People v. Marlow

Citation: Not availableDocket: 3-98-0090

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 17, 1999; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Jack L. Marlow pled guilty to four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, resulting in a total sentence of four consecutive 30-year terms for the assaults and a concurrent seven-year term for the abuse. On appeal, he contended that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because the trial court relied on psychiatric reports from a previously dismissed petition to declare him a sexually dangerous person. He also argued that his sentence was excessive.

Prior to his guilty plea, the State had filed a petition declaring him a sexually dangerous person, leading to evaluations by psychiatrists who diagnosed him with pedophilia. After his guilty plea, the State dismissed the petition, but at sentencing, the court considered the psychiatrists' reports, which described the defendant's manipulative behavior towards potential victims. The trial judge found the reports alarming and expressed concern that Marlow would reoffend if released.

On appeal, the court determined that Marlow had waived his right to contest the use of the psychiatric reports since he stipulated to their admission at sentencing and did not raise the issue during the trial or in post-sentencing motions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing with the State that the issue was not preserved for appeal.

Failure to object to alleged errors during sentencing and in post-sentencing motions typically results in waiver of those errors on appeal. The defendant contends that this case qualifies for the plain error rule, which allows appellate courts to recognize waived errors if the evidence is closely balanced or if the error deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. However, the court found that the evidence at the sentencing hearing was not closely balanced; rather, it was overwhelmingly against the defendant, who admitted to multiple sexual assaults against children and had a prior conviction for raping a child. There was also a significant lack of mitigating evidence.

Furthermore, the court determined that the admission of psychiatric evidence did not constitute a substantial error that would warrant application of the plain error doctrine, which is reserved for errors fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process. The defendant had not only failed to object to the psychiatric reports but had also stipulated to their content, indicating that any potential error could have been addressed by an objection. Therefore, the court concluded that the integrity of the judicial process did not require invocation of the plain error rule to allow the defendant to raise issues that could have been remedied at trial.

Illinois courts have consistently not found plain error in cases involving constitutional violations, such as a prosecutor commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence or failure to testify, which have been deemed not to constitute plain error. In similar cases, federal courts have also ruled that coerced statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights do not rise to plain error. Consequently, the defendant in this case waived the argument regarding the trial court's consideration of psychiatric reports by Dr. Chapman and Dr. Caterine during sentencing.

The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing four consecutive 30-year sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault against four children, asserting that the total 120-year sentence is excessive and does not allow for rehabilitation. However, it is established that a sentence within statutory limits will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, defined as a sentence that is manifestly unjust or palpably wrong. The trial judge is presumed to have considered all mitigating factors unless indicated otherwise, and it is the judge's role to balance these factors in sentencing. 

The trial judge weighed both aggravating and mitigating factors and deemed a severe sentence appropriate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant's lack of rehabilitative potential, as evidenced by a history of sexual assaults on children. The record supports that the sentence was not unjust or wrong. Therefore, the decision to impose four consecutive 30-year terms is affirmed.

Justice Slater dissents, arguing that plain error exists and calling for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge, asserting that the trial court improperly relied on potentially prejudicial information from the psychiatric reports obtained through compelled testimony.