Sylvia S. Romo, Bexar County Tax Assessor - Collector v. Cavender Toyota, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-10-00199-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 20, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Sylvia S. Romo, Bexar County Tax Assessor-Collector, appealed a trial court's denial of her plea to the jurisdiction regarding a lawsuit filed by Cavender Toyota, Inc. The appellate court addressed Romo's claim of governmental immunity from the suit. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Cavender's lawsuit. 

The background involved Rogelio Sanchez, who purchased a Mazda that had a lien from National Auto Finance Company (NAFC), but this lien was not noted on the title issued by Romo. Sanchez later traded the Mazda at Cavender Toyota when purchasing a Toyota Tundra, presenting a lien-free title. Cavender subsequently sold the Mazda to Cynthia Steubs, who later discovered the lien and returned the vehicle, prompting Cavender to refund Steubs and pay NAFC for a clear title. 

Cavender sued Romo for breaching the Texas Certificate of Title Act, claiming damages of $23,388.74 due to Romo's failure to note the lien. Romo argued that Cavender did not sufficiently plead a waiver of her governmental immunity, which led to her plea to dismiss the action. Cavender contended that the Texas Transportation Code section 501.137 waived Romo’s immunity by holding her liable for not complying with the Certificate of Title Act. The trial court's denial of Romo's plea was ultimately deemed erroneous by the appellate court.

Governmental immunity shields political subdivisions such as counties, cities, and school districts from lawsuits seeking damages, consisting of two elements: immunity from suit, which prevents lawsuits unless explicitly permitted by the Legislature, and immunity from liability, which protects entities even if a lawsuit is allowed. Immunity from suit is jurisdictional, depriving courts of the authority to hear cases, while immunity from liability serves as an affirmative defense.

A plea to the jurisdiction is a procedural challenge questioning a court's authority over the subject matter, placing the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate the court's jurisdiction. Determining subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question reviewed de novo, focusing only on pleadings and relevant evidence without addressing case merits. 

In this appeal, the court must decide if the Legislature waived Romo’s immunity from suit through section 501.137 of the Transportation Code. Waivers of immunity must be stated in clear and unambiguous language. Courts typically recognize legislative intent to waive immunity when such explicit language is present, but its absence complicates the determination. The Texas Supreme Court employs several aids to assess statutes for implied consent to suit, including interpreting ambiguous provisions in favor of retaining immunity and evaluating whether the statute serves a purpose without a waiver. The statute in question lacks the standard language indicating a waiver of immunity, which is acknowledged by both parties.

Sovereign immunity to suit is waived only to the extent necessary for garnishment actions and within the limits of liability created by specific provisions of the Texas Government Code. Courts may utilize certain aids established by the Supreme Court to determine legislative consent to suit but are not mandated to do so. Upon analyzing section 501.137, it is concluded that it does not waive Romo’s immunity from suit. The statute’s language, which states that county assessor-collectors must comply with the chapter and are liable for damages from non-compliance, does not unambiguously waive immunity. The use of terms like "assumes liability" does not indicate a waiver of governmental immunity as the Legislature intended for such waivers to be clear and unambiguous. The mere mention of "damages" does not imply a waiver of immunity from suit, as supported by previous case law. Ambiguities in the statute are resolved in favor of retaining immunity, and the absence of a requirement for governmental entities to be joined in lawsuits further indicates the Legislature's intent not to waive immunity. Additionally, there is no express limitation on the government’s liability to the amount of the assessor-collector’s bond in the statute.

An elected or appointed county assessor-collector must provide bonds to both the state and county before starting their duties, ensuring faithful performance (TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 6.28). The bond to the county is set at 10% of the previous year’s total county taxes, capped at $100,000. Cavender incorrectly relies on Keller v. Judd and Doyle v. Harben to argue for liability, as those cases did not address legislative intent regarding government immunity under the relevant statute. Romo argues that applying section 501.137 as suggested by Cavender could lead to unlimited damage awards, necessitating a new bond if the original is depleted, with no provision to limit subsequent liability. The conclusion drawn is that the absence of such limitations indicates no waiver of immunity was intended by the Legislature. Cavender claims that interpreting section 501.137 as not waiving immunity would make other provisions, such as sections 501.030(f) and 501.106, meaningless. However, it is argued that these provisions still serve their purpose within the framework of Chapter 501 of the Certificate of Title Act, which aims to protect governmental interests in tax revenues and fees collected.

The official bond mentioned in section 501.137 can be a state or county bond and is accessible to a governmental entity that has not received its tax share from an assessor-collector. This statute provides a framework for liability even without a waiver of immunity. It has been determined that section 501.137 does not waive Romo’s immunity from suit. Cavender claims that immunity is inapplicable as the suit targets a governmental official for not performing a ministerial act, attempting to classify the case as an ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity. However, the action is fundamentally a claim for monetary damages, which is prohibited by immunity, supported by precedent (City of El Paso v. Heinrich). Furthermore, the Certificate of Title Act aims to protect the public and prevent fraud, not endorse it. Although Sanchez defrauded Cavender, Cavender is pursuing damages solely from Romo, which does not align with the Act's intent. The court concludes that Cavender's interpretation of the statute is untenable, resulting in the reversal of the trial court’s denial of Romo’s plea to the jurisdiction and instructing dismissal of Cavender’s suit.