People v. Perkins

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1-95-0218

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; September 30, 1997; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Defendant Umberto Perkins, a probational corrections officer at Cook County jail, was convicted in September 1994 of official misconduct and aiding an escape related to inmate Erdogan Kurap's escape in August 1992. He was sentenced to four years on each count, to run concurrently. Perkins appeals, claiming he deserves a new trial due to the State's use of perjured testimony from two eyewitness inmates, Edward Kmet and Michael Hamilton, who denied receiving favorable treatment for their testimony. The court finds merit in this claim and orders a new trial, not addressing Perkins' other arguments. 

At trial, evidence showed that Kurap was under investigation for drug offenses and had a $5 million cash bond. On the night of his escape, he interacted with Perkins, who failed to secure the area properly. Witnesses detailed Perkins opening cells and Kurap later exiting the facility in a correctional officer's uniform. Another officer noted unusual darkness in Perkins' wing, and multiple testimonies linked Perkins to Kurap's escape preparations, including delivering pizzas with a note from Kurap. The combination of this testimony and the alleged perjury led the court to conclude that a new trial is warranted.

Ozaksut testified that the defendant visited Milano's on August 13 at around 2:00 p.m., prior to business hours, inquiring about whether Kurap or his father had left anything for him. After being informed nothing was left and that the police had indicated Kurap was not missing, Ozaksut suggested the defendant inform the police of Kurap's escape, which the defendant declined, stating he did not want to "get involved." Telephone records revealed collect calls from Cook County jail to Akif's residence on August 10, followed by outgoing calls to the defendant's pager. The defendant was arrested on August 14, and after being read his rights, admitted in a police statement that he had been approached by inmates about assisting Kurap's escape for a reward of $50,000 to $100,000. He confirmed discussing this with Ozaksut at a pizza place and later received another call from someone claiming to be Kurap's girlfriend, who informed him that Kurap had escaped. The defendant did not report these conversations to his superiors. He was subsequently convicted of official misconduct and aiding an escape, receiving a concurrent four-year prison sentence for each count. The defendant argued that his due process rights were violated due to the State eliciting false testimony from witnesses Kmet and Hamilton, who denied receiving any favorable treatment for their cooperation. The State sought to demonstrate that neither witness had been promised leniency in exchange for their testimonies, which Kmet and Hamilton both denied, despite the defense's unsuccessful attempts to challenge their testimonies regarding any favorable treatment received.

A witness, Hamilton, was called by the State's Attorney and noted he had previously made contact with State's Attorneys in 1992, believing it was the right thing to do. During cross-examination, he acknowledged having served time in penitentiary twice and expressed a desire to be released but stated he was fulfilling his debt for a crime committed. When questioned about cooperating with the State to potentially reduce his sentence, Hamilton indicated he would be open to such offers but specified there were limits to what he would do.

Defense counsel challenged Hamilton's motivations, suggesting he was testifying against law enforcement to gain favors or reduce his sentence, which Hamilton denied. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed for supplemental discovery to obtain information on any benefits offered to inmates for testifying, but the State did not disclose relevant information regarding witnesses Kmet and Hamilton. The defense later presented evidence suggesting both witnesses provided false testimony, which the State allegedly knew about. Additionally, it was revealed that Kmet had previously been involved in plea negotiations that resulted in a significantly lighter sentence after cooperating with the State in the current case.

Evidence was presented indicating that Hamilton received leniency in sentencing for his cooperation in a criminal investigation against the defendant. Peter Vilkelis, Hamilton's attorney, testified that the State initially recommended over 20 years of imprisonment, which was later negotiated to 12 years after the trial judge was informed of Hamilton's cooperation. The State acknowledged these events but argued that there was no obligation to disclose this information to the jury, claiming that the trial judge independently decided on the sentence reductions without a formal request from the State. This argument was dismissed, as it was determined that the judge's decision was influenced by the information provided by the State regarding Hamilton's cooperation. The absence of a formal contract was deemed irrelevant because both witnesses, Hamilton and Kmet, were under oath and at risk of perjury for failing to uphold their agreement to testify against the defendant. Their testimonies regarding any favorable treatment were found to be misleading or false. The court emphasized that knowingly using perjured testimony to secure a conviction violates a defendant's due process rights, regardless of whether the State solicited the false evidence or allowed it to remain uncorrected. This principle holds true even if the false testimony pertains solely to a witness's credibility, as it can significantly influence the jury's assessment of guilt or innocence. The precedent set in People v. Olinger further illustrated the consequences of allowing misleading testimony to go unchallenged, highlighting the importance of witness credibility in criminal proceedings.

The Olinger court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to assess a potential violation of the defendant's due process rights. It established that misleading a jury about a witness's bias can result in such a violation, regardless of the literal truth of the witness's statements. In Olinger, while Stalder's testimony was technically accurate regarding the agreement with Whiteside County officials, the jury was not fully informed about the extent of his motives to testify, justifying the remand.

The current case presents a more severe issue; although the State claimed no promises of leniency were made to witnesses Kmet and Hamilton, the jury was not informed of their motives to fabricate testimony. While the State's assertions may be technically correct, both witnesses benefited from reduced sentences due to their cooperation, which was not disclosed to the jury or defense counsel. Previous cases underscore that the lack of a formal agreement does not negate the need for disclosure regarding leniency offered to witnesses.

The prosecution was aware of the leniency given to Kmet and Hamilton yet allowed misleading testimony to go uncorrected, which constitutes a due process violation. It is sufficient for any member of the prosecution to possess knowledge of false testimony for a violation to occur. Despite the State's claims to the contrary, it failed to adequately inform the jury of the witnesses' biases, only referencing their leniency in a single closing argument statement.

The prosecutor's rebuttal regarding Kmet and Hamilton's cooperation revealed inconsistencies that undermine the clarity of their sentencing leniency in exchange for testimony. The initial assertion that they received no breaks contradicts the later implication of favorable treatment, leaving the jury without a clear understanding of the witnesses' potential biases. The passage emphasizes that the prosecutor's ambiguous comments, made after the defense's cross-examination, failed to rectify the earlier lack of disclosure about the witnesses' motives. Citing previous case law, it highlights that a conviction based on perjured testimony must be overturned if there is any reasonable likelihood it influenced the jury's decision. Despite acknowledging other evidence of guilt, the court concludes the prosecution did not prove the evidence was overwhelming. Given the defense's efforts to expose the witnesses' biases and the reliance on their testimonies regarding the defendant's actions, the court finds a significant possibility that the false testimony impacted the verdict. Consequently, the court reverses the defendant's conviction and orders a new trial.