In re H.D.B., Jr.

Citation: 301 Ill. App. 3d 234Docket: 4-97-0993

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; December 2, 1998; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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H.D.B. Jr., born January 8, 1981, appeals a delinquency adjudication for unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, resulting in commitment to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. The appeal raises two key issues: the voluntariness of H.D.B.'s first confession and whether his second confession should be considered inadmissible as a derivative of the first. The appellate court, led by Justice McCullough, finds merit in these arguments and reverses the original decision, remanding for a new trial.

The case arises from a search warrant executed on May 28, 1997, at a residence linked to a controlled buy of crack cocaine. University of Illinois police officer John Brown, part of the Drug Task Force, testified that after securing the scene, H.D.B. was found in the trailer and was handcuffed along with others present. About 20 minutes post-entry, Brown conversed with H.D.B. in a back bedroom, where H.D.B. disclosed selling crack cocaine from the location over the preceding week. The conversation lasted approximately three minutes, was calm, and no threats or promises were made. 

Before speaking with H.D.B., Brown had brief interactions with a woman claiming to be his mother, during which he stated no arrest decision had been made. H.D.B. did not request to see his mother during the incident. The total time from the execution of the search warrant to H.D.B. being transported to the police department was around 40 to 60 minutes.

Brown interacted with H.D.B. in the juvenile holding area approximately 15 to 20 minutes after H.D.B. arrived at around 6:20 p.m., during which H.D.B. was advised of his constitutional rights, with Brown ensuring H.D.B. comprehended each right. H.D.B. confirmed his understanding and exhibited a calm and cooperative demeanor. The meeting lasted 5 to 10 minutes, and although H.D.B.'s mother was present at the station, he did not request to see her, nor did she ask to see him. Following fingerprinting and photographing, H.D.B. was released to his mother around 7 p.m., after a total process duration of 45 minutes.

H.D.B., a 16-year-old, recounted an incident at 5 p.m. on May 28, 1997, when he was startled awake by loud noises, prompting him to hide in a bathtub. He encountered officers in ski masks who ordered him to the ground and was subsequently handcuffed. H.D.B. was moved to the front room as officers searched the mobile home, where his girlfriend Robertson and her one-year-old son were also present. Under pressure from officers who suggested Robertson would be jailed and her son taken by DCFS if he did not admit to drug involvement, H.D.B. felt compelled to confess, despite initially only discussing $150 he claimed was a loan from his aunt for school supplies. During this coercive interrogation, he experienced fear and anxiety, indicated by tears and shaking, and did not request to see his mother until after being fingerprinted and photographed.

H.D.B. was aware of the youth detention center process due to prior experiences and was attending school for a general equivalency diploma, demonstrating his ability to read and write well.

The trial court determined that H.D.B. and his mother did not request to see each other during the proceedings, and H.D.B. was aware of his rights against self-incrimination due to prior experiences with the legal system. The entire interaction, from the execution of the search warrant to H.D.B.'s release, lasted under two hours, with only a brief questioning in the bedroom and a quick follow-up at the police station. The court assessed that Officer Brown's inquiries regarding Robertson's involvement were not coercive, concluding that H.D.B. was not threatened or coerced into making statements. The motion to suppress evidence was denied, with the court emphasizing that such rulings are not reversed unless clearly erroneous, as assessing witness credibility is the trial court's responsibility.

Regarding Miranda rights, the court reiterated that these rights are triggered during custodial interrogation. Factors to determine if an interrogation is custodial include the time and location of questioning, police presence, and any formal arrest procedures. The State contended that H.D.B.'s statement in the bedroom was voluntary and did not require Miranda warnings; however, the court disagreed, noting that H.D.B. was in custody, made the statement in response to questioning, and was not informed of his rights beforehand. The court distinguished the cited cases from the State, asserting that Miranda warnings were necessary prior to the interrogation, leading to the conclusion that H.D.B.'s confession should have been suppressed.

The judgment of the trial court has been reversed due to unclear considerations regarding the weight given to the respondent's first confession in determining delinquency. The admissibility of the second confession is addressed for clarity on remand. It is stated that the first confession was not coerced, and its suppression does not necessitate the suppression of the second confession made at the police station. The trial court's assessment of confession admissibility is based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's age, education, intelligence, duration of questioning, awareness of constitutional rights, and any physical punishment experienced. 

The respondent was not arrested due to his statements made in a bedroom, as he was going to the police station based on prior officer knowledge. At the station, he understood his Miranda rights, and there was no evidence that his mother requested to see him, which the trial court found credible. 

The document discusses the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which applies to evidence obtained through constitutional violations but not merely violations of Miranda's prophylactic rules. If a confession is made prior to Miranda warnings, it is inadmissible, but a subsequent confession, after waiving rights, is permissible. The respondent's argument about coercion and the failure to allow mother-son communication is acknowledged as potentially violating the Juvenile Court Act, but it is emphasized that this does not render the first confession per se inadmissible; it is merely a factor in assessing voluntariness.

In People v. Hernandez, the court upheld the trial court's determination that H.D.B.'s statement made in the trailer was voluntary, given H.D.B.'s familiarity with the legal system, awareness of his mother's presence outside, and his choice not to speak with her before making the statement. Additionally, the court found that Brown’s actions did not constitute a threat to H.D.B. that would compel a confession. The only basis for excluding H.D.B.'s initial statement was the lack of Miranda warnings; had these warnings been provided, the confession would have been admissible. The court concluded that the second confession, along with evidence from the stipulated bench trial, was sufficient to establish H.D.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thus allowing for a retrial without infringing on his protection against double jeopardy. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial, with KNECHT, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J. concurring.