Lough v. BNSF Ry. Co.

Citations: 2013 IL App (3d) 120305; 988 N.E.2d 1090Docket: 3-12-0305

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 3, 2013; Illinois; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Summary judgment in favor of defendants BNSF Railway Company and Leo Joerger was upheld in a wrongful death case involving Charles Lough, the independent executor of Kenneth Lough's estate. The court found insufficient evidence to support Charles Lough's claim that the 2007 automobile accident exacerbated Kenneth's pre-existing health conditions, specifically congestive heart failure related to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and emphysema, which were cited as causes of death on his death certificate. The accident occurred on October 19, 2007, and Kenneth Lough passed away 22 months later. 

Kenneth had a history of severe health issues, including COPD, chronic pain, and depression, which were documented by his physician, Dr. Martin Faber. Kenneth's COPD had progressed significantly since its initial diagnosis in 1979, and he suffered from various ailments, including chronic neck and back pain, depression, and cognitive decline prior to the accident. Dr. Faber attributed Kenneth's health problems to a combination of factors, such as smoking and hereditary conditions. The court ruled that the absence of evidence linking the accident directly to Kenneth’s deteriorating health warranted the dismissal of the wrongful death claims. The circuit court's judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded.

Dr. Faber indicated that Kenneth's pre-existing health issues made him more vulnerable to injury, leading to increased pain and potential complications like pneumonia due to immobilization after the accident. Despite MRIs showing no acute injuries post-accident, Dr. Faber expressed difficulty in linking the October 19, 2007, accident to Kenneth's death, agreeing with defense counsel that there was likely no connection. Kenneth's son, Chuck, testified that Kenneth's quality of life declined after the accident, noting increased depression and hospitalizations for pneumonia. Dr. Ronald Kloc, a pain management specialist, identified degenerative conditions in Kenneth but could not definitively attribute his pain to either car accident, acknowledging age as a significant factor. Kloc confirmed the cause of death on the death certificate and stated that Kenneth's degenerative issues were not the cause of death. He could not quantify the impact of the 2007 accident on Kenneth’s condition. Lastly, an emergency room visit on April 14, 2008, revealed Kenneth had an irregular heart rhythm, but Dr. Rick Cernovich found no link between his symptoms and any prior car accident.

Kenneth died on August 11, 2009, from congestive heart failure, with COPD/emphysema listed as a contributing factor. No autopsy was performed. The plaintiff's complaint includes four counts: Counts I and II allege wrongful death under the Wrongful Death Act, while Counts III and IV involve negligence claims under the Survival Act. The defendants sought summary judgment on Counts I and II, asserting that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that their actions were a proximate cause of Kenneth's death. The trial court granted this motion and dismissed Counts I and II, citing no reason to delay enforcement or appeal as per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Counts III and IV remain pending.

The review of summary judgment orders is conducted de novo, guided by the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which mandates that summary judgment should only be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. To establish a wrongful death claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty, breached that duty, caused the death, and that damages resulted. Proximate cause requires that the defendant's negligence more likely than not caused the injury. Proximate cause encompasses both cause in fact and legal cause, with the former focusing on whether the defendant's actions were a material factor in the injury and the latter on foreseeability.

The plaintiff argues that this is an "eggshell" plaintiff case, suggesting the accident activated a dormant condition. However, the defendants counter that the plaintiff did not provide credible evidence linking the accident to Kenneth’s death, further supported by testimony from Kenneth’s physician stating that the accident did not contribute to his death.

Dr. Faber expressed difficulty in linking the October 19, 2007, motor vehicle accident to the patient’s death after 22 months, agreeing with defense counsel that it is more probable than not that no connection exists. Legal precedent establishes that recovery requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the event, with proximate cause needing to be established with a reasonable degree of certainty, not merely speculation or conjecture.

In Simon v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., the decedent's widow contested the insurance carrier's liability following her husband's death after a minor car accident. Witnesses reported the decedent exhibiting distress post-collision, with no visible trauma, and minimal vehicle damage. The decedent's death was attributed to acute coronary thrombosis, with Dr. Goldt, his physician, unable to definitively link the accident to the heart attack, stating it could have been caused by either the accident or the pre-existing hypertensive condition. 

Despite additional testimony from the decedent's wife and bystanders noting his good health prior to the accident, the trial court struck Dr. Goldt’s testimony as speculative and directed a verdict for the defendant. The appellate court affirmed this decision, concluding that without Dr. Goldt’s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to present the case to a jury, leaving them to speculate about the connection between the accident and the death.

Dr. Goldt's testimony indicated that trauma could potentially cause coronary issues, while Dr. Faber asserted there was no connection between the automobile accident and the decedent's death, stating it was "more probably true than not" that no connection existed. Dr. Kloc agreed with the death certificate's cause of death and did not offer alternative causes. The plaintiff argued for the 'eggshell plaintiff doctrine,' claiming that the accident activated a dormant condition leading to death but provided no supporting evidence. Citing People v. Amigon, the plaintiff attempted to draw parallels but the court found significant differences, noting that Amigon involved clear causation from a shooting leading to a medical condition that increased susceptibility to pneumonia, an element lacking in the current case. The court emphasized that there was no evidence linking the accident to the decedent’s congestive heart failure or COPD/emphysema. While the plaintiff referenced circumstantial evidence to establish causation, the court found that such evidence must show a higher likelihood than mere possibility, which was not met here. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on remaining counts.