Flanzo Lafont Townes v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-10-00796-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 14, 2012; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Falanzo Townes was found guilty of murdering Conrad Chapman, receiving a thirty-year prison sentence. Key evidence presented during the trial included testimony from a taxi driver who described picking up Chapman and a woman, Rose Marie Wood, taking them to a motel after several stops. Wood testified they used crack cocaine in the motel room for about an hour before leaving to search for more drugs. They interacted with Daniela "Tiger" Lama and her mother, Dionetta "Happy" Lama, during this time. 

Tiger later returned to the motel with Chapman, but after he exhibited erratic behavior, she called her mother for a ride. Happy, who recognized Townes from a previous drug transaction, arrived at the motel and saw Townes approach the room. After knocking and demanding to see her daughter, Townes allegedly kicked the door. Tiger eventually managed to leave the room, but Wood remained inside. 

Wood later described hearing a struggle, gunshots, and Chapman's pleas for money before witnessing him being shot by Townes. After the incident, she hid under the bed until it was quiet and then informed the motel manager to call the police. The jury's verdict was affirmed by the court.

The trial court invoked the Rule, which prohibits witnesses from discussing the case among themselves, on the first day of trial, but neither Wood nor Happy were present in the courtroom that day. The court later instructed them about the Rule on the day of their testimony. The appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding Wood’s testimony and striking Happy’s testimony due to a violation of the Rule. The State contended that the appellant waived this issue by moving to admit a DVD recording of Wood’s prior police statement, which contained similar evidence to her testimony.

The Rule aims to prevent witness testimony from influencing one another and requires that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom during each other's testimony. However, the court has discretion to allow testimony from a witness who has violated the Rule. The presumption on appeal is that the trial court properly exercised this discretion unless proven otherwise.

During the trial, both Happy and Wood were in police custody for unrelated charges. They were placed in the same holding cell and admitted to discussing the case. Happy heard Wood mention seeking "closure" regarding a friend's death, and they confirmed discussing their respective involvement in the case. The defense moved to strike Happy’s testimony and prevent Wood from testifying based on this violation. The trial court denied the motion.

To determine if the violation harmed the appellant, it needed to be shown that 1) the witnesses conferred, and 2) the testimony contradicted or corroborated that of another witness. Although Happy had heard the Rule instructions, it was concluded that the Rule was violated because they discussed the case without court permission. The court retains discretion to exclude testimony from a witness who technically violates the Rule, regardless of whether the witness was formally placed under it.

The first prong of the harm test was satisfied as Wood and Happy conferred after the invocation of the Rule regarding witness communication. Under the second prong, their testimonies were consistent with prior statements made before the Rule was violated, indicating no harm. Wood informed the investigating detective that only she, the appellant, and Chapman were in the motel room at the time of the shooting, and Happy consistently testified she was not in the room. Happy’s cross-examination did not introduce new information that could affect the testimony. The brief conversation between Wood and Happy did not influence their statements, as they had already provided similar accounts before the violation. Thus, it was determined that the second prong was not met, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not err in admitting their testimonies, as there was no evidence of harm or prejudice to the appellant. The appeal was overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.