Estate of Waldemar

Citation: Not availableDocket: 3-01-0217 Rel

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 20, 2002; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Brandy A. Eyrich appeals a Tazewell County circuit court judgment granting Grayboy Cycle Center, Inc. summary judgment on her negligent sale and entrustment claim. The court found no genuine issue of material fact and ruled that Grayboy was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The case arose from a motorcycle accident involving Cory L. Waldemar, who died, and Eyrich, who was injured while riding with him. Eyrich alleged that Grayboy was negligent in selling a motorcycle to Waldemar, claiming they knew or should have known he lacked a valid motorcycle license and was inadequately trained to operate it safely.

Grayboy argued there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding their knowledge of Waldemar's competency at the time of sale. The motion included deposition transcripts revealing Waldemar was 20, held a valid driver's license but lacked a motorcycle classification, and had prior experience with motorcycles. His mother did not express concern during the purchase. Grayboy's sales manager testified that Illinois law does not require verification of a motorcycle license for purchase. Eyrich contended that Waldemar's age, driving record, and lack of a motorcycle license created a genuine issue about Grayboy's awareness of the risks involved in selling to him. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Grayboy, prompting Eyrich to appeal. Appeals of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, meaning the appellate court considers the matter without regard to the trial court's conclusions. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An issue of fact must have legal significance regarding the controlling issue to be considered material. 

Eyrich's claim revolves around negligent entrustment, which occurs when a dangerous item is entrusted to someone known or reasonably believed to be likely to use it irresponsibly. While an automobile is not inherently dangerous, it can be if operated by someone unskilled. Eyrich argues that there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Grayboy knew or should have known that Waldemar was incompetent or reckless. Eyrich cites the case of Small v. St. Francis Hospital, which established that negligent entrustment can arise from selling a vehicle to someone deemed incompetent, such as a minor without a license.

However, in this case, Waldemar was 20 years old, possessed a valid driver's license, was employed, owned an insured car, and had prior motorcycle experience, presenting himself as a competent adult driver. The only negative information was a single speeding ticket, which did not sufficiently indicate recklessness. Furthermore, the court noted that a seller of a vehicle is not obligated to investigate a buyer's driving abilities unless there are clear indicators of incompetence. Eyrich's argument that Waldemar's lack of an M classification on his license suggested incompetence was rejected, as a missing motorcycle endorsement does not inherently imply negligence. Thus, Grayboy could not be deemed to have known or should have known that Waldemar would operate the motorcycle negligently.

Eyrich contends that Waldemar's poor driving record should have alerted Grayboy to the risk of negligent operation of a motorcycle. However, the evidence shows Waldemar only had one speeding ticket and one for tinted windows, leading to the conclusion that a 20-year-old with such minimal infractions does not inherently pose a risk. The court reviewed the record and found no evidence indicating that Grayboy should have known Waldemar would operate the motorcycle negligently, affirming the trial court's decision to grant Grayboy's motion for summary judgment.

In dissent, Justice Lytton argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding negligent entrustment. The dissent highlights that while the majority claims there are no relevant issues, the law recognizes a cause of action for negligent entrustment if a seller knows a buyer is unlicensed or incompetent. The dissent emphasizes that Waldemar's lack of a motorcycle license, while not direct evidence of negligence, is pertinent to Grayboy’s potential negligence in entrusting the motorcycle to him. The dissent cites precedent establishing that entrusting a vehicle to an unlicensed driver is akin to entrusting it to an incompetent driver. Evidence presented indicates Waldemar was unlicensed for motorcycles, and Grayboy had reason to know this, suggesting that genuine issues of material fact warrant a trial. Consequently, the dissent would reverse the majority's decision and remand the case.