Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; September 24, 1998; Illinois; State Appellate Court
The case involves Samantha Villareal, representing her minor child Elamonzo Villareal, and defendant Juan Peebles, regarding the establishment of paternity and child support. After a bench trial, the court identified Peebles as the natural father and issued support orders. Villareal's complaint, filed on November 29, 1994, alleged that she and Peebles conceived Elamonzo through sexual intercourse in August 1986, leading to his birth on May 11, 1987. Blood tests conducted in April 1995, utilizing a restricted fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) protocol, yielded a combined paternity index (CPI) of 2,582 to 1, indicating a strong likelihood of paternity. Peebles challenged the blood test's admissibility under the Illinois Parentage Act, but the court deemed his challenge untimely and admitted the report as evidence.
Villareal testified about their relationship, including admissions of paternity from Peebles, while her sister confirmed seeing Peebles with a maroon Volvo, which Villareal stated he drove. In contrast, Peebles denied the allegations, asserting he only met Villareal on a few occasions and never had sexual relations with her. His sister also testified regarding the vehicle but denied allowing Peebles to drive it. An expert witness for Peebles critiqued the DNA testing protocol, arguing that the CPI should be significantly higher than 10,000 for reliability, thus questioning the significance of the 2,582 CPI in this case. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal.
On February 26, 1996, the court found the defendant to be the father, leading to a timely appeal by the defendant. The defendant filed a notice under Supreme Court Rule 19 on June 2, 1997, and the court permitted the Attorney General to intervene on July 10, 1997. The defendant's appeal raised three main arguments: (1) the unconstitutionality of section 11(f) of the Act (750 ILCS 45/11 (West 1994)); (2) a claim that the trial court incorrectly determined paternity after the defendant successfully rebutted the presumption established by section 11(f) of the Act; and (3) an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by not requiring the plaintiff to produce the examining physician despite contradicting expert evidence related to blood test results.
Section 11(f)(4) of the Act establishes a presumption of fatherhood if testing indicates a combined paternity index (CPI) of at least 500 to 1. The defendant argued that this presumption is unconstitutional because it considers a CPI of at least 500 to 1 as significant, irrespective of laboratory protocols. However, this argument was deemed waived as it was not raised in the trial court, and the defendant's prior constitutional challenge related to section 11(e) (750 ILCS 45/11(e) (West 1994)) concerning the right to confront witnesses differed from the CPI presumption issue.
The court highlighted that constitutional issues not presented at the trial level are considered waived and cannot be introduced on appeal, citing relevant case law. Additionally, the defendant did not follow the procedural requirements of Supreme Court Rule 19 for timely notice to the Attorney General regarding the constitutional challenge, which also resulted in waiver of the issue. While the defendant did provide notice, the court questioned whether it was done "promptly" after the constitutional question arose, which was determined to be when the court denied the motion to challenge the blood test admissibility on February 16, 1996. At that juncture, the defendant faced an imminent threat of harm from the enforcement of the statute, fulfilling the requirement for standing to challenge its constitutionality.
Application of section 11(f) of the Act could lead to a finding of paternity for the defendant, imposing financial obligations. As of February 16, 1996, the defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 11(f) and was required to notify the Attorney General of this challenge due to a circuit court ruling. However, the defendant failed to provide this notice until nearly 16 months later, which is considered a significant delay, thus waiving the constitutional argument.
The presumption of paternity under section 11(f)(4) is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. The defendant claimed to have met this burden through expert testimony, arguing that a higher CPI (10,000 to 1) should have been used instead of the statutory 500 to 1. The court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that the expert, Dr. Boon, did not provide scientific support for his claim and that the testing method used was generally accepted in the field. The trial court has discretion to evaluate expert evidence and is not obligated to accept a single expert's opinion.
In addition to Dr. Boon's testimony, the defendant's evidence to counter the paternity presumption included his own denial of sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and his sister's testimony about not knowing the plaintiff. However, these were insufficient to overcome the presumption of paternity, as the plaintiff's testimony remained valid despite the defendant's denials. The defendant was required to present more substantial evidence, such as genetic evidence, to rebut the presumption effectively.
The court determined that the evidence presented by the defendant was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity. The defendant's claims, including his denial of sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and supportive testimony from his sister, did not meet the clear and convincing standard required to challenge paternity. The court also addressed the defendant's argument regarding the trial court's decision not to summon the examining physician for testimony. Under Supreme Court Rule 215(d)(4), the court has discretion in such matters, and since the court had already heard relevant testimony from another expert, it was not deemed necessary to call the physician. The court noted that the defendant failed to challenge the validity of the blood test itself and that the calculated probability index (CPI) of 2,582 to 1 exceeded the statutory threshold, affirming the presumption of paternity. The defendant had options to contest the blood test results within a specific timeframe or to take a second test but chose not to pursue these avenues. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the finding of paternity against the defendant was upheld. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County was affirmed.
