Sebastian Willie Mejia v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-08-00365-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 25, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Sebastian Willie Mejia was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine, weighing between four grams and less than 200 grams, with intent to deliver, classified as a first-degree felony. The jury, having found that he used a firearm during the offense, sentenced him to life imprisonment and imposed a $10,000 fine. Mejia raised four issues on appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed the cocaine, had the intent to deliver, and used a firearm in the commission of the crime. He also contended that his sentence was cruel, unusual, and disproportionate.

During the trial, evidence presented by the State included testimonies from law enforcement officers who stopped Mejia's vehicle for excessive window tint. Upon approaching the car, the officers detected a strong odor of marijuana. A search revealed that Mejia had a digital scale and plastic baggies in his pocket, which tested positive for cocaine. Additionally, two loaded semi-automatic handguns were found in the vehicle, along with a bag containing cocaine and a wallet with marijuana and cash. The cocaine found weighed approximately 4.18 to 4.19 grams. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Mejia's claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the severity of the sentence.

Officer Torres reported that firearms, a black makeup bag containing cocaine, and a wallet were within arm's reach of all occupants in the vehicle. He discovered compacted marijuana in the center console and a plastic bottle of Mannitol, which is often mixed with cocaine for sale. None of the occupants claimed ownership of the firearms or drugs. Torres noted that the small plastic baggies and scale found on Mejia suggested an intent to distribute cocaine. Officer Smith corroborated that Mannitol and digital scales are typically associated with drug sales. On cross-examination, Torres acknowledged the legality of possessing Mannitol and that its bottle lid did not test positive for cocaine. He also mentioned that the firearms were partially concealed and not easily visible from the driver’s seat, although the makeup bag was clearly within view.

During booking, Mejia allegedly instructed Vasquez to claim ownership of the drugs and firearms, as he and Perez had criminal records, while Vasquez did not. Officers Castillo, Kolar, and Stillwell testified about Mejia's comments urging Vasquez to "take the rap" for the items. In defense, Vasquez and Perez testified that they had traveled to Corpus Christi and that Vasquez had purchased the cocaine at a strip club, placing it in her makeup bag. Vasquez claimed she had bought the guns for safety reasons and stated they were never displayed or removed from a CD case. She admitted to pleading guilty to related charges, asserting that it was her cocaine and no coercion influenced her plea. However, she did not recall whether Mejia had asked her to take the blame for the drugs and firearms. Vasquez also acknowledged a prior conviction for making a false report to law enforcement.

Vasquez testified she had owned the firearms for only a few days, purchasing a .25 caliber Titan from someone in Corpus Christi, but could not recall details about the 9mm firearm. She lacked knowledge about the guns, including how many bullets they could hold, how to load them, and the location of their safety switches. She confirmed that she had not been romantically involved with Mejia since July 2007 and had no prior experience or training with firearms before buying them.

Perez testified he owned the blue Grand Am driven by Mejia during a police stop and was unaware of Vasquez buying cocaine the previous night. He acknowledged ownership of a digital scale found in Mejia's pocket and marihuana discovered in the vehicle but claimed ignorance of the cocaine's presence until police revealed it. Vasquez informed officers that the guns and drugs belonged to her. On cross-examination, Perez noted he had not previously mentioned the scale being used to weigh the cocaine because it had not been asked.

Following the evidence, the jury convicted Mejia of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Mejia challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the finding that he used a firearm during the offense. The standards of review for legal sufficiency require an appellate court to assess whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, while factual sufficiency involves a neutral review of evidence to determine if the verdict is clearly wrong or unjust. Mejia specifically argues that the evidence fails to establish that he knowingly possessed the cocaine found in the vehicle.

To establish possession of a controlled substance, the State must demonstrate that the accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the substance and (2) was aware of their connection to it and knew what it was. If the accused does not have exclusive possession of the location where the contraband is found, additional independent facts are required to link them to the possession. Factors that can establish this "affirmative link" include whether the contraband was in plain view, the accused's ownership or control of the premises or vehicle, presence of cash, proximity to the contraband, a strong odor, possession of related paraphernalia, recent consumption, evasive conduct, and conflicting statements from occupants. There is no definitive formula for establishing this link; rather, it is assessed based on the logical force of the evidence on a case-by-case basis.

In the case of Mejia, the argument that evidence was insufficient to prove knowing possession of cocaine was rejected. Convenient access to the contraband, indicative of knowledge and control, was a key factor. Mejia was driving a vehicle where cocaine was found in a zipped black makeup bag, which was accessible in the backseat.

Officer Torres described Mejia's vehicle as a small one, with a black makeup bag containing cocaine easily visible and within Mejia's arm's reach. Officer Smith noted that Mejia could have quickly transferred the contraband to another person inside the vehicle, and Officer Torres confirmed there was sufficient time to conceal the items before the officers approached. This evidence indicates the cocaine was conveniently accessible to Mejia. Relevant case law supports that a driver's presence in a vehicle containing contraband establishes an affirmative link to that contraband.

Additionally, Mejia was found with a digital scale and small bags in his pocket, with traces of cocaine on the scale, further linking him to the cocaine. A rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mejia had actual care, custody, control, or management of the cocaine and was aware of its presence.

Mejia contested the sufficiency of the evidence by citing that another individual claimed ownership of the scale and another identified the cocaine as hers. However, the jury holds the authority to assess witness credibility and may disregard conflicting testimonies. Mejia's challenge regarding the reliability of the presumptive test for cocaine residue was waived since he did not object during Officer Smith's testimony. After reviewing the evidence neutrally, the court found it sufficient to support the jury's verdict regarding Mejia's possession of the cocaine.

Regarding the intent to deliver, the State must demonstrate that an accused intended to transfer controlled substances. Intent can be established through circumstantial evidence, including possession. The court considers various factors in determining intent, though specific factors were not fully elaborated in the excerpt.

Key factors influencing the determination of intent to deliver drugs include the location of arrest, quantity of contraband, packaging methods, presence of drug paraphernalia, possession of cash, and the accused's drug user status. In Mejia's case, he possessed approximately 4.18 grams of cocaine, a digital scale, small plastic baggies, Mannitol, and loaded semi-automatic handguns, indicating a potential intent to distribute. Officer Torres provided insights into the evidence suggesting distribution, including the use of plastic baggies for packaging and Mannitol as a cutting agent. Testimony from multiple officers affirmed that digital scales and Mannitol are associated with drug distribution. Additionally, Mejia's actions at the jail, instructing Vasquez to take the blame, further supported the inference of intent to deliver. The jury found sufficient evidence to establish this intent, and any contradictory testimony from Perez and Vasquez was within the jury's discretion to discredit.

Regarding the use of a deadly weapon, the court assessed whether the firearm met the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, was used during the felony, and posed a danger to others. A firearm is classified as a deadly weapon per se, and its possession can constitute use if it facilitates the felony. The ruling concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support both the intent to deliver cocaine and the use of a deadly weapon in relation to Mejia's offenses.

The jury found that the defendant, Mejia, used a firearm while committing the offense of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, based on evidence of a loaded semi-automatic handgun discovered in the vehicle. The Houston Court of Appeals supported this finding, noting that the presence of both the firearm and cocaine was likely not coincidental, and that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury's decision. In Mejia's case, two loaded handguns were found under a jacket in the backseat, with bullets in the chambers and additional ammunition nearby. The cocaine was located in a makeup bag on the backseat, and there was testimony indicating that the amount of cocaine was significant, along with items such as a digital scale and packaging materials found in Mejia's possession, suggesting intent to distribute.

Contradictory evidence from a witness claiming ownership of the guns and Mejia's ignorance of their presence was deemed less credible by the jury, which could reasonably infer that the firearms were intended to protect the cocaine. Thus, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's deadly weapon finding. 

Regarding Mejia's fourth issue, he contended that his life sentence was disproportionate and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive sentences but does not require strict proportionality. It only forbids sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime, applicable in rare cases. Texas courts maintain that as long as a sentence falls within legislative guidelines, it is not considered excessive or cruel. Overall, the court overruled Mejia's issues concerning the deadly weapon finding and the constitutionality of his sentence.

In Trevino v. State, the court evaluated the proportionality of Mejia's sentence, which fell within the statutory range for his first-degree felony conviction of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver. Despite this, Texas law permits scrutiny for grossly disproportionate sentences under the Eighth Amendment. The court referenced the tests established in Solem and McGruder, which analyze the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty.

1. **Gravity of the Offense**: The evidence indicated Mejia knowingly possessed a significant quantity of cocaine, and two loaded semi-automatic firearms were found within his reach. Additionally, Mejia had a prior felony conviction for aggravated robbery involving a deadly weapon, and he admitted to committing two other violent offenses.

2. **Harshness of the Penalty**: The punishment for Mejia's crime could range from five years to life imprisonment, reflecting the seriousness of the offense. Given the nature of the crime, Mejia's prior convictions, and the jury's deadly weapon finding, the court determined that a life sentence was not excessive.

The court noted the lack of comparative sentencing data for similar crimes, which limited the ability to conduct a thorough Solem analysis. Ultimately, the court concluded that Mejia's sentence was neither grossly disproportionate nor cruel and unusual, affirming the trial court's judgment. The Chief Justice, Rogelio Valdez, delivered the ruling, which was filed on March 25, 2010.