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in Re: Dallas National Insurance Company
Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-09-00674-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 17, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Justice Yañez dissents from the majority opinion regarding the case involving Dallas National Insurance Company. He agrees that the trial court has a ministerial duty to rule on Dallas National's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, and acknowledges that the court has failed to do so. However, he contests the majority's view that a delay in ruling is justified due to a potentially related case in another court, which has not been definitively linked to the trial court's delay. Yañez emphasizes that the trial court has abused its discretion by not ruling on Dallas National's motions for an unreasonable three-year period. To determine if there has been an abuse of discretion, it is necessary to establish that the trial court had a legal duty to rule, was requested to do so, and failed to act. A trial court is deemed to have acted with clear abuse of discretion if it does not rule on a pending motion within a reasonable timeframe, which varies by circumstance. The dissent notes that while the opposing party, Garcia, mentioned a separate lawsuit involving Alfaro, he did not provide evidence that this pending case justified the trial court’s delay or that it governed the current motions. Yañez points out that the burden to establish the right to mandamus relief lies with Dallas National, yet Garcia failed to make a compelling argument regarding the relevance of the Alfaro case. Reasonableness of the delay is assessed based on factors such as the trial court's knowledge of the motion, refusal to act, docket status, and other pressing judicial matters. The dissent asserts that the majority's rationale relies on speculation about the trial court's motives rather than concrete evidence of a justified delay. The trial court indicated during a March 6, 2007 hearing that the current case should be coordinated with the Alfaros' suit, suggesting the cases might be consolidated. However, the hearing ended with the court's intention to consult with another judge to resolve the issue. Three years later, Dallas National has yet to receive a ruling. Past cases cited demonstrate that appellate courts have found trial courts abused their discretion for delays in ruling, including a thirteen-month delay in City of Galveston v. Gray, an eighteen-month delay in In re Ramirez, and a nineteen-month delay in a similar case involving arbitration. These precedents imply a pattern of unacceptable delays. Given that three years have passed since Dallas National's hearing and multiple requests for a ruling have gone unanswered, it is concluded that the trial court has also abused its discretion here. While the appellate court acknowledges its jurisdiction to compel some action from the trial court, it cannot dictate the specific outcome. Therefore, the dissenting opinion advocates for a conditional grant of Dallas National's petition for writ of mandamus due to the unreasonable delay in ruling on its plea and motion.