Vosbein v. E.T. Simonds Construction Co.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 5-97-0220

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; April 8, 1998; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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In the appellate case Vosbein v. E.T. Simonds Construction Co., Patricia A. Vosbein, as the administrator of Shaun T. Parrott's estate, and Stephen Willis filed separate negligence lawsuits against E.T. Simonds Construction Company following an accident on Interstate 57 that resulted in Parrott's death and Willis's injuries. The plaintiffs claimed that Simonds, engaged in bridge reconstruction nearby, failed to exercise reasonable care by improperly storing cement barrier segments in the median at an angle that posed a danger to motorists. The trial court dismissed their complaints, ruling that they failed to establish a legal duty owed by Simonds. However, upon appeal, the appellate court reversed this decision, emphasizing that all pleadings should be interpreted favorably to the plaintiffs. The court clarified that the existence of a legal duty of care, essential for a negligence claim, is a question of law. It determined that Simonds did indeed owe a duty to the plaintiffs, given the circumstances of the case, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

In Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., the Illinois Supreme Court determined that an electric utility does not have a common law duty to ensure that utility poles will fall away from the roadway if struck by a vehicle leaving the traveled portion of the road. Liability for injuries from a collision with a utility pole hinges on the pole's proximity to the roadway, assessing whether it poses a danger to lawful road users. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the utility had a duty to install the pole in compliance with specific Illinois Commerce Commission rules, as those rules were not designed to prevent such injuries.

In Hoffman v. Vernon Township, the court upheld a summary judgment favoring the defendant after a plaintiff's car struck a utility pole located 27 feet from the road centerline. Key factors included the existence of a protective barrier, the pole’s distance from the road, and warning signs about road conditions. The ruling emphasized that the pole's placement was approved by the State Department of Transportation and noted no prior accidents indicated a dangerous condition.

The document argues that the design of interstate highways, which includes features like grassy medians and paved shoulders, reflects the expectation that vehicles may occasionally leave the traveled lanes. This design provides a safety margin against driver error, although certain conditions may necessitate the absence of such safety features, highlighting a balance between safety and practical considerations in road design.

The case lacks a thorough balancing of considerations necessary to impose a duty based on the alleged facts. For a section 2-619 motion, the facts presented by the plaintiffs must be accepted as true. The plaintiffs claim that placing barrier materials in the median of an Interstate Highway violates established engineering practices outlined by the American Association of State Highway Officials, which mandates unobstructed medians in certain terrains, with a width of at least 36 feet. If obstructions are necessary, they must be safeguarded by guardrails. The defendant acknowledges the truth of this policy for the appeal. Unlike previous cases, the plaintiffs assert that the barriers were improperly stored in the median without necessity or public benefit, as construction was allegedly complete at the time of the accident. Furthermore, if construction was still ongoing, the Illinois Department of Transportation had guidelines that required barriers to be stored safely behind guardrails, making compliance a duty for the defendant, E.T. Simonds Construction Co. Inc. Both the American Association of State Highway Officials and the Illinois Department of Transportation prohibit obstructing medians without necessary protections, indicating a foreseeable risk to drivers. Foreseeability is one factor in determining the imposition of a duty in legal cases.

In Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital, the court identified several factors relevant to establishing a duty of care: the likelihood of injury, the burden of preventing it, and the consequences of imposing that burden on the defendant. The case involved the deaths and injuries resulting from a vehicle colliding with concrete barriers placed in the median of a highway. The court found that the likelihood of serious injury was evident, especially at speeds near the highway's limit. The court concluded that the burden on the defendant to eliminate or guard against this hazard was minimal, as moving the barriers was necessary for the completion of the construction project. The court emphasized that, despite the typical low traffic in median areas, a reasonable expectation of danger existed in this case. The court imposed a duty of reasonable care on the defendant regarding the risk posed by the barriers. Additionally, the trier of fact could consider any contributory negligence on the plaintiffs' part in determining liability.

In dissent, Justice Welch argued that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to vehicle occupants in scenarios where vehicles leave a highway without an access point and strike barriers positioned far from the driving lane. The dissent highlighted that establishing a duty in negligence cases requires a legal obligation to act reasonably to protect the plaintiff, which involves factors beyond mere foreseeability, including the likelihood of injury and the implications of imposing a duty on the defendant. The dissent underscored that a legal duty cannot be based solely on the possibility of harm.

The legal standard established by the Illinois Supreme Court indicates that a party cannot be expected to guard against harms that are not reasonably anticipated. In this case, Simonds did not have a common law duty to protect the plaintiffs from the harm they experienced, drawing parallels to the Gouge case, which determined that electric utilities are not liable for injuries from collisions with utility poles unless the poles are dangerously close to the roadway. In Gouge, the court noted that the pole was situated 15 feet from the road, and it was not foreseeable that a driver would deviate from the roadway in a typical driving scenario. Similarly, in Hoffman, a utility pole located 27 feet from the roadway was deemed not to pose a foreseeable risk for deviation during normal travel. The ruling emphasizes that while it is conceivable that vehicles may leave the roadway, it must be reasonably foreseeable for a duty to exist. The analysis further references section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that liability arises when a person foreseeably deviates from the roadway in a typical manner, highlighting that deviations must be considered normal incidents of travel. The conclusion is that the plaintiffs’ vehicle deviation into the median was not reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances, thus negating the imposition of a duty on the defendant.

Deviating from the interstate highway into the grassy median and traveling 27 feet is not a typical travel incident and is not foreseeable by the defendant. It is unreasonable to expect that a vehicle would leave the highway to such a degree under ordinary circumstances. The determination of legal duty is based on the relationship between parties, which must impose an obligation for one to act in the protection of the other. In this case, the plaintiffs have not established such a relationship with the defendant that would necessitate a legal duty of care. Industry standards may indicate a standard of care but do not create the necessary relationship. Consequently, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a legal duty owed by the defendant through statute, contract, or common law, leading to a dissenting opinion.