Sneed v. Howell

Citation: Not availableDocket: 5-97-1066

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; August 26, 1999; Illinois; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

On August 26, 1999, the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the case of John C. Sneed, the independent administrator of Sandra Marie Sneed's estate, against defendants Billie E. Howell, the City of Mt. Vernon, and Jefferson County State's Attorney Gary Duncan. The initial complaint, filed on June 6, 1997, included 11 counts, alleging that Howell killed Sandra Sneed between July 4 and July 5, 1996. It charged Howell with wrongful death and survival claims, while the City faced negligence and willful and wanton negligence claims. Four corresponding counts were filed against the State's Attorney, and another count sought to compel the Sheriff to respond to discovery requests.

On November 19, 1997, the court dismissed all counts with prejudice except for two against Howell and two willful and wanton counts against the City. An amended order was issued on December 10, 1997, allowing for an appeal. An amended complaint was filed on December 8, 1997, which included two counts each against Howell and the City for willful and wanton negligence. The court dismissed the counts against the City with prejudice on March 16, 1998, leading to the consolidation of appeals after a notice was filed on March 23, 1998.

The facts revealed that Sandra and Howell were married in December 1991, divorced in August 1994, and that she sought an order of protection against him due to ongoing threats, which was granted on June 18, 1996. The order prohibited Howell from harassing or stalking her, as well as from entering her home or workplace. Multiple incidents of harassment were reported, including Howell slashing her tire and stalking her from a nearby restaurant. The fatal incident occurred on July 4, 1996, when Howell forcibly took Sandra from a tavern, shot her in the chest, and continued driving until she bled to death.

The original complaint against the Jefferson County State's Attorney included four counts alleging failure to act to protect the decedent, asserting that the State's Attorney, aware of Howell's actions and influenced by their friendship, willfully violated the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. A court order on November 19, 1997, dismissed all counts against the State's Attorney with prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the complaint accused the City’s police department of negligent inaction regarding Howell’s violations of a protection order, leading to the dismissal of two negligence claims with prejudice and allowing amendments for the willful and wanton claims. The amended complaint included two counts of willful and wanton conduct, which the trial court subsequently dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff is appealing the dismissals from both November 19, 1997, and March 16, 1998. The appellate court, conducting a de novo review under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, will assess the legal sufficiency of the complaints based solely on the allegations within the pleadings, presuming all well-pleaded facts as true. The November 19 dismissal of the State's Attorney's charges was based on the assertion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Illinois law allows for claims against the State to be heard exclusively in the Court of Claims, as established by the 1970 Illinois Constitution and the Court of Claims Act.

The enactment of the Court of Claims Act alongside the ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution reflects a legislative intent to formalize common law public official immunity, which protects state officials from personal liability while acting in the public interest. Public official immunity and sovereign immunity work together to safeguard the discretionary functions of state employees. Sovereign immunity limits the state’s liability to lawsuits according to its own terms, with the key issue being whether the state has an interest in the lawsuit based on the matters raised or the relief sought.

The Illinois Supreme Court established a three-part test to determine if the state is considered a party in a suit involving state employees: (1) no allegations that the employee acted beyond their authority; (2) the breach of duty does not solely concern the public but is linked to state employment; and (3) the actions in question fall within the employee's official duties, rendering the action nominally against the employee.

The classification of State's Attorneys as state or county employees is pivotal since it influences the applicable immunity laws. State's Attorneys, elected by county voters, could potentially fall under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act if deemed county officials. Historical context from the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention and the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Hoyne v. Danisch established that State’s Attorneys are classified as state employees under the 1870 Illinois Constitution. The Supreme Court further examined this classification in Ingemunson, considering whether State's Attorneys belong to the judicial or executive branches of government.

The 1970 Illinois Constitution classifies State's Attorneys as state officials, aligning with the principles established in the Hoyne case. The constitution's drafters recognized State's Attorneys as state employees, leading to the question of whether their actions fall within the scope of employment. The Court of Claims Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Claims unless a state employee exceeds their authority by violating laws or regulations. In this case, the plaintiff contends that the State's Attorney's inaction regarding Howell's stalking breached the Jefferson County domestic violence policy, thus allowing for a circuit court lawsuit. However, the court argues that the State's Attorney’s responsibilities stem from his position as a state employee and that he acted within his discretionary powers, including obtaining an order of protection and transferring the case to prevent conflicts of interest. 

Additionally, the 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished the sovereign immunity doctrine, delegating immunity authority to the State General Assembly. While the Court of Claims Act protects state employees acting within their employment scope, the Tort Immunity Act shields municipalities and their employees from liability for negligent duties, grounded in the public-duty doctrine. This doctrine aims to protect law enforcement from liability in performing their duties, with the special-duty doctrine serving as an exception to this immunity.

A party identified as having special needs can pursue claims against law enforcement if they negligently fail to perform their duties, as there is no immunity for such negligence. The plaintiff contends that an order of protection identified the decedent as someone requiring special police duty. However, the Tort Immunity Act and the public-duty doctrine do not apply here due to the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act, which addresses these matters specifically. 

In the case of Calloway v. Kinkelaar, the Illinois Supreme Court examined the application of the Domestic Violence Act concerning law enforcement's failure to protect domestic abuse victims. The plaintiff alleged that the sheriff and the county failed to protect her, leading to a four-count complaint for emotional distress, which included negligence and willful and wanton conduct. The trial court dismissed all counts, but the appellate court upheld the dismissal of negligence claims while reversing on the willful and wanton counts.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the Domestic Violence Act allows recovery for willful and wanton negligence in enforcing orders of protection. The case involved a plaintiff who obtained a protective order against her husband, who subsequently threatened her and eventually kidnapped her at gunpoint, leading to his suicide. The court noted the Domestic Violence Act's intent to promote proactive law enforcement intervention in domestic violence situations, recognizing the historical inadequacies in law enforcement responses to such incidents.

The Supreme Court articulated the Calloway rule, emphasizing the necessity of judicial acknowledgment of a civil right to damages under the Domestic Violence Act, contingent upon the injured party demonstrating their status as a protected person, breach of statutory duties by law enforcement through willful and wanton acts or omissions, and direct causation of injuries. The Domestic Violence Act defines protected persons as those abused by family or household members, and harassment includes disturbances at a victim's workplace and repeated unwanted communications. Law enforcement officers are mandated to arrest without a warrant if they have probable cause of a crime, including violations of protection orders, regardless of the offense's presence during their observation. However, liability for law enforcement is confined to willful and wanton conduct, with immunity granted for good faith actions taken in emergencies.

Willful and wanton conduct implies a deliberate intention to harm or a reckless disregard for safety. In this case, the decedent notified the police of multiple violations of her protection order by Howell, including vandalism and stalking, yet law enforcement failed to act. The court questioned whether this inaction constituted willful and wanton negligence, noting that while police discretion typically leads to simple negligence, the Domestic Violence Act imposes a clear obligation to respond to complaints. The amended complaint alleges sufficient facts suggesting potential willful and wanton conduct by the police due to their inaction despite repeated reports and corroborating evidence of harassment. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case for further proceedings.