaranteed and should be reserved for necessity. There is no obligation for maintenance to equalize net disposable incomes, though this may be appropriate in some cases as marriage is viewed as a partnership. The appellate court upheld a prior ruling that did not require equalization in a specific case, citing the circumstances did not warrant it. Modifications to maintenance require proof of substantial changes in circumstances, with the burden on the party seeking change. The trial court must consider statutory factors for modifications and those from the initial award determination. A specific argument raised by Mary Anne noted that the trial court did not adequately address her contributions during the marriage, which included part-time work, child-rearing, and managing election campaigns.

Mary Anne relocated to Bloomington/Normal to support Charles' career as an assistant State's Attorney, sacrificing her own successful career in country decorating sales. She actively campaigned for Charles during multiple election years from 1979 to 1996 but did not obtain her teaching license despite completing the necessary coursework. The trial court, presiding over both the 2002 and 2006 proceedings, did not specifically restate the marriage length or Mary Anne's contributions, yet it reviewed the case file and was familiar with the evidence. A key argument for Mary Anne was that Charles' college-payment obligations for their daughter, Meghan, should have significantly decreased by the time of the hearings. Charles had been paying between $2,900 and $3,400 monthly for Meghan’s college expenses, which totaled approximately $134,400 since the original order in November 2002. Although Charles has ongoing loans related to Meghan's education, it was reasoned that he likely was not paying at the previous rate. The trial court initially awarded Mary Anne $1,600 in maintenance, reflecting Charles' capability to pay without compromising his own needs. Despite recognizing that Charles' college-payment obligations would decrease over time, the court noted that his overall expenses remained constant, primarily due to capital improvements on his home. Charles’ financial affidavit indicated he was making significant payments towards debts, including college and home improvements, but the distribution of these payments was unclear. Ultimately, the trial court found the expenses reasonable and did not abuse its discretion in its rulings.

A disagreement with the trial court's assessment of Charles' home-improvement costs as optional does not automatically justify an increase in Mary Anne's maintenance. Generally, an increase in a party's income is insufficient for modifying a maintenance award, as supported by case law indicating adherence to a "substantial change in circumstances" standard. The trial court had previously considered Mary Anne's contributions to the marriage, awarded her a significant portion of the marital estate valued at nearly $700,000, acknowledged her earning capacity, and facilitated her potential retirement in 2013. The maintenance of $1,600 per month was designed to help Mary Anne maintain a lifestyle similar to that during the marriage. Continuous evaluation of Charles' income without evidence of Mary Anne's genuine need would undermine the goal of a "clean break" post-dissolution.

The case differs from those cited by Mary Anne involving minimal or absent maintenance awards in lengthy marriages. Additionally, while Mary Anne argued that the trial court misused percentage gains to assess the parties' financial changes, the court clarified that percentages were used for illustrative purposes alongside consideration of actual circumstances. Mary Anne's claim that Charles' marriage to Judith Valente enhanced his financial situation is dismissed, as Judith's income is allocated to her own expenses. Also, the changes in Charles' mortgage payments and Mary Anne's rental income do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances, especially given that the trial court found Charles' overall expenses had increased.

Mary Anne is no longer receiving $300 monthly from a lodger but benefits from higher interest after selling her marital residence for a profit. Both parties have seen an increase in their overall income and net worth since the original financial award, though Mary Anne claims her expenses have risen. She pays $500 monthly on her mortgage, exceeding the required $280, and struggles to save for retirement, as maintenance payments will end in 2013. Mary Anne contributes $1,116 to her 403(b) retirement account and $416 to her Roth IRA each month. Despite worsening health due to fibromyalgia, her medical expenses have not increased according to her financial affidavits from 2002 and 2006. The trial court found no error in assessing Mary Anne's increased expenses, determining that only necessary expenses should be considered for modifying maintenance payments. The court allowed the $280 mortgage payment and the 403(b) contribution but denied the additional $220 mortgage payment and the Roth IRA contribution. 

In dissent, Justice Myerscough argues that the trial court abused its discretion, asserting that Mary Anne demonstrated a significant change in circumstances. During the dissolution, the property division aimed to equalize income disparities, with Mary Anne receiving 52% of the marital property. Charles, her former spouse, has seen substantial income increases since the dissolution, with his financial obligations to their daughter Meghan now eliminated. The dissent highlights that the trial court's percentage-based comparison for maintenance modification lacks statutory support and unfairly disadvantages Mary Anne, who has only recently reentered the workforce at a lower salary. The dissent suggests a fair maintenance award should be significantly higher than the current amount.

The dissenting opinion critiques the majority’s reliance on a previous case (Reynard) regarding maintenance, highlighting the significant income disparity between the parties that has worsened over four years. The dissent notes that Charles received cost-of-living adjustments, which will continue annually, while Mary Anne is criticized for her more frugal financial decisions, such as mortgaging a smaller home and contributing to retirement accounts. In contrast, Charles's expenses for home repairs are viewed favorably, despite their significant impact on his financial situation.

The dissent argues that the majority misinterprets legal standards for modifying maintenance, incorrectly asserting that an increase in income alone does not justify such modifications. Cases cited (Plotz and Stone) support the notion that substantial changes in income and expenses should be considered. The dissent emphasizes that the trial court failed to apply relevant statutory factors under section 504 of the Dissolution Act, which include the income, needs, and earning capacity of both parties.

Additionally, it is noted that while Illinois law does not mandate equal income distribution in high-income cases, the needs of both parties should still be met. The opinion underscores that Mary Anne’s sacrifices during their marriage enabled Charles’s greater earning potential, and it is inequitable for him to retain the majority of their combined income post-dissolution. The dissent concludes that the trial court's decision should be reversed based on its failure to address these critical issues.