in Re: Dallas National Insurance Company

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-09-00674-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 17, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Dallas National Insurance Company filed a motion for rehearing regarding its petition for writ of mandamus on April 6, 2010, following a previous opinion issued on March 17, 2010. The Court of Appeals requested responses from real parties in interest, Vega Roofing, Inc. and Jose E. Garcia, which were not submitted by the deadline. Upon reviewing Dallas National's motion, the Court granted the rehearing, vacated the prior opinion, and issued a new opinion.

The case involves a dispute over insurance coverage for Jose Amparo Alfaro, an employee of Vega Roofing, who was injured on February 23, 2005, while working on a job for Garcia. Vega had a workers’ compensation and employer’s liability policy with Dallas National effective from June 20, 2004, to June 20, 2005, and a commercial general liability policy with First Mercury Insurance Company covering a different time frame. Vega claimed Alfaro's injury occurred during the coverage period of the Dallas National policy, but Dallas National denied the claim, asserting that no valid policy existed. Consequently, Vega sued Dallas National for breach of contract and declaratory relief on April 11, 2006.

Garcia later intervened in the suit, alleging he was a third-party beneficiary of the policy and also sought damages against Dallas National. Alfaro and his wife intervened as well, attributing liability to Vega, the Monday defendants, and possibly Garcia. Dallas National's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss were filed on January 3, 2007, but the trial court had not ruled on them, prompting the mandamus action. The Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to act on Dallas National’s plea and motion, resulting in the conditional granting of the writ.

Dallas National contended that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission exclusively addresses coverage under its policy on the injury date. A hearing on this plea occurred on March 6, 2007, but the trial court did not issue a ruling. Dallas National followed up with three letters requesting an order from July 2007 to October 2009. Subsequently, Dallas National filed a petition for writ of mandamus on December 16, 2009, after the trial court's inaction. Vega asserted that the trial court had jurisdiction as the case involved a breach of contract, while Garcia argued that the claims were not within the Texas Workers’ Compensation Division's jurisdiction, criticized Dallas National's delay in seeking a ruling, and claimed that Dallas National waived its right to complain by not objecting. Garcia also pointed out that the related Alfaro non-subscriber lawsuit had proceeded with minimal interference. Dallas National responded to Vega and Garcia's arguments but did not address the status of the Alfaro lawsuit. The majority concluded that Dallas National failed to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief due to this omission. However, in a motion for rehearing, Dallas National revealed that the Alfaro lawsuit had settled in February 2009, and that Vega and Garcia were non-suited in November 2008. Mandamus relief is described as an extraordinary remedy granted only when there is a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate legal remedy, requiring the relator to show both the absence of an adequate remedy and that the action sought is ministerial rather than discretionary.

A relator seeking mandamus relief must establish three requirements: (1) the district court had a legal duty to perform a non-discretionary act; (2) the relator requested the performance of that act; and (3) the court failed or refused to perform it. The requesting party bears the burden of providing a sufficient record to support their claim. A properly filed motion before the trial court is considered a ministerial act, and mandamus can compel the court to act, although the court is allowed a reasonable time to perform its duty. Failure to rule on a pending motion within a reasonable timeframe is regarded as a clear abuse of discretion, with the determination of what constitutes a reasonable time dependent on the specifics of each case. Factors influencing this assessment include the trial court's knowledge of the motion, its refusal to act, the state of the court's docket, and other judicial responsibilities. The inherent power of a trial court to manage its docket is discretionary, and appellate courts cannot interfere arbitrarily. In the case at hand, it is acknowledged that Dallas National's plea and motion were properly filed, and while there is disagreement regarding the trial court's ministerial duty to rule favorably, the appellate court cannot dictate how the trial court should rule.

A trial court has a ministerial duty to rule on motions, and it cannot be directed on how to rule before making a decision. Dallas National's petition asserts that a reasonable time has lapsed for the court to rule on its plea and motion, supported by three letters sent to the court requesting a ruling, dated July 12, 2007, December 17, 2007, and October 7, 2009. The letters included proposed orders for the court to sign, indicating that Dallas National sought a ruling which the court failed to provide. Garcia, in response, claims that Dallas National waived its complaint by not objecting to the court's inaction, citing a precedent where failure to obtain a ruling and subsequent objection led to error preservation issues. However, the current case differs because Dallas National established that the court had a legal obligation to perform a non-discretionary act, was requested to do so, and refused. The record shows over three years have passed since the last hearing on the matter, despite Dallas National's multiple requests for a ruling. This prolonged inaction constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court, as supported by similar cases where extended delays in ruling were deemed unreasonable.

A trial court's failure to rule on a motion for default judgment for fifteen months was deemed an abuse of discretion. Consequently, Dallas National was found entitled to mandamus relief to compel the trial court to address its plea and motion. However, the court clarified that it cannot direct the trial court on how to rule regarding those matters and does not express an opinion on their merits. The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted, with the writ to be issued only if the trial court does not act. Dallas National's motion for temporary relief was denied as moot.