Smith v. Hendricks

Citations: 140 F. Supp. 3d 66; 92 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1643; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143437; 2015 WL 6406273Docket: Civil Action No. 2015-1226

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; October 22, 2015; Federal District Court

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Vicky Smith filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia Superior Court against Dr. Frederick Hendricks, Medical Faculty Associates, Inc., and Boston Scientific, claiming injuries from the 'Advantage Transvaginal Mid-Urethral sling system.' The case was removed to the federal court by Boston Scientific. Smith alleges medical malpractice against the Healthcare Provider Defendants and product liability against Boston Scientific. Currently, motions are pending regarding the remand of the case to Superior Court and the severance of claims.

The Court must determine its jurisdiction, specifically whether the citizenship of the Healthcare Provider Defendants can be disregarded due to allegations of fraudulent or improper joinder. The Court found that while the Healthcare Provider Defendants were not fraudulently joined, the claims against them were improperly joined with those against Boston Scientific. Consequently, the Court decided to sever the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, retaining jurisdiction over the claims against Boston Scientific.

The Court remanded the Healthcare Provider Defendants' motion to dismiss to the Superior Court for consideration, granted the motion to sever, and denied Smith's motion to remand the entire case. It also granted Boston Scientific’s request to stay proceedings pending transfer to the ongoing multi-district litigation in the Southern District of West Virginia.

The Court accepts the well-pleaded allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint as true but does not accept legal conclusions or unsupported inferences. The background focuses on relevant facts associated with the motions before the Court, including motions to sever claims and remand the case to the D.C. Superior Court, as well as a motion by Boston Scientific to stay proceedings pending transfer to MDL No. 2326. 

Boston Scientific manufactures the Advantage Transvaginal Mid-Urethral Sling System, designed for pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence. The FDA issued multiple health notifications regarding complications related to surgical mesh products, although no specific brands were named. Despite these notifications and numerous injury reports associated with Advantage implants, Boston Scientific continued to promote the product, claiming its reformed model, the Advantage Fit System, was safe, without disclosing adverse events on its website or promotional materials.

The Plaintiff alleges Boston Scientific was aware of the device's defects and failed to disclose related complications. After being referred to Medical Faculty Associates for urinary issues, the Plaintiff underwent surgery by Dr. Hendricks, who implanted the Advantage sling. The Plaintiff contends she was not adequately informed about the procedure or potential complications, having only received a simple consent form. Following surgery, the Plaintiff experienced severe abdominal pain and other complications, leading to further medical treatment and surgeries from various practitioners.

Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in the District of Columbia Superior Court on June 22, 2015, alleging medical complications following procedures performed by Dr. Frederick Hendricks, including the implantation of a Boston Scientific device. The claims against Dr. Hendricks include medical negligence (count I) and lack of informed consent (count II), with Medical Faculty Associates, where Dr. Hendricks is employed, also named as a defendant. Against Boston Scientific, the Plaintiff alleges negligent manufacture of a defective product (count III), breach of duty to warn (count IV), negligent product design (count V), multiple breaches of warranty (counts VI-VIII), fraudulent misrepresentation (count IX), and fraud by concealment (count XI). Additionally, the Plaintiff asserts violations of D.C. consumer protection statutes against both Dr. Hendricks and Boston Scientific (count X) and seeks punitive damages from all defendants (count XII). Boston Scientific filed a Notice of Removal on July 29, 2015, leading to pending motions before the Court.

The Court examines the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which requires that the parties be citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. For diversity actions involving multiple defendants, the Plaintiff must demonstrate diversity for each one, or risk dismissal. The Court emphasizes the strict construction of removal statutes, favoring remand in cases of ambiguity. The analysis will address whether Boston Scientific's removal complied with statutory requirements, particularly concerning the forum defendant rule and the necessity for consent from all properly joined defendants.

The Court considers the motion to dismiss by the Healthcare Provider Defendants and Boston Scientific's request to stay the action. The plaintiff contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to insufficient diversity among the parties. In contrast, Boston Scientific argues for jurisdiction by claiming that the citizenship of the Healthcare Provider Defendants can be ignored because they were misjoined. The Healthcare Provider Defendants assert that their claims should be severed and remanded to D.C. Superior Court due to improper joinder. All defendants maintain that, if joinder is deemed proper, the Court should exercise discretion under Rule 21 to sever the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants and remand those claims while retaining jurisdiction over Boston Scientific.

The standard for removability is based on the record at the time of removal, though some courts require complete diversity at the time of the original state court filing. The Court identifies no factual disputes regarding diversity jurisdiction; all parties are not diverse as both MFA and Dr. Hendricks are citizens of Washington, D.C., like the plaintiff. Boston Scientific is a citizen of Delaware and Massachusetts. If the citizenship of the Healthcare Provider Defendants is disregarded, diversity exists. The Court must determine whether to disregard their citizenship based on three potential justifications: fraudulent joinder, misjoinder, or exercising discretion to sever the claims. The Court notes that fraudulent joinder and misjoinder are distinct concepts requiring separate analyses.

Fraudulent joinder allows a court to ignore the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants for jurisdictional purposes, thereby maintaining jurisdiction by dismissing those defendants. The burden of proof lies with the removing party to demonstrate either that the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant or that the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts. In this case, the court found no evidence of fraudulent pleading, as the parties acknowledged that complete diversity was absent. Regarding the possibility of a successful cause of action against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, the court noted that the defendants did not clearly argue this point. They contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with a 90-day pre-suit notice requirement for medical malpractice claims, which can be waived at the discretion of trial courts. The court concluded that since a waiver could be granted in the interests of justice, there exists at least a possibility of the plaintiff succeeding in their claims against these defendants. Therefore, the court found the fraudulent joinder doctrine inapplicable and did not need to delve into the merits of the waiver arguments.

The Healthcare Provider Defendants' motion to dismiss claims under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act and for punitive damages does not negate other claims against them, as the Court finds no fraudulent joinder that would allow for the disregard of their citizenship. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, multiple defendants can be joined in an action if the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence and share common questions of law or fact. Misjoinder is not a basis for dismissal; courts can add or drop parties and sever claims as needed. The Healthcare Provider Defendants, supported by Boston Scientific, argue they were improperly joined, asserting that their claims do not arise from the same occurrences as those against Boston Scientific and lack common legal or factual questions. The Plaintiff counters by claiming that jurisdiction must be established before considering joinder and that both prongs of Rule 20(a)(2) are met. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends the claims are interconnected because the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Hendricks involved a device manufactured by Boston Scientific. However, the Court agrees with the Healthcare Provider Defendants, noting that the claims stem from distinct transactions: the Healthcare Provider Defendants relate to the treatment of the Plaintiff, while the claims against Boston Scientific concern the device's research, testing, and information disclosure. The Court concludes that the connection claimed by the Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements for joinder.

The Court determines that the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet the joinder requirements under Rule 20(a)(2). Specifically, the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, rooted in medical malpractice related to the Plaintiff's treatment, do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the products liability claims against Boston Scientific, which involve allegations of defectiveness and failure to disclose information about the Advantage system. The only overlapping claim is Count X, under D.C. consumer protection statutes, against both Dr. Hendricks and Boston Scientific, asserting insufficient information given to the Plaintiff for informed medical decisions. However, the distinct factual underpinnings of the claims against Boston Scientific (focused on the device's research and marketing) and those against the Healthcare Providers (related to the Plaintiff's treatment) reinforce the Court’s conclusion. Additionally, the punitive damages claim (Count XII) is improperly broad, as it only seeks damages from Boston Scientific, highlighting a lack of joint liability among the defendants. This aligns with precedent from other district courts indicating that joining medical malpractice claims with product liability claims is typically inappropriate due to the absence of common legal or factual questions arising from the same events.

In Hughes v. Sears, Roebuck Co., the court determined that product liability claims were improperly joined with medical malpractice claims, aligning with precedents such as Sutton v. Davol, Inc. and In re Guidant Corp. where similar findings were made. Conversely, in Stephens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, the court found that the claims were related. In the current case, the court concluded that the claims against Boston Scientific did not arise from the same transactions or occurrences as those against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, leading to a finding of improper joinder. Consequently, the court did not need to address the defendants' argument regarding the absence of common legal or factual questions.

Under Rule 21, the court has the authority to sever parties that are not indispensable, provided there is no prejudice to the involved parties. The court found no basis for the permissive joinder of the Healthcare Provider Defendants, determining they were not necessary parties per Rule 19. The court also ruled that their absence would not hinder complete relief for existing parties and would not risk imposing inconsistent obligations on any party. The plaintiff did not demonstrate any prejudice from severing and remanding the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants to the D.C. Superior Court while continuing the case against Boston Scientific in federal court.

Thus, the court severed the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants and remanded them to D.C. Superior Court, while retaining jurisdiction over the claims against Boston Scientific due to complete diversity, as the misjoined parties' citizenship could be disregarded. The court confirmed its subject matter jurisdiction based on the misjoinder of the Healthcare Provider Defendants and did not need to consider severing claims solely to preserve jurisdiction.

The court has determined it has diversity jurisdiction over claims against Boston Scientific, following the severance and remand of claims against Healthcare Provider Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The plaintiff contends that Boston Scientific did not comply with removal statutes. However, since the Healthcare Provider Defendants were found not to be properly joined, the court concludes that the forum defendant rule, which prohibits removal if any properly joined defendant is a citizen of the state where the action is brought, does not apply. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that removal was procedurally improper due to a lack of consent from the Healthcare Provider Defendants. The court notes that all properly joined and served defendants must consent to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). Importantly, the court recognizes that the forum defendant rule is largely viewed as nonjurisdictional, aligning with the majority view among circuit courts. Thus, Boston Scientific is found to have complied with the requirements for removal.

The Plaintiff's assertion regarding the requirement for consent under the relevant statutory provision is flawed since it applies only to parties that have been properly joined and served. The Court concluded that the Healthcare Provider Defendants were not properly joined, making the consent requirement inapplicable and affirming that the Notice of Removal was both substantively and procedurally proper. Consequently, the Court maintains jurisdiction over the claims against Boston Scientific and rejects the Plaintiff's arguments for remanding all claims to the D.C. Superior Court.

The Court's interpretation aligns with precedents concerning the consent requirement, specifically noting that in cases of improper or fraudulent joinder, requiring consent from such parties would be illogical. Generally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), all defendants must consent to removal unless they are nominal, unknown, or fraudulently joined, but this applies only to defendants that are properly joined and served.

While some courts have addressed the exception for fraudulently joined parties, the Court acknowledges a lack of explicit rulings on the exception for improperly joined parties. Based on the authority from other jurisdictions recognizing this exception, the Court concludes that consent from improperly joined parties is not mandated by the statute.

Regarding procedural matters, the Healthcare Provider Defendants requested that their motion to dismiss be considered before their motion to sever and remand. The Court disagrees, asserting that it must first resolve the motion to sever and remand to establish its jurisdiction. Therefore, the arguments for dismissal were only considered in the context of the fraudulent joinder claims. Since the Court found no fraudulent joinder, it determined that severing the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants and remanding them to the D.C. Superior Court is necessary before addressing their motion to dismiss, which will be held in abeyance.

The Court addresses Boston Scientific’s Motion to Stay all Proceedings pending a decision by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) regarding the transfer of this action to MDL No. 2326 in the Southern District of West Virginia. The JPML issued Conditional Transfer Order CTO-149 on August 4, 2015, which would transfer this action; however, the order has been stayed due to the Healthcare Provider Defendants filing a Notice of Opposition and a motion to vacate the order, which remains pending before the Panel with a hearing scheduled for December 3, 2015. Boston Scientific opposes this motion to vacate. The Court previously determined not to stay the briefing on various motions in the case, but now, having resolved those motions by severing and remanding claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, concludes that a stay is appropriate regarding claims against Boston Scientific. The Court emphasizes the need for judicial efficiency and recognizes that similar cases against Boston Scientific are pending in MDL 2326. Therefore, the Court decides to postpone consideration of claims against Boston Scientific and the commencement of discovery until the JPML resolves the Motion to Vacate, noting that the resolution of jurisdictional issues makes a stay proper. The Court anticipates prompt resolution by the Panel, especially as the only pending Motion to Vacate is from the Healthcare Provider Defendants, who will likely have no grounds to object once their claims are remanded.

The Healthcare Provider Defendants' Motion to Sever and Remand indicated that transferring claims against Boston Scientific to ongoing multi-district litigation would facilitate a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution. The Court anticipates that claims against Boston Scientific will be transferred to the Southern District of West Virginia following the resolution of pending motions, noting that the Plaintiff failed to timely object to the Motion to Vacate. Consequently, the Court will stay this action while awaiting the Panel's decision on the Conditional Transfer Order. 

In conclusion, the Court holds in abeyance and remands the Healthcare Provider Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the Superior Court for determination, grants their Motion to Sever and Remand claims to D.C. Superior Court, and denies the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the case back to the D.C. Superior Court. The Court severs the claims against the Healthcare Provider Defendants, remanding them, and grants Boston Scientific’s Motion to Stay all proceedings pending transfer to MDL No. 2326, thereby staying the action until further notice. An accompanying Order is issued.