Antonio Aviles v. State

Citations: 385 S.W.3d 110; 2012 WL 4373509; 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8069Docket: 04-11-00877-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 26, 2012; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Antonio Aviles was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence related to his blood specimen. Aviles argued that his arrest was unwarranted and that the blood sample was obtained without consent and without a warrant. The trial court's judgment was affirmed. 

During the suppression hearing, Officer Joe Rios provided testimony regarding the circumstances of Aviles's arrest on June 2, 2011. Rios observed Aviles driving erratically, leading him to conduct a traffic stop. Upon interaction, Rios noted Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Aviles failed three standardized field sobriety tests, which further supported Rios's suspicion of intoxication.

Upon discovering Aviles had two prior DWI convictions, Rios requested a breath or blood specimen, adhering to Texas Transportation Code section 724.012, which mandates blood draws under certain conditions, including prior DWI convictions. After Aviles refused to provide a specimen, Rios proceeded with a blood draw at a nurse's facility, completing the necessary documentation. The blood was drawn by registered nurse Elizabeth Arguello, who confirmed proper procedures were followed in collecting and securing the sample. 

Rios acknowledged that his patrol vehicle lacked video recording capabilities, but confirmed that Aviles did not resist arrest. The court found the evidence admissible and upheld the conviction.

Arguello described the procedures for drawing Aviles's blood post-arrest, acknowledging a lack of direct recollection and relying on her written affidavit. The trial court denied Aviles’s motion to suppress, leading him to plead nolo contendere to driving while intoxicated, resulting in a two-year confinement sentence. Aviles appeals, arguing the denial of suppression was erroneous due to: (1) his warrantless arrest, (2) blood sample collection without consent or a warrant, and (3) evidence admission violating his constitutional rights under the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The appeal's review follows a bifurcated standard: factual determinations by the trial court receive deference, while legal applications are reviewed de novo. Implied findings supporting the trial court’s ruling are acknowledged if evidence justifies them. The trial judge assesses witness credibility and testimony weight. A ruling on suppression will stand if any valid legal theory supports it, even if not explicitly cited by the trial court. 

Aviles did not address Texas Transportation Code section 724.012, relevant to the blood draw after his DWI arrest, nor did he challenge the statute's constitutionality, which could result in waiving constitutional claims. Regarding the warrantless arrest, Aviles must first rebut the presumption of lawful police conduct by showing lack of a warrant, shifting the burden to the State to prove the reasonableness of the arrest under total circumstances. It is acknowledged that Aviles was arrested without a warrant, placing the onus on the State to justify the arrest’s legality. Determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure is a legal question subject to de novo review.

Law enforcement officers are permitted to stop and briefly detain individuals suspected of criminal activity based on reasonable suspicion, which is a lower standard than probable cause for arrest. Reasonable suspicion must be founded on specific, articulable facts relevant to the officer's experience. The assessment of whether suspicion is reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances. In this case, Officer Rios observed Aviles driving erratically at 2:20 AM, which established reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Aviles's driving constituted a traffic violation under Texas law, further justifying the stop.

Upon approaching Aviles, Officer Rios noted signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Aviles's unsteadiness when exiting the vehicle and his performance on three field sobriety tests provided additional evidence of intoxication. The totality of these circumstances led to a conclusion that Officer Rios had probable cause to arrest Aviles for driving while intoxicated, consistent with established legal precedents.

Regarding the blood draw, the withdrawal of a blood specimen is classified as a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches. Such actions without a warrant are generally deemed unreasonable unless an exception applies. Aviles argued that the trial court incorrectly admitted his blood specimen into evidence, asserting it was taken without consent and without a warrant.

Aviles contends that, without consent, a blood sample from a defendant in custody necessitates a warrant, citing Texas case law and Article 18.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the cases he references (Davis and McBride) are not applicable because they involve different offenses (murder and sexual assault), while Aviles’s case pertains to driving while intoxicated (DWI), governed by Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. This code allows for implied consent for blood samples from suspected intoxicated drivers, even without a warrant, as established in Beeman v. State.

Under the Texas Transportation Code, individuals arrested for DWI are deemed to consent to blood or breath tests, although they may refuse, resulting in an automatic license suspension. If a suspect has two prior DWI convictions, as in Aviles's case, an officer may mandate a blood draw without consent. Officer Rios had credible information from his mobile laptop about Aviles's prior convictions and required a blood sample after Aviles refused a breath test.

The court determined that the warrantless blood draw complied with the Transportation Code and did not violate Aviles's Fourth Amendment rights. Aviles's argument regarding the possibility of obtaining a warrant was deemed irrelevant. He also claims his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when his blood evidence was admitted, but this point was not adequately addressed in his brief, leading to its waiver. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Aviles’s motion to suppress the blood evidence was upheld, affirming the judgment based on the lawful authority granted by the Texas Transportation Code.